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ENTER AT YOUR OWN RISK: 
CRIMINALIZING ASYLUM-SEEKERS 
Thomas M. McDonnell* and Vanessa H. Merton** 
ABSTRACT 
In nearly three years in office, President Donald J. Trump’s 
war against immigrants and the foreign-born seems only to have 
intensified. Through a series of Executive Branch actions and policies 
rather than legislation, the Trump Administration has targeted 
immigrants and visitors from Muslim-majority countries, imposed 
quotas on and drastically reduced the independence of Immigration 
Court Judges, cut the number of refugees admitted by more than 80%, 
cancelled DACA (Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals), and 
stationed Immigration Customs and Enforcement (“ICE”) agents at 
state courtrooms to arrest unauthorized immigrants, intimidating 
them from participating as witnesses and litigants. Although initially 
saying that only unauthorized immigrants convicted of serious crimes 
would be prioritized for deportation, the Trump Administration has 
implicitly given ICE officers carte blanche to arrest unauthorized 
immigrants anytime, anywhere, creating a climate of fear in 
immigrant communities.  
Particularly disturbing is the targeting of asylum-seekers, 
employing the criminal justice system and the illegal entry statute in 
the “zero tolerance policy.” Under this policy, children, including 
toddlers, are seized and languish for months and years separate from 
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their families, many of whom are seeking asylum. Directly contrary to 
federal statute and international law, another policy makes anyone 
who enters the country without inspection ineligible for asylum. 
Kirstjen Nielsen, Trump’s second Secretary of the Department of 
Homeland Security (“DHS”), ordered asylum applicants to await the 
lengthy processing of their claims in cartel-ruled border areas of 
Mexico, with no realistic safe shelter and deprived of all meaningful 
opportunity to exercise their statutorily-guaranteed right to access to 
counsel—a necessity, given today’s convoluted asylum law.  
Trump’s first Attorney General, Jefferson Sessions, largely 
disqualified as grounds for asylum even the most brutal and terroristic 
persecution of women and violence perpetrated by inescapable quasi-
state gang actors. Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”) officers 
mislead asylum-seekers at the southern border, telling them they don’t 
have the right to apply for asylum or saying yes, they may apply, but 
admitting only a minute fraction of those who present themselves for 
processing at ports of entry. President Trump’s Administration refuses 
to grant parole or reasonable bond even to those asylum-seekers who 
establish a credible fear of persecution, frequently resulting in long-
term detention, and forcing on detained asylum-seekers the Hobson’s 
choice of lengthy incarceration in terrible conditions in the United 
States or the risks of persecution and death in their countries of origin.  
International law prohibits using the criminal justice system 
or prolonged administrative detention to deter and discourage bona 
fide asylum-seekers from asserting and proving their claims. We 
suggest two remedies: Federal courts should enforce article 31 of the 
1951 Refugee Convention (1) by prohibiting criminal charges of 
unlawful entry against bona fide asylum-seekers until they complete 
the asylum application process and are denied asylum; and (2) by 
requiring parole or reasonable bond for asylum-seekers who pass fair 
credible fear interviews. The article argues that bona fide asylum-
seekers should be kept in detention only for a short period, if at all, to 
determine whether they have a credible fear of persecution.  
Article 31 of the Refugee Convention, made binding on the 
United States through our accession to the 1967 Refugee Protocol, 
generally prohibits “impos[ing] penalties, on account of their illegal 
entry or presence, on refugees . . . where their life or freedom was 
threatened.” “Penalties” clearly must include not only criminal 
prosecution and prison, but also prolonged immigration detention and 
the seizure of children from parents without good cause, for 
“deterrence” purposes. We argue also that customary international law 
and human rights treaties support the recommended remedies and 
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stand squarely against the Trump Administration’s policies. Federal 
courts may utilize customary international law directly or through the 
Charming Betsy canon. 
Not only do the Trump Administration’s harsh immigration 
policies and practices violate international law and American values, 
but also foretell a government tending toward exclusion, racism, 
nationalism, parochialism, authoritarianism, and disregard of the rule 
of law. The parallels between the Trump Administration and 
Hungary’s autocratic, essentially one-party, state, are chilling. See 
Patrick Kingsley, He Used to Call Victor Orban an Ally. Now He Calls 
Him a Symbol of Fascism, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 15, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/15/world/europe/viktor-orban-
hungary-ivanyi.html (on file with the Columbia Human Rights Law 
Review). 
Federal courts, however, have both the authority and the 
responsibility to enforce the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967 
Refugee Protocol as well as international human rights norms to 
protect asylum-seekers from criminal prosecution and from prolonged 
detention. The Framers of the United States Constitution and its key 
amendments envisioned that federal courts would apply treaties as the 
rule of decision to protect foreigners and would serve as a check upon 
an Executive that tramples on individual rights, particularly the rights 
of a vulnerable minority. Given the outlandish behavior of this 
Administration, federal courts must live up to that vision. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Led by authoritarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, Hungary 
has virtually closed its border to asylum-seekers from Syria, Sudan, 
and other countries. The few who are admitted to Hungarian “transit 
zones” generally are denied asylum and are given only three days to 
appeal, which they must do themselves in written Hungarian without 
a lawyer.1 In June 2018, the Hungarian Parliament enacted a statute 
making it a criminal offense punishable by up to one year in prison for 
any person to “‘enable[] illegal immigration . . .’ defined 
[as] . . . helping asylum-seekers who are ‘not eligible for 
protection. . . .’ includ[ing] [prohibiting any person from] ‘border 
monitoring,’ producing and disseminating information [about the 
asylum process], or ‘network building.’”2 
In November 2018, U.N. inspectors went to Hungary to ensure 
that its immigration centers met international standards. The 
Hungarian government refused them access. Mr. Orbán also refused to 
comply with the European Union’s order to admit 2,000 refugees as 
part of Hungary’s obligation as an EU member. 3  An imposing 
Hungarian-built barbed wire fence, reinforced with drones and heat 
sensors, traverses the entire border between Hungry and Serbia. The 
state-controlled Hungarian media refers to immigrants, including 
 
1.  See Elisabeth Zerofsky, Viktor Orbán’s Far-Right Vision for Europe, NEW 
YORKER (Jan. 14, 2019), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2019/01/14/ 
viktor-orbans-far-right-vision-for-europe [https://perma.cc/9JHL-C9HS]. 
2.  Hungary: Bill Makes Aiding Migrants a Crime, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH 
(May 31, 2018), https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/05/31/hungary-bill-makes-aiding-
migrants-crime [https://perma.cc/K468-XUG4] (“[I]f committed ‘regularly,’ or with 
the aim of ‘help[ing] several persons,’ the offense would be considered aggravated.”). 
(second alteration in original); see also Patrick Kingsley, Hungary Criminalizes 
Aiding Illegal Immigrants, N.Y. TIMES (June 20, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2018/06/20/world/europe/hungary-stop-soros-law.html (on file with the Columbia 
Human Rights Law Review) (discussing statute criminalizing aid to undocumented 
migrants). 
3.  James Kanter, E.U. Countries Must Accept Their Share of Migrants, Court 
Rules, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 6, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/06/world/ 
europe/eu-migrants-hungary-slovakia.html (on file with the Columbia Human 
Rights Law Review); European Court of Justice Press Release No 91/17, Judgment 
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asylum-seekers, as undesirables and criminals. 4  The Parliament, 
dominated by Orbán’s Fidesz party, enacted a statute to detain 
asylum-seekers, including children, during the entire course of the 
asylum procedure.5 
Aside from its anti-immigration policies, the Fidesz party 
pushed through a new constitution, gerrymandered election districts, 
virtually eliminated the independent judiciary, took over the state 
media, and enabled large portions of the private media to be “bought 
up by pro-Orbán oligarchs.”6 These disturbing policies have effectively 
made Hungary a one-party state 7  and an example of new 
authoritarianism in Europe.8 
Hungary is not the only government to use criminal law and 
prolonged detention against the foreign-born. United States President 
 
4.  A young immigrant girl came home from her Hungarian public school, 
crying because a banner had been displayed in her school, saying, “No Refugees.” 
See Zerofsky, supra note 1; see also Zach Beauchamp, It Happened There: How 
Democracy Died in Hungary, VOX (Sept. 13, 2018), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-
politics/2018/9/13/17823488/hungary-democracy-authoritarianism-trump [https:// 
perma.cc/VJB5-655H] (describing how Orbán and Fidesz used anti-democratic 
tactics to consolidate power). 
5.  See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 2. 
6.  Hungary’s Viktor Orban Condemns EU ‘Blackmail’, Vows to Block Illegal 
Migrants, FRANCE 24 (Nov. 9, 2018), https://www.france24.com/en/20180911-
hungary-viktor-orban-european-union-migrants-corruption-media-soros [https:// 
perma.cc/KP4F-7X5S]. 
7.  See Zack Beauchamp, Hungary’s Leader Is Waging War on Democracy. 
Today, He’s at the White House, VOX (May 13, 2019), https://www.vox.com/policy-
and-politics/2019/5/13/18564378/donald-trump-viktor-orban-white-house-visit-
2019 [https://perma.cc/HJ6L-RAGS] (providing a step-by-step description of how 
Orbán and Fidesz rapidly transformed Hungary from a strong democracy into an 
avowedly “illiberal,” “Christian” autocracy, and describing implications of President 
Trump’s and the Republican Party’s adoption of similar systematic tactics and 
enthusiastic endorsement of Orbán). The European Parliament has imposed 
sanctions on Hungary “for flouting EU rules on democracy, civil rights and 
corruption.” Alistair MacDonald, EU Parliament Pushes Hungary Sanctions over 
Orban Policies, REUTERS (Sept. 12, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-eu-
hungary/eu-parliament-pushes-hungary-sanctions-over-orban-policies-idUSKCN 
1LS1QS [https://perma.cc/9G39-4RB9]. 
8 .  See The Situation in Hungary, Resolution on Proposal Calling on the 
Council to Determine, Pursuant to Article 7(1) of the Treaty on European Union, 
the Existence of a Clear Risk of a Serious Breach by Hungary of the Values on which 
the Union is Founded, EUR. PARL. DOC. P8_TA(2018)0340 (2018), http://www. 
europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-8-2018-0340_EN.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
EPF3-WFQ2]. Notably, Orban was the first world leader to publicly support Mr. 
Trump’s 2016 Presidential Campaign see also Kingsley, supra note 2. 
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Donald J. Trump has likewise demonized immigrants.9 Although all 
reliable studies demonstrate that immigrants commit fewer crimes per 
capita than native-born American citizens and many studies indicate 
 
9.  See Susan F. Martin, Trump’s Asylum Policy Is Eerily Similar to America’s 
During the Holocaust, FORTUNE (June 19, 2018), https://fortune.com/2018/06/19/ 
refugees-asylum-seekers-separation-families-children-border-holocaust/ [https:// 
perma.cc/P2Z9-P9VE]. It is not hyperbole to state that from the moment of his 
inauguration, the Trump Administration has metaphorically gone to war against 
immigrants, both lawful and undocumented. See, e.g., Bob Hennelly, What if 
Trump’s War on Immigrants Is Not Just Cruel and Lawless But Is a Dead End for 
the Economy?, SALON (Apr. 14, 2019), https://www.salon.com/2019/04/14/what-if-
trumps-war-on-immigrants-is-not-just-cruel-and-lawless-but-is-a-dead-end-for-
the-economy/ [https://perma.cc/WU3D-WBDY] (explaining the economic impacts of 
reducing immigration); Matt Ford, Trump’s War on the Rule of Law Is Reaching the 
Breaking Point, NEW REPUBLIC (Apr. 9, 2019), https://newrepublic.com/article/ 
153536/trumps-war-rule-law-reaching-breaking-point [https://perma.cc/4WUD-
Q2ZP] (“There’s a disturbing cycle to Donald Trump’s war on immigrants.”); Chas 
Danner, The Long-Term Damage of Trump’s War on Immigrants, NEW YORKER 
(Apr. 7, 2019), http://tiny.cc/bmj85y [https://perma.cc/GL35-8SPH]; Masha Gessen, 
Trump’s New War on Immigrants, NEW YORKER (Aug. 10, 2018), 
https://www.newyorker.com/news/our-columnists/trumps-new-war-on-immigrants 
[https://perma.cc/5J8P-PYDH] Juan Escalante, 2018 Was The Year Donald Trump 
Declared Total War on Immigrants, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 26, 2018), 
http://tiny.cc/5pj85y [https://perma.cc/XT7A-FJBL]. For an overview of how and 
why Trump can use his executive authority to wage this war, see Kimberly J. 
Winbush, Annotation, Issuance of Presidential Executive Orders Concerning 
Immigration or Immigrants, 25 A.L.R. Fed. 3d Art. 2 (2017). 
A necessarily incomplete list of this Administration’s attacks on immigrants, 
compiled by co-author Vanessa Merton, is appended as “The Trump 
Administration’s Policies and Practices Toward Asylum Applicants and Refugees” 
and will be posted at a URL available by email to vmerton@law.pace.edu. It is 
difficult to keep it up to date, because almost every week new policies are 
promulgated (often in violation of Administrative Procedure Act requirements) that 
are designed to make it more difficult and expensive to apply for any type of lawful 
entry or status, to get accurate and timely decisions on those applications, and to 
appeal or challenge incorrect decisions. See infra passim. The American 
Immigration Lawyers Association (AILA), a membership organization joined by 
most expert immigration lawyers who represent immigrants, has found an artful 
metaphor for the massive policy changes under this Administration: the “Invisible 
Wall.” See AM. IMMIGRATION LAWYERS ASS’N, DECONSTRUCTING THE INVISIBLE 
WALL: HOW POLICY CHANGES BY THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION ARE SLOWING AND 
RESTRICTING LEGAL ADMINISTRATION (Mar. 19, 2018); see also Featured Issue: 
Changes in USCIS Policy Under the Trump Administration, AM. IMMIGRATION 
LAWYERS ASS’N (Sept. 2020, 2019), https://www.aila.org/advo-
media/issues/all/featured-issue-changes-in-uscis-policy-under [https://perma.cc/ 
62HY-ZMSL] (collection of news articles about changes in U.S. Citizenship and 
Immigration Services policy). 
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that immigrants significantly help the economy, 10  the Trump 
campaign portrayed immigrants as largely criminal, labelling Mexican 
 
10.  See the recent review of decades of academic expert studies issued by the 
highly conservative Cato Institute, which found “All immigrants have a lower 
criminal incarceration rate and there are lower crime rates in the neighborhoods 
where they live, according to the near-unanimous findings of the peer-reviewed 
evidence. . . . Illegal immigrant incarceration rates are about half those of native-
born Americans in 2017. In the same year, legal immigrant incarceration rates are 
then again half those of illegal immigrants. . . . crime along the Mexican border is 
much lower than in the rest of the country, homicide rates in Mexican states 
bordering the United States are not correlated with homicide rates here, El 
Paso’s border fence did not lower crime, Texas criminal conviction rates remain low 
(but not as low) when recidivism is factored in, and that police clearance rates 
are not lower in states with many illegal immigrants—which means that they don’t 
escape conviction by leaving the country after committing crimes. . . . [H]igher 
illegal immigrant populations [are correlated with] large and significantly 
associated reductions in drug arrests, drug overdose deaths, and DUI arrests with 
no significant relationship between increased illegal immigration and DUI deaths.” 
Alex Nowrasteh, Illegal Immigrants and Crime—Assessing the Evidence, CATO 
INST.: CATO AT LIBERTY (Mar. 4, 2019), https://www.cato.org/blog/illegal-
immigrants-crime-assessing-evidence [https://perma.cc/76JV-GHLW]; The Effects 
of Immigration on the United States’ Economy, PENN WHARTON BUDGET MODEL 
(June 27, 2016), https://budgetmodel.wharton.upenn.edu/issues/2016/1/27/the-
effects-of-immigration-on-the-united-states-economy [https://perma.cc/7XMM-
DT5W] (finding immigration does not slow wage growth for native-born workers); 
Gretchen Frazee, 4 Myths About How Immigrants Affect the Economy, PBS NEWS 
HOUR (Nov. 2, 2018), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/economy/making-sense/4-
myths-about-how-immigrants-affect-the-u-s-economy [https://perma.cc/AH9G-
2P3Q] (refuting misconceptions about economic impacts of immigration); Ryan 
Nunn, Jimmy O’Donnell & Jay Shambaugh, Economic Facts: A Dozen Facts About 
Immigration, THE HAMILTON PROJECT (Oct. 9, 2018), https://www.hamiltonproject. 
org/papers/a_dozen_facts_about_immigration [https://perma.cc/6369-MX4T] 
(noting output in U.S. economy is higher and grows faster with more immigrants; 
small impact of immigration on low-skilled native-born wages; and immigration to 
the United States does not increase crime rate); Alexia Fernández Campbell, These 
Immigrants Contribute $4.6 Billion in Taxes. Trump’s Trying to Strip Their Legal 
Status, VOX (Apr. 17, 2019), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-
politics/2019/4/17/18411975/tps-immigrants-pay-billions-in-taxes [https://perma. 
cc/SXE7-24H3] (demonstrating that President Trump is trying to terminate 
Temporary Protected Status (TPS) for thousands of immigrants who pay taxes, 
mortgages, rents, and contribute to the economy); Nina Roberts, Undocumented 
Immigrants Quietly Pay Billions into Social Security and Receive No Benefits, 
AMERICAN PUBLIC MEDIA: MARKETPLACE (Jan. 28, 2019), https://www.market 
place.org/2019/01/28/undocumented-immigrants-quietly-pay-billions-social-
security-and-receive-no/ [https://perma.cc/YLS9-YKZ7] (noting that in one year, 
undocumented immigrants contributed $13 billion to Social Security and $3 billion 
to Medicare). 
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immigrants as “rapists.”11 As President, Mr. Trump has continued to 
highlight immigrant crime all out of proportion to reality.12 
Mr. Trump appointed as his first Attorney General the most 
conservative and anti-immigrant sitting Senator, Jefferson Sessions.13 
Mr. Sessions, and his anti-immigration counterparts the Secretaries of 
State and Homeland Security, pressured if not ordered the 
Departments of State, Justice, Homeland Security—and their 
subsidiary agencies, including Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”), 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”), and the Executive 
Office of Immigration Review, which includes the Board of 
Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) and Immigration Court Judges  
(“IJs”)—to harshly enforce immigration laws.14 At times, these laws 
 
11.  Anthony Rivas, Trump’s Language About Mexican Immigrants under 
Scrutiny in Wake of El Paso Shooting, ABC NEWS (Aug. 4, 2019), https://abcnews. 
go.com/US/trumps-language-mexican-immigrants-scrutiny-wake-el-paso/story? 
id=64768566 [https://perma.cc/47XF-9FPR]. 
12.  See Lomi Kriel, Trump Presses Border Crisis in McAllen, but Reality Is 
Different, HOUSTON CHRONICLE (Jan. 10, 2019), https://www.houstonchronicle. 
com/news/houston-texas/houston/article/Trump-presses-border-crisis-in-McAllen-
but-13525102.php [https://perma.cc/F5D8-MUMG] (noting that, contrary to 
President Trump’s rhetoric, official sources report that majority of drugs, criminals, 
and suspected terrorists entering United States arrive by air or through ports of 
entry; the current wave of family migrants seek out U.S. officials to surrender and 
seek asylum, rather than evade capture); IntelBrief: Terrorism in the West: 
Comparing the Threat in Europe and the U.S., SOUFAN CENTER (Jan. 9, 2019), 
https://thesoufancenter.org/intelbrief-terrorism-in-the-west-comparing-the-threat-
in-europe-and-the-u-s/ [https://perma.cc/6S62-EJF3] (finding in 2018 just one death 
in the United States as result of jihadi-linked terrorism, while native-born right-
wing terrorists killed fifteen Americans; terrorism threat in Europe qualitatively 
different from threat posed to the United States). 
13 .  Eric Lichtblau & Matt Flegenheimer, Jeff Sessions Confirmed as 
Attorney General, Capping Bitter Battle, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 8, 2017), https://www. 
nytimes.com/2017/02/08/us/politics/jeff-sessions-attorney-general-confirmation. 
html (on file with the Columbia Human Rights Law Review). 
14.  Mr. Trump also appointed people with strong anti-immigrant and anti-
immigration views to head the key Cabinet departments that control and 
implement immigration policy: the Departments of State, Justice, and Homeland 
Security. See, e.g., Peter Baker, Pitched as Calming Force, John Kelly Instead 
Mirrors Boss’s Priorities, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 25, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2017/10/25/us/politics/trump-kelly.html (on file with the Columbia Human Rights 
Law Review) (reporting that former Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) 
Secretary Kelly said, “If it were up to him, . . . the number [of refugees admitted 
into the United States] would be between zero and one.”); see also Bill Chappell & 
Jessica Taylor, Defiant Homeland Security Secretary Defends Family Separations, 
NPR (June 18, 2018), https://www.npr.org/2018/06/18/620972542/we-do-not-have-
a-policy-of-separating-families-dhs-secretary-nielsen-says [https://perma.cc/ 
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are used to retaliate against activists, journalists, and even IJs who 
express the slightest resistance to, or merely report on, his policies. 
 
K6WC-CE5K] (reporting that DHS Secretary Kirstjen Nielsen, who succeeded 
Kelly, defended the policy of separating immigrant children from their parents and 
claimed that the children were not to be used as “a pawn”). Secretary Nielsen 
initially denied the existence of the policy to Congress but later began defending it. 
See Brian Tashman, ACLU Report: Kirstjen Nielsen Continues to Insist That There 
Is No Family Separation Policy, https://www.aclu.org/blog/immigrants-rights/ice-
and-border-patrol-abuses/kirstjen-nielsen-continues-insist-there-no [https:// 
perma.cc/G5JA-8CMM]. Despite her unstinting loyalty to Mr. Trump’s war on 
immigrants, he still fired Secretary Nielsen for failing to be tough enough. See Zolan 
Kanno-Youngs et al., Kirstjen Nielsen Resigns as Trump’s Homeland Security 
Secretary, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 7, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/07/us/ 
politics/kirstjen-nielsen-dhs-resigns.html (on file with the Columbia Human Rights 
Law Review) (indicating that DHS Secretary Nielsen’s willingness to cage children 
and authorize turning away asylum-seekers, contrary to national and international 
law, was insufficiently aggressive for Mr. Trump because she advised against 
closing entire border with Mexico); Jamelle Bouie, Who Is Left to Say No to Trump?, 
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 8, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/08/opinion/kirstjen-
nielsen-trump-border.html (on file with the Columbia Human Rights Law Review).  
The most notoriously extremist anti-immigrant power broker in the federal 
government is Presidential Senior Staff Stephen Miller, whose ties to white 
supremacist and nationalist organizations have been manifest. See Mike DeBonis, 
Rachael Bade & Felicia Sonmez, Democrats Take Aim at Miller as Questions Persist 
About ‘Sanctuary City’ Targeting, WASH. POST (Apr. 14, 2019), https://www. 
washingtonpost.com/powerpost/democrats-take-aim-at-miller-as-questions-
persist-about-sanctuary-city-targeting/2019/04/14/61824ef4-5ed5-11e9-9ff2-
abc984dc9eec_story.html (on file with the Columbia Human Rights Law Review) 
(identifying Miller as the “common thread” in Trump Administration’s most 
controversial immigration policies and “[seemingly] the boss of everybody on 
immigration”); Abigail Tracy, “He Actually Prefers the Chaos”: Stephen Miller, 
Immigration Warlord, Emerges from the Shadows, VANITY FAIR (Apr. 14, 2019), 
https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2019/04/stephen-miller-dhs-purge-kirstjen-
nielsen-immigration [https:// perma.cc/J6KK-NBFX] (noting the dividing line in 
Trump Administration is between immigration officials who respect the law and 
those willing to break it); Kim Belware, Leaked Stephen Miller Emails Suggest 
Trump’s Point Man on Immigration Promoted White Nationalism, WASH. POST 
(NOV. 12, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/11/12/leaked-
stephen-miller-emails-suggest-trumps-point-man-immigration-promoted-white-
nationalism/ (on file with the Columbia Human Rights Law Review); Michael 
Edison Hayden, Report: Stephen Miller’s Affinity for White Nationalism Revealed 
in Leaked E-mails, SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER (NOV. 12, 2019) 
https://www.splcenter.org/hatewatch/2019/11/12/stephen-millers-affinity-white-
nationalism-revealed-leaked-emails [https://perma.cc/BB37-EP2C] (content 
analysis of more than 900 emails Miller sent to Breitbart News during 2015-2016 
period; more than 80% focus on race and/or immigration issues with extensive 
reference to the supposed evils of nonwhite immigration and apprehension about 
nonwhite crime). 
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This type of wholesale hijacking of legal authority to marginalize 
opposition was not seen in the United States even during the Holocaust 
era of abandonment of refugees.15  
The Trump Administration’s harsh immigration policies and 
practices violate international law generally, international human 
rights and refugee law more specifically, and basic norms of morality 
 
15 . Holocaust Memorial Museum, Voyage of the St. Louis, Holocaust 
Encyclopedia, https://www.ushmm.org/wlc/en/article.php?ModuleId=10005267 
[https://perma.cc/4LMB-DJJA] (describing the voyage of the St. Louis, a ship that 
in 1938 travelled from Hamburg, Germany, with over 900 Jewish refugees, almost 
all of whom were denied entry in Havana, Cuba; the St. Louis was not allowed to 
dock in Miami, and was compelled to return to Europe. Over 250 of the Jewish 
passengers were killed in the Holocaust.). See ‘Saving Lives Is Not a Crime’: 
Politically Motivated Legal Harassment of Migrant Human Rights Defenders by the 
USA, AMNESTY INT’L (July 2, 2019), https://www.amnestyusa.org/reports/saving-
lives-is-not-a-crime-politically-motivated-legal-harassment-of-migrant-human-
rights-defenders-by-the-usa/ [https://perma.cc/634Z-K647] (reporting that U.S. 
authorities have unlawfully targeted human rights defenders, that the DHS has 
violated domestic and international law, and that the United States and Mexico 
have collaborated in their abuses); Sam Knight, Pattern of Deportation as 
Retaliation Emerging in Trump Era, DISTRICT SENTINEL (Mar. 22, 2017), 
https://www.districtsentinel.com/pattern-deportation-retaliation-emerging-trump-
era/ [https://perma.cc/62SD-R8AD]; Max Rivlin-Nadler, Journalists, Lawyers, 
Volunteers Face Increased Scrutiny By Border Agents, NPR (Feb. 15, 2019), 
https://www.npr.org/2019/02/15/695164916/journalists-lawyers-volunteers-face-
increased-scrutiny-by-border-agents [https://perma.cc/NX2R-ESBF]; COMMITTEE 
TO PROTECT JOURNALISTS, Nothing to Declare: Why U.S. Border Agency's Vast Stop 
and Search Powers Undermine Press Freedom (Oct. 22, 2018) 
https://cpj.org/reports/2018/10/nothing-to-declare-us-border-search-phone-press-
freedom-cbp.php [https://perma.cc/PA6Q-PVAN]; Julia Ainsley, U.S. Officials 




NE8R-7839] (list includes ten journalists, seven of them U.S. citizens, a U.S.-based 
attorney, and others labeled as organizers and “instigators,” 31 of whom are U.S. 
citizens; by the time the list was compiled, 12 had already been subject to additional 
questioning during border crossings and nine had been arrested); Michelle Chen, 
Trump’s Crackdown on Immigrant Activists Is an Attack on Free Speech, NATION 
(Oct. 30, 2018), https://www.thenation.com/article/ravi-ragbir-deportation-free-
speech/ [https://perma.cc/RT4L-D6JQ]; Maria Sacchetti & David Weigel, ICE Has 
Detained or Deported Prominent Immigration Activists, WASH. POST (Jan. 19, 
2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/powerpost/ice-has-detained-or-deported-
foreigners-who-are-also-immigration-activists/2018/01/19/377af23a-fc95-11e7-
a46b-a3614530bd87_story.html (on file with the Columbia Human Rights Law 
Review). 
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and humanity.16 This Article analyzes only one aspect of the Trump 
Administration’s breaches of international law: its policies and 
practices that penalize asylum-seekers in contravention of the 1951 
Refugee Convention and the 1967 Refugee Protocol.17 
 
16 .  Cf. Robert Ticehurst, The Martens Clause and the Laws of Armed 
Conflict, 317 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 125, 128–29 (1997) (noting that while 
international humanitarian law is developing, populations “remain under the 
protection . . . of the principles of international law, as they result from the usages 
established between civilized nations, from the laws of humanity and the 
requirements of the public conscience”). 
17 .   Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189 
U.N.T.S. 137 (entered into force Apr. 22, 1954) [hereinafter “1951 Refugee 
Convention”]; Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 
6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 (entered into force Oct. 4, 1967) [hereinafter “1967 Refugee 
Protocol”]. 
In July 2019, the Trump Administration issued perhaps its most restrictive 
order against asylum-seekers yet, precluding them from even applying for asylum 
if they have travelled through another country before reaching the southern land 
border with the United States—i.e., if they are not able to arrive by boat or 
airplane—and did not apply for asylum in the countries of transit. See Michael D. 
Shear & Zolan Kanno-Youngs, Most Migrants at Border with Mexico Would Be 
Denied Asylum Protections Under New Trump Rule, N.Y. TIMES (July 15, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/15/us/politics/trump-asylum-rule.html (on file 
with the Columbia Human Rights Law Review).  
This purported rule directly contradicts not only the international law 
incorporated into domestic law, but a Congressional statute: Immigration and 
Nationality Act (INA) § 208(a)(1) (emphasis added) (“Any alien who is physically 
present in the United States or who arrives in the United States (whether or not at 
a designated port of arrival and including an alien who is brought to the United 
States after having been interdicted in international or United States waters), 
irrespective of such alien’s status, may apply for asylum in accordance with this 
section.”) as well as the Congressionally crafted scheme defining “firm 
resettlement” as a bar to asylum claims, see 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(a)(2)(A) and 
1158(b)(2)(A)(vi) (noncitizen ineligible for asylum in the United States only if 
“firmly resettled in another country prior to arriving in the United States.”). 
Related provisions of the INA were at issue in another Interim Final Rule issued in 
November 2018, which sought to prevent asylum-seekers who enter the United 
States other than through a Port of Entry from qualifying for asylum. See infra note 
60 and accompanying text. The U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
in December 2018 issued a preliminary injunction against that regulation, see East 
Bay Covenant Sanctuary, et. al. v. Trump, 3:18-cv-6810-JST (N.D Cal. November 
19, 2018) (Motion for Temporary Restraining Order), application for stay pending 
appeal denied sur nom. Trump v. East Bay Sanctuary Covenant, 139 S.Ct. 782 
(Mem) (2018).  
On July 16, 2019, the ACLU, Southern Poverty Law Center, and the Center for 
Constitutional Rights filed a legal challenge to this latest Rule, seeking a 
preliminary and permanent injunction against its implementation, in the Northern 
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Part I of this article extensively details the Trump 
Administration’s policies toward immigrants generally and more 
specifically toward asylum-seekers, and briefly contrasts those policies 
and practices with those of his predecessors. Part II analyzes the 
relevant articles of the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967 Refugee 
Protocol, including their historical context and various interpretations. 
Part II analyzes analogous customary international law governing 
refugees and discusses the practice of states. Part III argues that 
Articles 31(1) and 33(1) of the 1951 Refugee Convention are self-
executing and, consequently, should be the rule of decision when 
processing asylum-seekers. Since Article 31(1) expressly forbids 
imposing “penalties” on refugees for their unlawful presence, the 
United States Justice Department may not criminally prosecute 
individuals with a prima facie case for asylum until the asylum case is 
concluded.18 The article concludes with the argument that Article 31(1) 
 
District Court of California: East Bay Sanctuary et al. v. Barr, 3:19-cv-04073 (N.D. 
Cal. July 16, 2019)(Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief) (“as part of our 
nation’s commitment to the protection of people fleeing persecution and consistent 
with our international obligations, it is longstanding federal law that merely 
transiting through a third country is not a basis to categorically deny asylum”), 
https://www.dropbox.com/s/4wckd0ol9hhusb8/1-main.pdf?dl=0.  
See also Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for 
Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction, Capital Area 
Immigrants’ Rights Coalition v. Donald J. Trump, cv 1:19-02117 (D. D.C. July 16, 
2019) (challenging this IFR as contrary to both international law and the Charming 
Betsy canon, as well as the INA), https://www.scribd.com/document/417970461/7-
16-19-Capital-Area-Immigrants-Rights-Coalition-Motion-for-TRO#download 
[https://perma.cc/3C7X-U8SL].  
As trenchantly put by ACLU attorney Lee Gelernt, “This is the Trump 
administration’s most extreme run at an asylum ban yet. It clearly violates 
domestic and international law, and cannot stand.” SPLC Sues Trump 
Administration Over New Rule That Makes Migrants Who Pass Through Other 
Countries Ineligible For Asylum (July 16, 2019), https://www.splcenter. 
org/news/2019/07/17/splc-sues-trump-administration-over-new-rule-makes-
migrants-who-pass-through-other [https://perma.cc/P9AL-B5EV]. However, in 
September 2019, the injunctions against the so-called “Third Country Rule” were 
stayed by the Supreme Court. Barr v. East Bay Sanctuary Covenant, 588  
S.Ct. ----, 2019 WL 4292781 (Mem) (September 11, 2019) (district court's July 2019 
preliminary injunction against enforcement of the Rule, and September 2019 order 
restoring the nationwide scope of that injunction, stayed pending disposition of 
government appeal in the Ninth Circuit and government's petition for writ of 
certiorari, if one is filed). 
18 .  1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 17, art. 31(1). The U.N. High 
Commissioner for Refugees’ authoritative refugee handbook identifies the “core 
principles” of the 1951 Convention as “non-discrimination, non-refoulement, 
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and customary international human rights law permit at most brief 
detention of bona fide asylum seekers and unquestionably prohibit the 
seizure of infants and children from their parents or lawful guardians. 
I. THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION’S POLICIES AND PRACTICES TOWARD 
ASYLUM-SEEKERS 
According to the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees 
(“UNHCR”), there are over sixty-seven million refugees, stateless 
persons, returnees, and internally displaced persons around the 
world.19 Over 70.8 million people have been forced from their  
homes—the highest number of displaced people ever recorded, 
substantially exceeding the number after World War II.20 The most 
obvious causes of this huge number include war and internal conflict; 
climate change; gross human rights violations; organized crime proto- 
and quasi-states; and severe economic exploitation—principally in the 
Global South. This unprecedented wave of refugees has coincided with 
tectonic political and economic shifts following the 9/11 attacks; the 
United States’ involvement in wars and failed states in Iraq, 
 
nonpenalization for illegal entry or stay, and the acquisition and enjoyment of rights 
over time.” U.N. HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, HANDBOOK ON PROCEDURES 
AND CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING REFUGEE STATUS AND GUIDELINES ON 








20.  Figures at a Glance, UNHCR (June 19, 2019), https://www.unhcr.org/en-
us/figures-at-a-glance.html [https://perma.cc/B4GJ-WMYG]; see also Adrian 
Edwards, Forced Displacement at Record 68.5 Million, UNHCR (June 19, 2018), 
http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/news/stories/2018/ 6/5b222c494/forced-displacement-
record-685-million.html [https://perma.cc/W5GG-S8A8] (reporting that global 
trends show 68.5 million refugees at the end of 2017). Concerning the number of 
refugees during and immediately after World War II, see Lydia DePillis, Kulwant 
Saluja & Denise Lu, A Visual Guide to 75 Years of Major Refugee Crises Around the 
World, WASH. POST (Dec. 21, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/ 
world/historical-migrant-crisis/ (on file with the Columbia Human Rights Law 
Review) (reporting that World War II displaced approximately 40 million 
Europeans between 1940 and 1945, and that post-World War II conflicts displaced 
approximately 1 million Russians, Ukrainians, and Belarusians between 1948 and 
1950 and approximately 13 million Germans from the Soviet Union, 
Czechoslovakia, and Poland between 1940 and 1950). 
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Afghanistan, Libya, Syria, Yemen, and other Islamic countries; the 
2008 worldwide economic crisis; increasing globalization; and the 
digitizing and growing automation of the economies of developed 
countries. Prompting steep increases in perceived economic and 
military insecurity, these events, together with the increasing 
realization by white Americans that they will be in the minority in the 
next decade or so, 21  seem to have contributed to the ever more 
vehement opposition by many Americans to immigration and 
immigrants from certain countries.22 
Elected in part by promoting and riding this burgeoning anti-
immigrant and white nationalist sentiment, 23  President Trump 
 
21.  See William H. Frey, Less than Half of US Children Under 15 Are White, 
Census Shows, BROOKINGS INST. (June 24, 2019), https://www.brookings.edu/ 
research/less-than-half-of-us-children-under-15-are-white-census-shows/ 
[https://perma.cc/N6KB-6YTH]; Thomas B. Edsall, Who’s Afraid of a White 
Minority?, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 30, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/30/ 
opinion/america-white-minority-majority.html (on file with the Columbia Human 
Rights Law Review) (showing the perception versus the reality of the coming white 
minority predicted by Census Bureau). 
22.  See Stef W. Kight, America’s Majority Minority Future, AXIOS (Apr. 29, 
2019), https://www.axios.com/when-american-minorities-become-the-majority-d8b 
3ee00-e4f3-4993-8481-93a290fdb057.html [https://perma.cc/89J5-LLK9]; Ryan W. 
Miller, 46% of Whites Worry Becoming a Majority-Minority Nation Will ‘Weaken 
American Culture,’ Survey Says, USA TODAY (Mar. 21, 2019), https://www.usa 
today.com/story/news/nation/2019/03/21/pew-survey-whites-fearful-minority-
country-will-weaken-american-culture/3217218002/ [https://perma.cc/S542-EZKJ] 
(reporting that a Pew Research national survey on perceptions of USA future 
“speaks for itself . . . suggests concern broadly held by whites about a majority-
minority country”). 
23.  It is indisputable that President Trump has singled out immigrants from 
Latino and Muslim countries. See, e.g., Clyde Haberman, Trump’s Argument 
Against Immigrants: We’ve Heard It Before, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 9, 2017), https://www. 
nytimes.com/2017/10/09/us/retro-anti-immigration.html (on file with the Columbia 
Human Rights Law Review) (comparing nineteenth-century treatment of Chinese 
and Irish immigrants, early twentieth-century treatment of Eastern European 
Jewish and Southern Italian immigrants, World War II treatment of Japanese-
Americans, and California’s Proposition 187 to current treatment of Latinos and 
Muslims); see also Jayashri Srikantiah & Shirin Sinnar, White Nationalism as 
Immigration Policy, 71 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 197, 197 (Mar. 2019), https://review. 
law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2019/02/71-Stan.-L.-Rev.-Srikantiah-
Sinnar.pdf [https://perma.cc/YT46-JPX8] (providing exhaustive catalogue of Mr. 
Trump’s racially disparaging statements or actions); David Leonhardt & Ian 
Prasad Philbrick, Donald Trump’s Racism: The Definitive List, Updated, N.Y. 
TIMES (Jan. 15, 2018, updated July 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/ 
2018/01/15/opinion/leonhardt-trump-racist.html (on file with the Columbia Human 
Rights Law Review) (listing examples of Donald Trump’s racist statements and 
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promptly adopted harsh policies and practices against both 
unauthorized and legal immigration. In 2018, President Trump’s 
Justice Department imposed quotas on immigration judges, requiring 
them to complete 700 cases a year and ensure that fewer than 15% of 
their decisions are remanded on appeal;24 cut the number of refugees 
admitted by almost 80%; 25  cancelled DACA (Deferred Action for 
 
actions), culminating in Mr. Trump’s embrace of the traditional chant of racial 
hatred and “ugly, lawless, racist sentiment”: “Send her back!” by an adoring crowd 
that had been whipped into a frenzy with his denunciations of four Congresswomen 
of color, see David Leonhardt, So This Is Where We Are, N.Y. TIMES (July 18, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/18/opinion/trump-ilhan-omar-rally.html (on file 
with the Columbia Human Rights Law Review).  
Political, social, and media leaders condemned Mr. Trump’s initial “why don’t 
you go back [where you came from]” “tweet” addressed to the same Congresswomen, 
with the exception of almost any Republican politician, as evinced in the vote on a 
censure resolution in the House of Representatives, Read the House Resolution 
Condemning ‘Trump’s Racist Comments Directed at Members of Congress, H. RES. 
489 (July 15, 2019), N.Y. Times (July 16, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/ 
16/us/politics/house-resolution-trump.html (on file with the Columbia Human 
Rights Law Review). See also Lara Takenaga and Aidan Gardiner, 16,000 Readers 
Shared Their Experiences of Being Told to ‘Go Back.’ Here Are Some of Their Stories, 
N.Y. TIMES (July 19, 2019); Bruce Haring, Hollywood, Politicians, Media Defend 
‘The Squad’ After Trump “Go Home” Remarks, DEADLINE (July 14, 2019) https:// 
deadline.com/2019/07/hollywood-politicians-media-defend-the-squad-after-trump-
go-home-remarks-1202646116/ (on file with the Columbia Human Rights Law 
Review). 
24. The quotas are constantly updated in red-yellow-green “dashboards” that 
automatically appear on judges’ computer screens, resembling the way piecework 
is tracked. For a comprehensive description of how Trump Administration policies 
are curtailing genuine judicial independence in the Immigration Courts, perhaps 
the current best source is the continuing blog, “Opinions/Analysis on Immigration 
Law,” of former Immigration Court Judge and BIA Senior Staff Advisor Jeffrey S. 
Chase. See, e.g., the transcript of his March 28, 2019 lecture at Cornell Law School, 
The Immigration Court: Issues and Solutions, OPINIONS/ANALYSIS ON 
IMMIGRATION LAW (Mar. 28, 2019), https://www.jeffreyschase.com/blog/2019/3/ 
28/i6el1do6l5p443u1nkf8vwr28dv9qi [https://perma.cc/L7AR-ER4U] (transcript of 
lecture). See also Laura Meckler, New Quotas for Immigration Judges as Trump 
Administration Seeks Faster Deportations, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 2, 2018), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/immigration-judges-face-new-quotas-in-bid-to-speed-
deportations-1522696158 (on file with the Columbia Human Rights Law Review). 
25.  Michael J. Shear and Zolan Kanno-Youngs, Trump Slashes Refugee Cap 
to 18,000, Curtailing U.S. Role as Haven, N. Y. Times (Sept. 26, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/26/us/politics/trump-refugees.html (on file with 
the Columbia Human Rights Law Review) (reduction to 18,000 is staggering when 
compared to the Obama Administration’s cap in the 2016 fiscal year of 110,000 
refugees). 
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Childhood Arrivals),26 authorized ICE agents to arrest immigrants who 
are using the court system affirmatively or defensively;27 militarized 
 
26.  DACA was instituted by the Obama Administration in 2012 to enable 
qualified children involuntarily brought to the USA to apply for temporary deferral 
of deportation as a matter of prosecutorial discretion. Cancelling DACA eliminated 
legal protection for about 700,000 children and youth. See Deferred Action for 
Childhood Arrivals (DACA) Data Tools, MIGRATION POLICY INST. (Aug. 2018), 
https://www.migrationpolicy.org/programs/data-hub/deferred-action-childhood-
arrivals-daca-profiles [https://perma.cc/GC2P-DTJY]; Adam Edelman, Trump Ends 
DACA Program, No New Applications Accepted, NBC NEWS (Sept. 5, 2017), 
https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/immigration/trump-dreamers-daca-immigration 
-announcement-n798686 [https://perma.cc/D3UG-VRPW]. 
Implementation of this Draconian measure was temporarily limited by a 
complex set of legal actions in multiple jurisdictions, ultimately consolidated before 
the Supreme Court. Dept. of Homeland Security v. Regents of Univ. of CA., 
consolidating Trump, President of U.S v. NAACP and Mcaleenan, Sec. of Homeland 
Security v. Vidal, https://www.supremecourt.gov/grantednotedlist/19grantednoted 
list. For a description of the Supreme Court argument on November 12, 2019 (and 
of Mr. Trump’s Tweet that morning, claiming with either profound ignorance or 
cynical mendacity that “Many of the people in DACA . . . are far from ‘angels’. Some 
are very tough, hardened criminals,” although DACA status is precluded by or 
revocable for any significant criminal record or perceived threat to national security 
or public safety. See DHS Memorandum, Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion with 
Respect to Individuals Who Came to the United States as Children (June 15, 2012), 
https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/s1-exercising-prosecutorial-discretion-
individuals-who-came-to-us-as-children.pdf [https://perma.cc/4F9W-D44G]); see 
also Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Appears Ready to Let Trump End DACA 
Program, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 12, 2019) https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/12/ 
us/supreme-court-dreamers.html (on file with the Columbia Human Rights Law 
Review). 
27.  See generally Michelle Chen, Kicking ICE out of the Courthouses, NATION 
(Sept. 5, 2018), https://www.thenation.com/article/kicking-ice-out-of-the-
courthouses/ [https://perma.cc/EL2N-53Y8] (reporting on the significant rise in 
immigration arrests at local and state court houses). In response to the disruptive 
effect of this practice on the ability of both lawful and unauthorized immigrants to 
participate in the judicial system as crime victims, witnesses, or litigants, the New 
York State Unified Court System’s Office of the Chief Administrative Judge issued 
a new court rule prohibiting federal immigration officials from arresting 
individuals inside New York state court buildings without a federal judicial arrest 
warrant for a specific individual. Office of the Chief Admin. Judge, N.Y. State 
Unified Court Sys., Protocol Governing Activities in Courthouses by Law 
Enforcement Agencies, https://www.immigrantdefenseproject.org/wp-content/ 
uploads/OCA-ICE-Directive.pdf [https://perma.cc/P9X7-YQLD]. See also 
Immigrant Defense Project, The New York Protect Our Courts Act, https://www. 
immigrantdefenseproject.org/wp-content/uploads/ICE-Courthouse-Model-Guide. 
pdf. 
In June 2019, in a case brought by state prosecutors alleging that ICE activity 
was causing major disruption of the state criminal justice system, a federal judge 
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the southern—and only the southern—border with thousands of 
deployed troops and combat equipment,28 in keeping with his troubling 
reference to immigrants as an invasion; 29  employed administrative 
removals to summarily deport immigrants;30 and ordered cancellation 
of Temporary Protected Status (“TPS”) for residents of six countries.31 
 
enjoined ICE from making arrests for civil immigration violations in Massachusetts 
courts, on courthouse steps, and in courthouse parking lots. These state prosecutors 
have been viciously attacked, by name, by Mr. Trump, who called them “people that 
[sic] probably don’t mind crime.” See Alanna Durkin Richer, Judge Halts 
Immigration Arrests at Massachusetts Courts, ASSOCIATED PRESS (June 20, 2019), 
https://www.apnews.com/4826abde814749bd9bc54119037263c5 [https://perma.cc/ 
C2QS-3HZ2] See also Akliah Johnson, ICE Arrests at Courthouses Disrupt Justice, 
Lawsuit Claims, BOSTON GLOBE (Mar. 16, 2018), https://www.bostonglobe.com/ 
metro/2018/03/15/ice-arrests-courthouses-are-disrupting-justice-two-lawsuits-
claim/N7IhXiHlEuw3Qdz1XDlt4I/story.html (on file with the Columbia Human 
Rights Law Review) (“According to the suit, ICE has been arresting immigrants—
both those in the country legally and illegally—at state courthouses in 
Massachusetts with increasing frequency since President Trump took office.”). See 
also Jeff Gammage, ICE to Cease Arrests In Philly Courthouses, Agree to New Rules 
of Conduct, Says Sheriff’s Department, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER (Apr. 5, 2019), 
https://www.inquirer.com/news/ice-immigration-immigrants-courts-arrests-
sheriffs-department-20190405.html?__vfz=medium%3Dsharebar. 
The right of concerned citizens to document the behavior of ICE officers engaging 
in this abusive practice has also been sharply challenged. See Media Lab, “Eyes on 
Courts,” https://lab.witness.org/eyes-on-courts-documenting-ice-arrests/ [https:// 
perma.cc/97DC-8HKV].  
28.  See Moving People and Materials: CBP and DoD Unite to Tackle Logistics 
of Operation Secure Line, U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROTECTION (Nov. 26, 2018), 
https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/spotlights/moving-people-and-materials-cbp-and-
dod-unite-tackle-logistics-operation-secure [https://perma.cc/QN8L-3LAF]. 
29 .  See, e.g., Kathryn Krawczyk, Trump Just Called Immigration an 
‘Invasion.’ So Did the New Zealand Shooter, WEEK (Mar. 15, 2019), https://theweek. 
com/speedreads/829486/trump-just-called-immigration-invasion-did-new-zealand-
shooter [https://perma.cc/E4ES-XFR5] (comparing Donald Trump’s use of the word 
“invasion” to the New Zealand shooter’s rhetoric). 
30.  See Daniella Silva, Trump Calls for Deporting Migrants ‘Immediately’ 
Without a Trial, NBC NEWS (June 24, 2018), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/ 
immigration/trump-calls-deporting-migrants-immediately-without-trial-n886141 
[https://perma.cc/XQS2-35Y3] (reporting that Mr. Trump tweeted, “when somebody 
comes in, we must immediately, with no Judges or Court Cases, bring them back 
from where they came”). 
31.  The Trump Administration ordered termination of Temporary Protected 
Status for U.S. residents from the countries of El Salvador, Haiti, Honduras, Nepal, 
Nicaragua, and Sudan. See Alan Gomez, Trump Orders 200,000 Salvadorans to 
Leave U.S., USA TODAY (Jan. 8, 2018), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/ 
world/2018/01/08/reports-trump-order-200-000-salvadorans-leave-u-s/1012345001/ 
[https://perma.cc/2A8U-GXNT]; Jonathan Blitzer, The Battle Inside the Trump 
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Although the Trump Administration initially said that only 
unauthorized immigrants convicted of serious crimes would be 
 
Administration Over T.P.S., NEW YORKER (May 11, 2018), https://www.new 
yorker.com/news/daily-comment/the-battle-inside-the-trump-administration-over-
tps?reload=true [https://perma.cc/V24X-7QXB]; David Leblang et al., By Ending 
‘Temporary Protected Status’ for Half a Million People, Trump Has Probably 
Increased Illegal Migration, WASH. POST (Aug. 7, 2018), https://www.washington 
post.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2018/08/07/by-ending-temporary-protected-status-
for-half-a-million-people-trump-has-probably-increased-illegal-migration/ (on file 
with the Columbia Human Rights Law Review).  
For the current status of litigation temporarily protecting TPS beneficiaries, see 
Ramos v. Nielsen, No. 18-cv-01554 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 2018), https://www.uscis.gov/ 
sites/default/files/USCIS/Laws/ramos-v-nielsen-order-granting-preliminary-
injunction-case-18-cv-01554-emc.pdf [https://perma.cc/6EXJ-HUZS] (preliminary 
injunction halting enforcement based on sufficient evidence that discriminatory 
purpose motivated decisions to terminate the TPS designations of Sudan, Haiti, 
Nicaragua, and El Salvador, indicating that (1) DHS Acting Secretary was 
influenced by President Trump and/or White House officials such as Stephen Miller 
in TPS decision-making; and (2) President Trump’s expressed animus against non-
white, non-European immigrants); Saget v. Trump, No. 18-cv-1599 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 
11, 2019), http://nipnlg.org/PDFs/practitioners/our_lit/impact_litigation/2019_12 
Apr_tps-haiti-prelim-injunt.pdf [https://perma.cc/HQH5-FM45] (holding that 
plaintiffs are likely to succeed on merits of claim that DHS Secretary did not 
conduct good-faith, evidence-based factual review when determining whether to 
extend Haitian TPS, but was instead improperly influenced by White House 
officials’ political motivations, in violation of Administrative Procedures Act); 
Bhattarai v. Nielsen, No. 19-cv-731 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 12, 2019), https://www.aclu 
socal.org/sites/default/files/aclu_socal_bhattarai_20190312_stipulation_stay.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/FS6X-CURX] (stipulating stay maintaining TPS for Nepal and 
Honduras pending resolution of Ramos v. Nielsen); see generally Temporary 
Protected Status, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., https://www.uscis.gov/ 
humanitarian/temporary-protected-status [https://perma.cc/5PXP-89A2] 
(providing information on current TPS administrative stances and ongoing 
litigation).  
In September 2019, the Trump administration concluded a so-called "safe third 
country agreement" with El Salvador, requiring migrants travelling through El 
Salvador to first seek asylum in that cartel-riven country. Zolan Kanno-Youngs & 
Elisabeth Malkin, U.S. Agreement With El Salvador Seeks to Divert Asylum 
Seekers, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 20, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/20/us/ 
politics/us-asylum-el-salvador.html (on file with the Columbia Human Rights Law 
Review. As part of the accord, the Trump Administration (reversing its previous 
position) agreed to extend TPS to Salvadorans until January 4, 2021. Miriam 
Jordan & Kirk Semple, U.S. Extends Temporary Work Permits for El Salvador 
Immigrants, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 28, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/28/us/ 
el-salvador-temporary-protected-status-tps.html (on file with the Columbia 
Human Rights Law Review). 
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prioritized for deportation,32 it has implicitly given ICE officers carte 
blanche to arrest unauthorized immigrants anytime, anywhere, 
creating a climate of fear in immigrant communities, and, somewhat 
ironically, substantially reducing the deportation of people actually 
convicted of significant crimes.33 
 
32.  In 1996, Congress enacted a statute changing the word for deportation 
to “removal.” See Deportation, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., 
https://www.uscis.gov/tools/glossary/deportation. In this article, however, we use 
the word “deportation” instead of “removal” because the former term is more readily 
and easily understood. 
33 .  Alan Gomez, ICE Arresting More Non-Criminal Undocumented 
Immigrants, USA TODAY (May 17, 2018), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/ 
nation/2018/05/17/ice-arresting-more-non-criminal-undocumented-immigrants/ 
620361002 [https://perma.cc/JV7G-7WEN] (noting that, during the Trump 
Administration, ICE agents have arrested on average 4,143 undocumented 
immigrants without a criminal record each month, whereas in the last two years of 
the Obama administration, agents averaged 1,703 a month); American 
Immigration Council, The End of Immigration Enforcement Priorities Under the 
Trump Administration (Mar. 7, 2018), https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil. 
org/research/immigration-enforcement-priorities-under-trump-administration 
[https://perma.cc/7EWM-CRAB] (indicating that the Trump Administration has 
broadened enforcement priorities to afford ICE officers greater power to remove 
unauthorized immigrants than exercised in other administrations); see also ICE 
Focus Shifts Away from Detaining Serious Criminals, TRANSACTIONAL RECORDS 
ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE (June 25, 2019), https://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/ 
564/ [https://perma.cc/CN6R-3H5W] (stating that the number of ICE detainees was 
up 22% from September 2016; the most striking change over the 27-month period 
was a dramatic drop in the number of detainees who had committed serious crimes); 
Profiling Who ICE Detains—Few Committed Any Crime, TRANSACTIONAL RECORDS 
ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE (Oct. 9, 2018), https://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/ 
530/ [https://perma.cc/WS4Z-B8ES] (stating that 58% of individuals in ICE custody 
had no criminal record; four out of five either have no record or committed only a 
minor offense such as traffic violation).  
In June 2019, Mr. Trump announced—on Twitter—the impending arrest of 
“millions” of immigrants, not at or near the border but in several major 
metropolitan areas—apparently more retaliation for the “sanctuary” policies often 
denounced by President Trump, then-Attorney General Jeff Sessions, and other 
Administration officials. See, e.g., Mike DeBonis, Rachael Bade & Felicia Sonmez, 
Democrats Take Aim at Miller as Questions Persist About ‘Sanctuary City’ 
Targeting, WASH. POST (Apr. 10, 2019) at https://www.washingtonpost.com/power 
post/democrats-take-aim-at-miller-as-questions-persist-about-sanctuary-city-
targeting/2019/04/14/61824ef4-5ed5-11e9-9ff2-abc984dc9eec_story.html (on file 
with the Columbia Human Rights Law Review); Nick Miroff & Maria Sacchetti, 
Trump Vows Mass Immigration Arrests, Removals of ‘Millions of Illegal Aliens’ 
Starting Next Week, WASH. POST (June 17, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
immigration/trump-vows-mass-immigration-arrests-removals-of-millions-of-
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A. Treating All Irregular Immigrants as Criminals 
Attorney General Sessions initiated the policy of criminally 
prosecuting all immigrants, including first-time entrants, who entered 
the United States without inspection.34 On April 6, 2017, Mr. Sessions 
formally declared his “zero tolerance” policy—every person who crossed 
the “Southwest” border (but not the Canadian border) without 
inspection would be “criminally prosecuted for illegal entry or illegal 
reentry.” 35  Sessions directed all U.S. Attorneys to prioritize 
prosecuting noncitizens for smuggling (broadly defined36) and illegal 
 
illegal-aliens-starting-next-week/2019/06/17/4e366f5e-916d-11e9-aadb-74e6b2b46f 
6a_story.html (on file with the Columbia Human Rights Law Review).  
Three days after announcing the threatened mass arrests of undocumented 
immigrants, the President began his re-election campaign. Trump, at Rally in 
Florida, Kicks Off His 2020 Re-election Bid, (June 18, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/18/us/politics/donald-trump-rally-orlando.html 
(on file with the Columbia Human Rights Law Review). Within a matter of days 
Mr. Trump delayed his directive, stating that Democrats had two weeks to change 
the asylum law. National Public Radio, Trump Delays Immigration Raids, Giving 




After the Democrats repudiated Mr. Trump’s demand, the massive raids still did 
not materialize, but nonetheless spread fear in immigrant communities. See Joseph 
Zeballos-Roig, ICE Arrested Only 35 Migrants in Trump-Announced Immigration 
Sweep Targeting Thousands of People, BUSINESS INSIDER (July 23, 2019), 
https://www.businessinsider.com/ice-arrested-dozens-trump-announced-
immigration-sweep-targeting-thousands-2019-7 [https://perma.cc/MN4C-RTS9]. 
34.  Attorney General Announces Zero-Tolerance Policy for Criminal Illegal 
Entry, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Apr. 6, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/ 
attorney-general-announces-zero-tolerance-policy-criminal-illegal-entry 
[https://perma.cc/8KVS-UQZ3]. 
35 . Memorandum from the Attorney Gen. to Fed. Prosecutors Along the 
Southwest Border (Apr. 6, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/ 
1049751/download [https://perma.cc/54UM-5D99]. 
36 .  On February 20, 2017, the Trump Administration released a 
memorandum directing DHS to take action against parents, family members, and 
any other individual who “directly or indirectly . . . facilitates the illegal smuggling 
or trafficking of an alien child into the United States.” Memorandum from Sec’y 
John Kelly, Sec’y of Homeland Sec., to Kevin McAleenan, Acting Comm’r, U.S. 
Customs and Border Prot., et al., ¶ M (Feb. 20, 2017), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/ 
default/files/publications/17_0220_S1_Implementing-the-Presidents-Border-
Security-Immigration-Enforcement-Improvement-Policies.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
FLF5-98LF]; see also Exec. Order No. 13767, 82 Fed. Reg. 8793 (Jan. 25, 2017) 
(ordering the detention and removal of individuals apprehended at the southern 
border).  
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entry. 37  His policy included asylum-seekers and families with 
children—no exceptions. A month later, he explained what “zero 
tolerance” meant: 
I have put in place a “zero tolerance” policy for illegal 
entry on our Southwest border. If you cross this border 
 
This provision is so broad that it could include persons who help to arrange a 
child’s travel to the United States, help pay for a guide for the child’s journey to the 
United States, or otherwise encourage the child to enter the United States. The 
memorandum directs that enforcement against parents, family members, or other 
individuals involved in the child’s unlawful entry into the United States could 
include (but is not limited to) placing such person in removal proceedings if they 
are removable, or referring them for criminal prosecution.  
As of June 29, 2017, ICE confirmed that it has begun targeting individuals in 
the United States who may have paid a guide to smuggle children into the United 
States. Although ICE has failed to disclose details regarding the scope or length of 
this enforcement action, its apparent focus is on “sponsors” (individuals, often 
parents or other close family members, who agree to provide a safe appropriate 
home for children awaiting immigration processing). This means that individuals 
who sponsor a child to facilitate the child’s release from immigration detention 
are likely themselves at increased risk. ALISON KAMHI & RACHEL PRANDINI, ALIEN 
SMUGGLING: WHAT IT IS AND HOW IT CAN AFFECT IMMIGRANTS (July 18, 2017), 
https://www.ilrc.org/sites/default/files/resources/alien_smuggling_practice_advisor
y-20170728.pdf [https://perma.cc/5RM2-SUAL].  
The 1996 Immigration Act had expanded the definition of smuggling to remove 
the requirement of financial gain, and technically include helping one’s own 
accompanying minor child or relative to enter the country without inspection. 
Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C.A. §§ 1182, 1227(a)(1)(E)(i) (2018); H.R. 
Rep. No. 104-828 (1996) (Conf. Rep.). However, this interpretation had rarely been 
utilized in previous administrations. See PUBLIC COUNSEL & CATHOLIC LEGAL 
IMMIGRATION NETWORK, INC., PRACTICE ADVISORY: WORKING WITH CHILD 
CLIENTS AND THEIR FAMILY MEMBERS IN LIGHT OF THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION’S 




37 .  Memorandum from Attorney Gen. Jeff Sessions to United States 
Attorneys (Apr. 8, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/file/956856/download 
[https://perma.cc/S7LF-7MKR] (encouraging greater enforcement of 8 U.S.C. § 1324 
(“[b]ringing in and harboring certain aliens”) and 8 U.S.C. § 1325 (unlawful entry 
into the United States, “[i]mproper entry by alien,” and other offenses)). This 
memorandum ordered the U.S. Attorneys to prioritize felony illegal entry (entry 
after two or more prior illegal entries). Later Sessions’ policy directives focused on 
first-time entrants. See Sarah N. Lynch & Mica Rosenberg, U.S. Attorney General 
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unlawfully, then we will prosecute you. It’s that simple. 
If you smuggle illegal aliens across our border, then we 
will prosecute you. If you are smuggling a child, then 
we will prosecute you and that child will be separated 
from you as required by law. If you make false 
statements to an immigration officer or file a 
fraudulent asylum claim, that’s a felony. If you help 
others to do so, that’s a felony, too. You’re going to jail. 
So if you are going to come to this country, come here 
legally. Don’t come here illegally.38 
B. Employing the Pretext of Criminality to Take More than 5000 
Children from Their Parents 
The Trump Administration seized on the so-called nuclear 
option of “zero tolerance”39 to deliberately separate noncitizens from 
their children on the theory that such violent disruption of people’s 
lives would deter other would-be immigrants from coming to the 
United States.40 Former DHS Secretary and then-Presidential Chief of 
 
38 .  Attorney General Jeff Sessions, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Remarks 
Discussing the Immigration Enforcement Actions of the Trump Administration, 
(May 7, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-sessions-
delivers-remarks-discussing-immigration-enforcement-actions [https://perma.cc/ 
A6NW-EBDJ]. 
39.  See Julie Hirschfeld Davis & Michael D. Shear, How Trump Came to 
Enforce a Practice of Separating Migrant Families, N.Y. TIMES (June 16, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/16/us/politics/family-separation-trump.html (on 
file with the Columbia Human Rights Law Review). See generally JULIE 
HIRSCHFELD DAVIS & MICHAEL D. SHEAR, BORDER WARS: INSIDE TRUMP’S ASSAULT 
ON IMMIGRATION (published October 8, 2019) (reviewed at Joe Klein, How Donald 
Trump’s Obsession with Immigrants Has Shaped His Presidency, N.Y TIMES (Oct. 
8, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/08/books/review/border-wars-julie-
hirschfeld-davis-michael-d-shear.html (on file with the Columbia Human Rights 
Law Review)). For a good summary of the legal history of this policy, see Shane 
Dizon & Pooja Dadhania, Immigr. L. Serv. § 2:154.50: Inspection and Admission of 
Persons Seeking Entry to the United States (2d ed. 2018–19). 
40 .  See Chappell & Taylor, supra note 14; see also L. v. United States 
Immigration & Customs Enf’t, 302 F. Supp. 3d 1149, 1166–67 (S.D. Cal. 2018) 
(holding that the Trump Administration’s zero tolerance policy involving the 
separation of families as a means of deterrence is a violation of the constitutional 
protection of family integrity); Tal Kopan, Exclusive: Trump Admin Thought 
Family Separations Would Deter Immigrants. They Haven’t., CNN (June 18, 2018), 
https://www.cnn.com/2018/06/18/politics/family-separation-deterrence-dhs/index. 
html [https://perma.cc/E7NT-JYGN] (writing that Mr. Trump’s zero-tolerance 
policy was intended to deter illegal entry into the United States by promising 
prosecution and potential family separation); Miriam Jordan, More Migrants Are 
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Staff John Kelly said, “a big name of the game is 
deterrence . . . [F]amily separation would be a tough deterrent.”41 In 
prior administrations, first-time entrants were usually placed in 
administrative (civil immigration) detention. 42  In civil detention, 
unlike federal penal custody, children can stay with their parents.43 
It is critical to stress that, despite obfuscation to the contrary, 
the Trump Administration is not required by any law to separate young 
children from their families: 
The president and top administration officials say U.S. 
laws or court rulings are forcing them to separate 
families that are caught trying to cross the southern 
border. These claims are false. Immigrant families are 
being separated primarily because the Trump 
 
Crossing the Border This Year. What’s Changed?, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 5, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/05/us/crossing-the-border-statistics.html (on file 
with the Columbia Human Rights Law Review) (stating that the zero-tolerance 
policy is not deterring families fleeing violence and corruption, although fewer 
single males seeking employment are being apprehended). 
41.  Chappell & Taylor, supra note 14; see also Julia Ainsley, Trump Admin 
Weighed Targeting Migrant Families, Speeding up Deportation of Children, NBC 
(Jan. 17, 2019), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/immigration/trump-admin-
weighed-targeting-migrant-families-speeding-deportation-children-n958811 
[https://perma.cc/6QQG-WY8E] (examining a 2017 draft of the Trump 
Administration’s family separation policy). 
42.  See Linda Qiu, Fact-Checking Trump’s Family Separation Claim About 
Obama’s Policy, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 9, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/09/ 
us/politics/fact-check-family-separation-obama.html (on file with the Columbia 
Human Rights Law Review) (“[T]op [Trump Administration] officials countered 
that Mr. Trump’s predecessors had also separated families at the border. That is 
misleading. While previous administrations did break up families, it was 
rare. . . . Neither former Presidents George W. Bush nor Barack Obama had a 
policy that had the effect of widespread family separation . . . . Nothing like what 
the Trump administration is doing has occurred before.”); see also Salvador Rizzo, 
The Facts About Trump’s Policy of Separating Families at the Border, WASH. POST 
(June 19, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/wp/2018/ 
06/19/the-facts-about-trumps-policy-of-separating-families-at-the-border/ (on file 
with the Columbia Human Rights Law Review) (noting that in past administrations 
immigrants seeking asylum were “were released and went into the civil court 
system, but now the parents are being detained and sent to criminal courts . . . .”). 
43.  See Seung Min Kim, 7 Questions About the Family-Separation Policy, 
Answered, WASH. POST (June 19, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/ 
q-and-a-understanding-the-controversy-over-separating-families-at-the-border/ 
2018/06/19/8a61664a-73fb-11e8-be2f-d40578877b7b_story.html (on file with the 
Columbia Human Rights Law Review). See also Salvador Rizzo, supra note 42. 
 
 
2019] Enter at Your Own Risk: Criminalizing Asylum Seekers 25 
administration in April began to prosecute as many 
border-crossing offenses as possible. This “zero-
tolerance policy” applies to all adults, regardless of 
whether they cross alone or with their children. The 
Justice Department can’t prosecute children along 
with their parents, so the natural result of the zero-
tolerance policy has been a sharp rise in family 
separations. . . . The Trump administration 
implemented this policy by choice and could end it by 
choice. No law or court ruling mandates family 
separations.44 
 
After nation-wide outcry, President Trump stated that he 
halted this program, but, as of late 2019, thousands of children are still 
separated from their parents or close relatives, whose whereabouts are 
essentially unknown.45 According to the Administration itself, in court 
filings, it may take at least a year and potentially two years before 
these children can be reunited with their families because the 
government made no effort to keep track of information about either 
 
44 .  Salvador Rizzo, supra note 42 (emphasis added). “Administration 
officials have pointed to "the law" as the reason why undocumented children are 
being separated from their parents. But there's no such law. . . . There is no law 
that requires migrant children who arrive at the border to be separated from their 
parents. The separation practice began in earnest when Attorney General Jeff 
Sessions announced in early May that the departments of Justice and Homeland 
Security would work together to criminally prosecute everyone who crosses the 
border illegally—the “zero tolerance” policy. “If you are smuggling a child, then we 
will prosecute you and that child will be separated from you as required by law,” 
Sessions said in Scottsdale, Ariz., on May 7. That tactic, in effect, directly leads to 
migrant children being separated from their parents; kids cannot be held in 
criminal jails alongside their mother or father.” Seung Min Kim, supra note 44. 
45.  In January 2019, the Inspector General of the Department of Health and 
Human Services identified 2,737 immigrant children whom the government had 
separated from their parents, but noted that there may have been “thousands” 
more. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, 
OEI-BL-18-00511, SEPARATED CHILDREN PLACED IN OFFICE OF REFUGEE 
RESETTLEMENT CARE (Jan. 2019), https://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-BL-18-
00511.pdf [https://perma.cc/5DSV-6V23]. Recently, the true number of children 
separated from family at the border since July 2017 has been revealed to be almost 
double that number, at least 5400. See, e.g., ASSOCIATED PRESS, More than 5,400 
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the children or their relatives prior to April 2018.46 Advocates were 
reduced to recommending that the names, birthdates, and, when 
known, “Alien Numbers” of parents or siblings be written in indelible 
ink on the backs of children, with the thought that children would be 
less likely to wash ink off their backs.47 Before Mr. Trump ostensibly 
stopped the policy, hundreds of immigrant parents had been deported 
to their countries of origin without their children.48 The young sons and 
daughters of these immigrants were left in locked residential facilities 
or in foster care to fend for themselves.49 No proceeding determined 
 
46.  See Julia Jacobs, U.S. Says It Could Take Two Years to Identify up to 
Thousands of Separated Immigrant Families, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 6, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/06/us/family-separation-trump-administration. 
html (on file with the Columbia Human Rights Law Review). 
47 .  Lorelei Williams, Esq., Chair, New York City AILA Chapter, 
Presentation (Apr. 9, 2019) (notes on file with author) (describing her multiple trips 
to asylum-seeker border camps and caravans and working with NGOs trying to 
provide food, water, clothing, and minimal shelter and protection to the refugees). 
48.  See John Bacon, Are Immigrant Family Reunions Likely? 463 Parents 
May Have Been Deported Without Kids, USA TODAY (July 24, 2018), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2018/07/24/immigration-parents-
mayhave-been-deported-without-kids/824904002/ [https://perma.cc/NF4K-GS58]; 
see also New Details on Border Patrol Arrests, TRANSACTIONAL RECORDS ACCESS 
CLEARINGHOUSE (June 27, 2018), http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/518/ 
[https://perma.cc/M5ZR-RPFP] (finding “[a] total of 1,060 out of the 4,537 adults 
arrested in April 2018 with children already had been deported.”); Miriam Jordan, 
‘I Can’t Go Without My Son,’ a Mother Pleaded as She Was Deported to Guatemala, 
N.Y. TIMES (June 17, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/17/us/immigration-
deported-parents.html (on file with the Columbia Human Rights Law Review); 
Graham Kates, Migrant Children at the Border—The Facts, CBS NEWS (June 20, 
2018), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/migrant-children-at-the-border-by-the-
numbers/ [https://perma.cc/8N5E-AYZF]. 
49.  See Emily Atkin, The Uncertain Fate of Migrant Children Sent to Foster 
Care, NEW REPUBLIC (June 20, 2018), https://newrepublic.com/article/149161/ 
uncertain-fate-migrant-children-sent-foster-care [https://perma.cc/57VW-QT6Z]. 
At the more than one hundred federally contracted “shelters,” children are not free 
to leave. The large, understaffed facilities have been denounced as hotbeds of illness 
and danger by Congressional leaders and criticized even by the Inspector General 
of the Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”). As of December 2018, 
the shelters were at 92% capacity with about 15,000 children detained, despite the 
fact that sponsors (usually family members residing in the United States) have 
applied for the release of thousands of the children pending resolution of their 
immigration proceedings. Release to sponsors is taking far longer than in prior 
administrations, in part because HHS now fingerprints sponsors to conduct a 
subsequent criminal background check. In contrast, staffers at the “shelter” 
facilities do not undergo the same kinds of background checks, and a horrifyingly 
high incidence of sexual assault on children has been documented by HHS and 
reported to Congress. See John Burnett, Almost 15,000 Migrant Children Now Held 
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that their parents were unfit or were otherwise abusive or neglectful. 
Even at the time that the program was formally and grudgingly 
disbanded—although it now appears DHS continues a de facto 
separation policy by claiming migrant parents present a risk to their 
children 50—ICE and CBP had little information they could use to 
 
at Nearly Full Shelters, NPR (Dec. 13, 2018), https://www.npr.org/2018/12/13/ 
676300525/almost-15-000-migrant-children-now-held-at-nearly-full-shelters 
[https://perma.cc/BAH3-GKHU]; Miriam Jordan, Thousands of Migrant Children 
Could Be Released After Sponsor Policy Change, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 18, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/18/us/migrant-children-release-policy.html (on 
file with the Columbia Human Rights Law Review); Michael Grabell, Topher 
Sanders & Silvina Sterin Pensel, In Immigrant Children’s Shelters, Sexual Assault 
Cases Are Open and Shut, PROPUBLICA (Dec. 21, 2018), https://www.propublica. 
org/article/boystown-immigrant-childrens-shelter-sexual-assault [https://perma.cc/ 
V4GE-PPH2]; Kristen Martinez-Gugerli, Reported Sex Abuse of Migrant Children 
in U.S. Custody Highlights Inadequacies in Immigration System, PANORAMAS, 
UNIV. OF PITT. (Mar. 18, 2019), https://www.panoramas.pitt.edu/news-and-
politics/reported-sex-abuse-migrant-children-us-custody-highlights-inadequacies-
immigration [https://perma.cc/N4BC-QGRP].  
HHS has also deliberately discouraged eligible sponsors from coming forward to 
claim children by reporting sponsors’ background information to ICE; at least 170 
potential sponsors who appeared to be undocumented have been targeted and 
arrested by ICE. See Brian Tashman, ACLU Report: Kirstjen Nielsen Continues to 
Insist that There Is No Family Separation Policy, https://www.aclu.org/blog/ 
immigrants-rights/ice-and-border-patrol-abuses/kirstjen-nielsen-continues-insist-
there-no [https://perma.cc/G5JA-8CMM].  
Finally, in an apparent attempt to hide the truth, ICE has sought permission 
from the National Archives and Records Administration (“NARA”) to destroy the 
records of physical and sexual abuse of immigrants in its custody, which have been 
widely reported and the subject of federal civil rights action. See Records Schedules; 
Availability and Request for Comments, 82 Fed. Reg. 32,585, 32,586 (July 14, 2017); 
see also Victoria López, ICE Plans to Start Destroying Records of Immigrant Abuse, 
Including Sexual Assault and Deaths in Custody, ACLU (Aug. 28, 2017), 
https://www.aclu.org/blog/immigrants-rights/ice-and-border-patrol-abuses/ice-
plans-start-destroying-records-immigrant [https://perma.cc/C7ZV-DFDH] 
(reporting that “NARA has provisionally approved ICE’s proposal” to destroy “11 
kinds of records, including those related to sexual assaults, solitary confinement 
and even deaths of people in its custody”); CIVIC Files Civil Rights Complaint on 
Rising Sexual Abuse in U.S. Immigration Detention Facilities, CIVIC: BLOG (Apr. 
11, 2017), http://www.endisolation.org/blog/archives/1221 [https://perma.cc/HA5M-
G4JE] (detailing CIVIC’s civil complaint against DHS regarding reported abuse 
and harassment at immigration detention facilities). 
50 .  Lomi Kriel & Dug Begley, Trump Administration Still Separating 
Hundreds of Migrant Children at the Border Through Often Questionable Claims 
of Danger, HOUSTON CHRONICLE (June 22, 2019), https://www.houstonchronicle. 
com/news/houston-texas/houston/article/Trump-administration-still-separating-
hundreds-of-14029494.php [https://perma.cc/DE8G-TDTU] (reporting that in 2018 
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comply with the court-ordered reunification of the thousands of 
children whom the agencies had separated from their parents.51 
C. Radical Attempts to Sharply Reduce Asylum-Seekers’ Rights to 
Assert Their Claims 
1. Denying Bond (Bail) and Making “Detention” Intolerable 
Almost as disquieting as the Trump Administration’s child 
separation policy are its actions targeting asylum-seekers and 
refugees.52 President Trump’s first executive order called on the U.S. 
 
“a federal judge ordered the government to reunify more than 2,800 children it had 
removed from their parents,” but “the judge allowed [DHS] to continue separating 
families if the parent posed a danger to the child or had a serious criminal record 
or gang affiliation. . . . More than 700 children were taken from their parents or, in 
a few cases, from other relatives between June 2018 and May 2019”). 
51.  Tal Kopan & Catherine E. Shoichet, Only 54 Children To Be Reunited by 
Court Deadline, but Judge Praises ‘Progress,’ CNN (July 9, 2018), 
https://www.cnn.com/2018/07/09/politics/family-separations-reunification-hearing/ 
index.html [https://perma.cc/3DPZ-4A4D]; see also Catherine E. Shoichet, Why It’s 
Taking So Long for the Government to Reunite the Families It Separated, CNN (July 
10, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/07/09/politics/family-separation-reunion-
hurdles/index.html [https://perma.cc/NG7D-Y643] (reporting that the delay in 
reuniting separated families is due to: officials’ failure to have a plan for 
reunification in place when the practice began, the fact that some parents had 
already been released from ICE custody and others deported, DHS’ attempts to 
confirm parentage by using DNA testing, and the agency’s lengthy process for 
releasing children from custody, including background checks and “suitability” 
determinations); Michael D. Shear, Zolan Kanno-Youngs & Maggie Haberman, 
Trump Signals Even Fiercer Immigration Agenda, With a Possible Return of Family 
Separations, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 8, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/08/us/ 
politics/trump-nielsen-family-separation.html (on file with the Columbia Human 
Rights Law Review) (reporting on a proposed Trump Administration policy called 
“binary choice,” which would involve giving migrant parents “a choice of whether to 
voluntarily allow their children to be separated from them, or to waive their child’s 
humanitarian protections so the family can be detained together, indefinitely, in 
jail-like conditions”).  
52.  Under the binding Flores settlement, the DHS “shall release a minor 
from its custody without unnecessary delay.” Stipulated Settlement Agreement 
¶14, Reno v. Flores, No. CV 85-4544 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 17, 1997). Rather than 
challenging the settlement, the Trump Administration is seeking to undermine  
it—and bypass a federal court finding that the settlement prohibits detention of 
children for more than twenty days—by issuing an interim regulation that permits 
DHS to detain immigrant children with their parents indefinitely during their 
immigration proceedings. See Dean DeChiaro, Trump Administration Moves to 
Detain Immigrant Children Longer, ROLL CALL (Sept. 6, 2018), https://www.roll 
call.com/news/politics/trump-administration-detain-immigrant-children-longer 
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Department of Justice to make prosecutions of illegal entrants a “high 
priority,” even though such cases already accounted for more than half 
of federal prosecutions. 53  Besides prosecuting first-time border 
entrants—including asylum-seekers—for illegal entry, 54  the Trump 
Administration had denied virtually all asylum-seekers parole or 
reasonable bond (that is, bail or some other form of release from 
detention) in their noncriminal immigration cases, regardless of the 
strength of their claims.55 The Trump Administration kept asylum-
seekers locked up in immigration detention until the ACLU obtained a 
 
[https://perma.cc/MFA3-F9TQ]. As the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights 
noted, “[c]hildren should never be detained for reasons related to their own or their 
parents’ migration status. Detention is never in the best interests of the child and 
always constitutes a child rights violation.” Press Release, United Nations Office of 
the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Briefing Note on Egypt, United States 
and Ethiopia (June 5, 2018), https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/ 
Display/News.aspx?NewsID=23174&LangID=E [https://perma.cc/6BM6-TBHC] 
(emphasis added). 
53.  Exec. Order No. 13768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799 (Jan. 25, 2017). 
54.  Corinne Duffy, New Analysis Reveals Increase in Prosecution of Asylum-
seekers Under Trump Admin, HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST (July 20, 2017), https://www. 
humanrightsfirst.org/press-release/new-analysis-reveals-increase-prosecution-
asylum-seekers-under-trump-admin [https://perma.cc/TKJ6-BG2C] (finding that 
prosecutions for illegal entry, illegal reentry, and other immigration-related 
violations constituted 52% of federal prosecutions in 2016—these prosecutions 
increased by 27% from April to May 2017 when federal prosecutors began 
criminally prosecuting first-time entrants for illegal entry); see also Lisa Riordan 
Seville & Hannah Rappleye, Trump Admin Ran ‘Pilot Program’ for Separating 
Migrant Families in 2017, NBC NEWS (June 28, 2018), https://www.nbcnews.com/ 
storyline/immigration-border-crisis/trump-admin-ran-pilot-program-separating-
migrant-families-2017-n887616 [https://perma.cc/8X67-UJX4] (reporting that prior 
to the Trump Administration’s “zero-tolerance” policy, the government had 
separated at least 2,342 migrant children from their parents in a “pilot program” 
in El Paso, Texas due to criminal prosecutions). 
55 .  The practice of denying parole for asylum-seekers who passed their 
credible fear interviews became most salient in 2017 when the Administration 
departed from the 2009 directive requiring ICE officials to make individualized 
determinations for parole. Damus v. Nielsen, 313 F. Supp. 3d 317, 339 (D.D.C. 
2018) (finding that from February to September of 2017, three field offices denied 
100% of parole applications and two other field offices denied 92 to 98% of parole 
applications, as compared to previous years where ICE granted more than 90% of 
parole applications) (emphasis added). For particularly vivid and egregious 
examples of the detention of more than 100 Cuban asylum-seekers (who used to be 
greeted with open arms when allegedly fleeing from Castro) languishing for years 
in detention despite having passed credible fear interviews, see Cuban Men Thrown 
into Louisiana Prisons Despite Legal Asylum Requests, SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW 
CENTER, (Apr. 10, 2019), https://www.splcenter.org/news/2019/04/10/cuban-men-
thrown-louisiana-prisons-despite-legal-asylum-requests [perma.cc/6CFY-C7DQ]. 
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district court order in July 2018 to stop the blanket denial of parole.56 
Despite the court order, ICE has reportedly rejected 75 percent of 
requests for parole made by asylum-seekers deemed to have a credible 
fear of persecution (often referred to as “passing the credible fear 
interview”).57 In comparison, the Obama Administration granted over 
90 percent of such requests.58 
A recent decision of Attorney General William Barr will 
presumably enable ICE to deny bond to almost all asylum-seekers. On 
April 16, 2019, Mr. Barr overruled a George W. Bush-era Board of 
Immigration Appeals decision and codified ICE’s bond denial practice 
with a directive to Immigration Judges that will further reduce 
meaningful access to asylum. Again exercising the unique power in our 
system of unilateral reversal of selected Board precedent, with no hint 
of deference to stare decisis, the Attorney General found that, except in 
extraordinarily limited cases, asylum-seekers who demonstrate a 
credible fear of persecution are no longer eligible for parole or 
reasonable bond. 59  By requiring asylum-seekers to remain 
 
56.  Damus, 313 F.Supp.3d at 323 (noting that the rate of parole grants 
“plummeted from over 90% [under the Obama Administration] to nearly zero” and 
entering a preliminary injunction on July 2, 2018 against the Department of 
Homeland Security to cease its wholesale denials of parole to asylum-seekers who 
passed credible fear interviews). 
57.  See Julián Aguilar, ACLU Claims ICE Still Detaining Some Asylum-
Seekers for No Reason Despite Court Order, TEXAS TRIBUNE (Aug. 28, 2018), 
https://www.texastribune.org/2018/08/28/aclu-ice-still-detaining-some-asylum-
seekers-no-reason/ [https://perma.cc/ZK8Z-KV4R] (noting that after a July 2018 
federal court order, ICE began granting parole to only about 25 percent of those 
asylum-seekers demonstrating credible fear, as compared to 90 percent under the 
Obama Administration); see also Will Weissert & Emily Schmall, ‘Credible Fear’ for 
U.S. Asylum Harder to Prove Under Trump, ASSOCIATED PRESS (July 16, 2018), 
https://www.apnews.com/a7c571cce7f94880816f2bb0e434ae80 [https://perma.cc/ 
HFS2-N2S7] (noting that the Obama administration “allow[ed] many immigrants 
passing credible fear interviews to remain free while their asylum cases 
progressed”). President Trump and other members of his Administration have 
pejoratively characterized prior policies, which would allow most who pass a 
credible fear interview to qualify for bond, as “catch and release” (as if immigrants, 
including asylum-seekers, were some sort of gamefish or animal). See, e.g., Rafael 
Carranza, Trump Administration Announces the End of 'Catch And Release'; USA 
TODAY (Sept. 24, 2019), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2019/09/ 
23/trump-administration-announces-end-catch-and-release-kevin-mcaleenan/ 
2425679001/ [https://perma.cc/K3UR-MC3L]. 
58.  Aguilar, supra note 57. 
59.  See Matter of M-S-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 509, 518–19 (A.G. 2019) (holding that 
noncitizens initially placed in expedited removal proceedings are statutorily subject 
to mandatory detention during full removal proceedings, even when found to have 
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incarcerated pending adjudication of their asylum claims, a process 
that now averages nearly two years,60 the Trump Administration has 
 
a credible fear of persecution); see also Michael D. Shear & Katie Benner, In New 
Effort to Deter Migrants, Barr Withholds Bail to Asylum Seekers, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 
16, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/16/us/politics/barr-asylum-bail.html 
(on file with the Columbia Human Rights Law Review). In July 2019, a federal 
district court judge issued a decision in a class action reversing the Attorney 
General’s ruling in Matter of M-S-, finding instead that the government must 
provide reasonably prompt bond hearings to asylum-seekers in Immigration Court 
and requiring Immigration Judges to grant bond unless the Department of 
Homeland Security can demonstrate good cause to keep the asylum-seeker in 
detention. See Noah Lanard, Judge Blocks Trump Administration’s Attempt to 
Subject Thousands of Asylum Seekers to Indefinite Detention, MOTHER JONES (July 
2, 2019), https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2019/07/judge-blocks-trump-
administrations-attempt-to-subject-thousands-of-asylum-seekers-to-indefinite-
detention/ [https://perma.cc/PV84-WMPH]; Padilla v. U.S. Immigration & Customs 
Enforcement, 379 F. Supp. 3d 1170, 1228 (W.D. Wash. 2019).  
For an explanation of the Attorney-General’s special prerogative to select and 
overrule or modify any decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals, and its prolific 
use in this Administration, see Jeffrey S. Chase, The AG's Certifying of BIA 
Decisions, OPINIONS/ANALYSIS ON IMMIGRATION LAW (Mar. 29, 2019), and 
references cited therein, https://www.jeffreyschase.com/blog/2018/3/29/the-ags-
certifying-of-bia-decisions [https://perma.cc/MH54-REN4]. 
60.  From the time President Trump took office in January 2017 through May 
2018, Immigration Courts experienced a 32% increase in backlog, causing waiting 
times before an Individual Merits Hearing (fact-finding and decision proceeding) to 
vary enormously, depending on location. See Immigration Court Backlog Jumps 
While Case Processing Slows, TRANSACTIONAL RECORDS ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE 
(June 8, 2018), http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/516/ [https://perma.cc/ 
5LTE-M8QE]. Overall, the Immigration Court backlog (exacerbated by a five-week 
federal government shutdown precipitated by the President’s attempt to force 
Congress to fund his obsession with a border wall) has ballooned by a stunning 49% 
during the first two years of the Trump Administration, surpassing one million 
pending cases for the first time. See Immigration Court Backlog Surpasses One 
Million Cases, TRANSACTIONAL RECORDS ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE (Nov. 6, 2018), 
https://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/536/ [https://perma.cc/BDP8-YZLQ]; 
Immigration Court Workload in the Aftermath of the Shutdown, TRANSACTIONAL 
RECORDS ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE (Feb. 19, 2019), https://trac. syr.edu/ 
immigration/reports/546/ [https://perma.cc/5W46-R876] (providing data on 
immigration backlog in February 2019). In some locations such as Houston, the 
wait averages 1,751 days; in other locations such as Dilley, Texas, 266 miles away, 
the wait may be only one to two months. Id.  
The location of the detainee and thus the venue of the proceeding are initially 
entirely up to the DHS officer who issues the I-862 Notice to Appear advising the 
recipient of the location, date and time of the removal proceeding. Although 
generally cases are located near the place of arrest or apprehension, a DHS officer 
can make a case returnable in whatever Immigration Court s/he selects. Amer. 
Imm. Council, Practice Advisory, Notices To Appear: Legal Challenges And 
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forced many bona fide asylum-seekers to give up their asylum claims. 
In effect, the Administration compels them to make the Hobson’s 
 
Strategies (updated Feb. 27, 2019) at 8-9, https://www.americanimmigration 
council.org/sites/default/files/practice_advisory/notices_to_appear_practice_adviso
ry.pdf [https://perma.cc/LC5L-AD29]. Detainees also can be transferred at will 
anywhere within the United States, which can result in a change of venue to a 
different Immigration Court. Since the issuing DHS officer largely determines 
where an asylum claim will be heard, the agency in turn controls the applicable 
legal standards that will be applied, because Immigration Courts follow precedent 
set by the Circuit Courts with jurisdiction over their geographic locations, and also 
the type of Immigration Court Judge likely to be assigned, which asylee advocates 
agree is perhaps the single most important factor (next to having counsel) in 
predicting the outcome of a claim. Roger Grantham, Jr., Detainee Transfers and 
Immigration Judges: ICE Forum-Shopping Tactics in Removal Proceedings (Feb. 
18, 2019).53 GEORGIA L. REV. 281 (2018); see also TRAC, Asylum Decisions by 
Custody, Representation, Nationality, Location, Month and Year, Outcome (May 31, 
2019), https://trac.syr.edu/phptools/immigration/asylum/; Findings of Credible Fear 
Plummet Amid Widely Disparate Outcomes by Location and Judge (July 30, 2018), 
https://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/523/; Asylum Outcome Continues to 
Depend on the Judge Assigned (Nov. 20, 2017) (odds of asylum denial range from, 
e.g., 10.9 percent to 98.7 percent depending upon the judge assigned), 
https://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/490/; see also SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW 
CENTER, The Attorney General’s Judges: How the U.S. Immigration Courts Became 
a Deportation Tool (June 25, 2019) (impact on decision-making of highly politicized 
hiring and firing in Executive Office of Immigration Review, along with many other 
factors that contribute to random and arbitrary outcomes), 
https://www.splcenter.org/20190625/attorney-generals-judges-how-us-
immigration-courts-became-deportation-tool [https://perma.cc/Z3VZ-8JTS]; 
Gabriel Thompson, Your Judge Is Your Destiny: The Immigration Court Judge Who 
Has Rejected Every Asylum Seeker, TOPIC (July 2019) (example of IJ who has denied 




As of September 2019, the average wait time for an Immigration Court 
proceeding has reached 696 days. Average Time Pending Cases Have Been Waiting 
in Immigration Courts as of September 2019, TRANSACTIONAL RECORDS ACCESS 
CLEARINGHOUSE, https://trac.syr.edu/phptools/immigration/court_backlog/ 
apprep_backlog_avgdays.php [https://perma.cc/7FRH-4CJ3]; see also, Marissa 
Esthimer, Crisis in the Courts: Is the Backlogged U.S. Immigration Court System 
at Its Breaking Point?, MIGRATION POLICY INSTITUTE (Oct. 3, 2019), 
https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/backlogged-us-immigration-courts-
breaking-point [https://perma.cc/M76L-RKWU ] (noting that average wait times for 
current open cases in Immigration Court surpass 700 days; yet, since the decision 
can mean life or death for those fleeing violence and persecution, growing backlog 
and pressure to expedite decisions, combined with pre-existing disparities in 
asylum grant rates, may result in insufficient due process for those who need it 
most). 
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choice between lengthy immigration detention in the United States or 
“voluntary” deportation with the risk of persecution and death in their 
countries of origin.61 Despite continuing publicity and protest about the 
conditions in which asylum-seekers are held, the Administration has 
descended to new lows in its treatment of detained children, at a cost 
to the U.S. taxpayer of about $775 per child, per day. 62  Terrified 
toddlers, who were promptly separated from their parents or guardians 
upon entering the United States, are confined with no understanding 
of why or for how long they will be detained without their parents, or 
whether or when they will ever see their parents again, and often with 
 
61.  In a classic example of this phenomenon, one co-author consulted with 
an asylum applicant with a textbook religious persecution claim who had been 
detained for seven months in an isolated facility in Georgia awaiting his individual 
hearing. He had never been accused of any crime and there was no reason to 
suspect, with his strong asylum claim, that he would not appear for his hearing. 
Because he was incarcerated, he was forced to appear pro se before one of the 
notorious Atlanta Immigration Judges who virtually never grant asylum (see GAO-
17-72, Asylum Variation Exists in Outcomes of Applications Across Immigration 
Courts and Judges (Nov. 2016) (grant rate of 52 percent (defensive)-66 percent 
(affirmative) in New York Immigration Court and less than 5 percent (affirmative 
and defensive) in Atlanta Immigration Court, https://www.gao.gov/assets/690/ 
680976.pdf [https://perma.cc/T7X4-RTWN]). This judge refused to allow him 
representation by someone of his own choosing, even though the representative was 
qualified by statute and regulation. See 8 C.F.R. § 1292.1(a)(3) (2011). After a 
cursory hearing and the subsequent denial, this immigration judge misinformed 
the respondent about the length of time an appeal to the Board of Immigration 
Appeals would likely take. In despair at the thought of years more in detention, he 
was persuaded to give up, irrevocably waive his right to appeal, and accept 
immediate removal to the country where he had been repeatedly physically harmed 
and threatened with death for carrying out his evangelical duties to resist the 
actions of local maras. 
The U.N. Committee Against Torture has specifically concluded that this 
practice violates the Convention, stating that “[s]tates parties should not adopt 
dissuasive measures or . . . policies, such as detention in poor conditions for 
indefinite periods, [or] refusing to process claims for asylum or prolonging them 
unduly, or cutting funds for assistance programmes for asylum seekers, . . . which 
would compel persons in need of protection under article 3 of the Convention . . . to 
return to their country of origin in spite of their personal risk of being subjected to 
torture or other cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment there.” 
U.N. Comm. Against Torture, General Comment No. 4 (2017) on the 
Implementation of Article 3 of the Convention in the Context of Article 22, 3, 
CAT/C/GC/4 (Sept. 4, 2018) (emphasis added). 
62.  Emily Atkin, The Mind-Boggling Cost of Breaking up Migrant Families, 
NEW REPUBLIC (June 2018), https://newrepublic.com/minutes/149220/mind-
boggling-cost-breaking-migrant-families [https://perma.cc/QBB7-6B2Q]. 
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no supervision but that of other children.63 Most recently, the Trump 
Administration announced that it would no longer provide any 
opportunity for sports, English classes, or the general know-your-
rights legal orientation programs that have long been offered to 
detained, unaccompanied children.64 
No one should even purport to decide whether the “temporary 
detention of asylum-seekers” constitutes a “penalty” within the 
meaning of international refugee and human rights law without first 
reading these truly shocking accounts by law professors and reputable 
journalists of the “detention centers”.65  
 
63 .  See Cedar Attanasio, Garance Burke & Martha Mendoza, Attorneys: 
Texas Border Facility Is Neglecting Migrant Kids, ASSOCIATED PRESS (June 21, 
2019), https://www.apnews.com/46da2dbe04f54adbb875cfbc06bbc615 
[https://perma.cc/RH7J-ANTW]; Isaac Chotiner, Inside a Texas Building Where the 
Government Is Holding Immigrant Children: Interview of Prof. Warren Binford, 
Willamette University School of Law, NEW YORKER (June 22, 2019), 
https://www.newyorker.com/news/q-and-a/inside-a-texas-building-where-the-
government-is-holding-immigrant-children [https://perma.cc/442A-MVV7]; 
Associated Press, DOJ Lawyer: Sanitary Conditions for Detained Migrant Children 
Doesn’t Necessarily Mean Providing ‘Toothbrush and Soap’, KQED NEWS (June 19, 
2019), https://www.kqed.org/news/11755713/doj-lawyer-sanitary-conditions-for-
detained-migrant-children-doesnt-necessarily-mean-providing-toothbrush-and-
soap [https://perma.cc/V34S-BTJQ]. Many blame the profit-making model of 
immigrant detention for the unacceptable conditions of confinement. See, e.g., 
Keramet Reider, Paying to Be Locked Up, AMERICAN SCHOLAR (Dec. 3, 2018), 
https://theamericanscholar.org/paying-to-be-locked-up/ [https://perma.cc/CPF9-
ZBWD] (arguing that corporations governing private detention centers “reap huge 
profits” from holding immigrant detainees, who are treated “like convicted 
criminals”). 
64 .  See Maria Sacchetti, Trump Administration Cancels English Classes, 
Soccer, Legal Aid for Unaccompanied Child Migrants in U.S. Shelters, WASH. POST 
(June 5, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/immigration/trump-
administration-cancels-english-classes-soccer-legal-aid-for-unaccompanied-child-
migrants-in-us-shelters/2019/06/05/df2a0008-8712-11e9-a491-25df61c78dc4_story. 
html (on file with the Columbia Human Rights Law Review). 
65.  Some have called the detention centers “concentration camps”—a term 
that has occasioned much controversy, but is defended as appropriate by a leading 
historian of mass incarceration. See Andrea Pitzer [author of ONE LONG NIGHT: A 
GLOBAL HISTORY OF CONCENTRATION CAMPS (2017)], An Expert on Concentration 
Camps Says That's Exactly What the U.S. Is Running at the Border, ESQUIRE (June 
21, 2019), https://www.esquire.com/news-politics/a27813648/concentration-camps-
southern-border-migrant-detention-facilities-trump/ [https://perma.cc/VM5N-
DUUL]; How the Trump Administration's Border Camps Fit into the History of 
Concentration Camps, GQ (June 19, 2019), https://www.gq.com/story/us-border-
concentration-camps [https://perma.cc/LD24-TMTE ] (“We tend to think of Nazi 
death camps as defining the term ‘concentration camp.’ But before World War II, 
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2. Prohibiting Asylum-Seekers Who Entered Without 
Inspection from Applying for Asylum 
The day after the 2018 midterm elections, the Secretary of 
Homeland Security and the Acting Attorney General jointly issued an 
interim rule purporting to prohibit immigrants who entered without 
inspection from applying for asylum.66 Such a regulation is without 
precedent and underscores not only the Administration’s disregard of 
 
this phrase was used to describe the detention of civilians without trial based on 
group identity. . . . A camp in a country in which the leader openly expresses 
animosity toward those interned, in which a government detains people and harms 
them by separating children from their parents or deliberately putting them in 
danger through neglect, is much closer to a concentration camp than a refugee 
camp. Nothing we are doing is likely to repeat Auschwitz, or to come anywhere close 
to it. But the history of concentration camps shows us that when it comes to this 
kind of detention, even when a government isn’t plotting a genocide, shocking 
numbers of people can still end up hurt—or dead.”)  
See also Masha Gessen, The Reality of American Concentration Camps, NEW 
YORKER (June 21, 2019), https://www.newyorker.com/news/our-columnists/the-
unimaginable-reality-of-american-concentration-camps; Paul Krugman, Trump 
and the Merchants of Detention, NY TIMES (July 8, 2019)(ICE detention centers 
meet historical definition of concentration camps), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2019/07/08/opinion/trump-migrants-detentioncenters.html (on file with the 
Columbia Human Rights Law Review); Peter Irons, ‘Concentration Camps’? What 
History Instructs [:] Consider Whether Term Applies to U.S. Migrant Detention 
Centers [;] Be Careful What You Call a Concentration Camp, SAN FRANCISCO 
CHRONICLE (2019 WLNR 2237119 (July 20, 2019) (noting that term originated with 
Britain’s war with the Boers).  
But see Aaron Bandler, Wiesenthal Center Calls AOC’s Concentration Camp 
Remarks ‘Insult to Victims of the Shoah’, JEWISH JOURNAL (June 18, 2019), 
https://jewishjournal.com/news/nation/300186/wiesenthal-center-calls-aocs-
concentration-.camp-remarks-insult-to-victims-of-the-shoah/. Rabbi Abraham 
Cooper, Associate Dean of the Simon Wiesenthal Center, stated, “It’s an insult to 
the victims of the Shoah to make blatant false comparisons. . . . Stop casting Trump 
as a latter-day Nazi scheming to build concentration camps. AOC and all 
Congressmen from both parties have a moral obligation to fix the humanitarian 
disaster at the border.” 
66.  See Memorandum from President Donald J. Trump to the Att’y Gen. and 
the Sec’y of Homeland Sec. (Apr. 29, 2019), https://www.whitehouse.gov/ 
presidential-actions/presidential-memorandum-additional-measures-enhance-
border-security-restore-integrity-immigration-system/ [https://perma.cc/4KYB-
L7FQ]; see also Memorandum from L. Francis Cissna, Director of United States 
Citizenship and Immigration Services, to USCIS Employees (Nov. 9, 2018), 
https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Laws/Memoranda/2018/2018-11-
09-PM-602-0166-Procedural_Guidance_for_Implementing_Regulatory_Changes_ 
Created_by_Interim_Final_Rule.pdf [https://perma.cc/5P54-5HAT] (disqualifying 
those who enter without inspection from applying for asylum). 
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American law and traditions, but, as this article shows, our 
international obligations and the rights of refugees. The stated purpose 
of the proposed rule is to funnel asylum-seekers to the U.S. ports of 
entry. Yet reliable reports have indicated that under this 
Administration many CBP officers first began telling asylum-seekers 
at the border ports of entry that they no longer have a right to asylum, 
dissuading them from filing asylum claims.67 Later, the CBP, claiming 
a lack of capacity, appears to have changed its policy to interview many 
fewer applicants at the ports of entry.68 Meanwhile, the rest of the 
applicants must remain in Mexico, trapped in an extralegal process 
called “metering” that is often controlled by corrupt Mexican law 
enforcement who make the destitute migrants bid with whatever they 
have for higher “numbers” on an unofficial list that is, nonetheless, 
enforced by the CBP.69 Given the resources of CBP and ICE, one has to 
 
67.  See AMNESTY INT’L, FACING WALLS: USA AND MEXICO’S VIOLATIONS OF 
THE RIGHTS OF ASYLUM-SEEKERS 1, 19–20 (2017), https://www.amnestyusa.org/wp-
content/uploads/2017/06/USA-Mexico-Facing-Walls-REPORT-ENG.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/G2M7-AE2Z] (reporting that between December 2015 and April 2017, 
nearly 71 asylum-seekers at the San Diego-Tijuana border crossing were told by 
CBP officers that they could not seek asylum or were given incorrect instructions 
on the procedures to follow, such as where to go to seek asylum); Zachary Mueller, 
Members of Congress Waited with Migrants Seeking Asylum. It Took Them 20 
Hours and a Cold Wait Overnight, AMERICA’S VOICE EDUC. FUND (Dec. 18, 2018), 
https://americasvoice.org/blog/reps-barragan-and-gomez-asylum/ [https://perma.cc/ 
35V5-5RDL] (video of Rep. Nanette Barragan confronting CBP officers who were 
rebuffing asylum-seekers at a port of entry). 
68.  Kate Smith, The Country’s Busiest Border Crossing Will Allow 20 People 




69 .  One non-governmental organization has sued the DHS Secretary, 
alleging that this “lack of capacity” is a deliberate governmental policy: 
[B]eginning around 2016, high-level CBP officials, under the 
direction or with the knowledge or authorization of the named 
Defendants (the “Defendants”), adopted a formal policy to 
restrict access to the asylum process at POEs [“Ports of Entry”] 
by mandating that lower level officials directly or constructively 
turn back asylum-seekers at the border (the “Turnback Policy”) 
contrary to U.S. law. In accordance with the Turnback Policy, 
CBP officials have used and are continuing to use various 
methods to unlawfully deny asylum-seekers access to the asylum 
process based on purported—but ultimately untrue—assertions 
that there is a lack of “capacity” to process them. These methods 
include coordinating with Mexican immigration authorities and 
other third parties to implement a “metering,” or waitlist, system 
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wonder whether this is a deliberate policy to discourage asylum 
applicants from claiming asylum at the ports of entry. 
3. Requiring Asylum-Seekers to “Remain in Mexico” 
The Trump Administration’s euphemistically-named 
Migration Protection Protocols (“MPP”) force asylum-seekers to remain 
in Mexico while their asylum claims are pending in the United States.70 
This policy geometrically magnifies the long-term practice of placing 
immigration detention centers in isolated areas of the United States, 
far from the media and, more importantly, far from attorneys who 
could represent those seeking refuge from systematic violence in their 
countries of origin. 71  Rather than protecting asylum-seekers, this 
 
that creates unreasonable and life-threatening delays in 
processing asylum-seekers; instructing asylum-seekers to wait 
on the bridge, in the preinspection area, or at a shelter until 
there is adequate space at the POE; or simply asserting to 
asylum-seekers that they cannot be processed because the POE 
is “full” or “at capacity.”  
See First Amended Complaint at 29, Al Otro Lado v. Nielsen, No. 3:17-cv-02366-
BAS-KSC (S.D. Cal. Oct. 12, 2018); Al Otro Lado v. Nielsen, CTR. FOR 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS (July 30, 2019), https://ccrjustice.org/home/what-we-
do/our-cases/al-otro-lado [https://perma.cc/HFA4-63QC]; see also Stephanie 
Leufert, What ‘Metering’ Really Looks Like in South Texas, LAWFARE (July 17, 
2019), https://www.lawfareblog.com/what-metering-really-looks-south-texas 
[https://perma.cc/W73D-6R63] (providing first-hand description by the Director of 
the Mexico Security Initiative at the University of Texas-Austin of the operation 
and effects of “metering” on the ability of asylum-seekers to present their cases at 
points of entry without delay). 
70.  See Migrant Protection Protocols (MPP), U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS 
ENFORCEMENT (Feb. 13, 2019), https://www.ice.gov/factsheets/migrant-protection-
protocols-mpp [https://perma.cc/QBN3-D2WP]. 
71.   See United States Commission on Civil Rights, Trauma at the Border: 
The Human Cost of Inhumane Immigration Policies (Oct. 4, 2019), 
https://www.usccr.gov/pubs/2019/10-24-Trauma-at-the-Border.pdf ("As of the end 
of June 2019, a total of 1,155 MPP cases had already been decided but asylum 
seekers were represented in only 14 of those cases—only 1.2 percent had legal 
representation.”). LEIDU PEREZ-DAVIS & KATE VOIGT, AM. IMMIGRATION LAWYERS 
ASS’N, POLICY BRIEF: “REMAIN IN MEXICO” PLAN RESTRICTS DUE PROCESS, PUTS 
ASYLUM-SEEKERS AT RISK 1, 3 (Feb. 1, 2019);); Michelle Chen, Trump’s ‘Remain in 
Mexico’ Policy Is Illegal Under International Law, NATION (Mar. 7, 2019) 
https://www.thenation.com/article/trump-border-mexico-international-law-
human-rights/ [https://perma.cc/SY3L-5C76]; see also Bill Frelick, U.S. Detention 
and Asylum Seekers, MIGRATION POL’Y INST. (Mar. 1, 2005), https://www.migration 
policy.org/article/us-detention-asylum-seekers-and-human-rights [https://perma. 
cc/5MEJ-7YKC] (discussing how detention impedes the right to seek asylum). 
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radical policy makes it all but impossible for asylum-seekers to obtain 
counsel while they wait for months, if not years, in the impoverished, 
cartel-ruled Mexican border cities. Not only does this policy deprive 
asylum-seekers of their right to obtain effective assistance of counsel, 
but the DHS memorandum establishing the “Remain in Mexico” policy 
also impermissibly imposed a much higher bar for asylum.72 
 
72.  Perez-Davis & Voigt, supra note 1, at 2. A federal district court issued a 
preliminary injunction halting the program, Innovation Law Lab v. Nielsen, 366 F. 
Supp. 3d 1110 (N.D. Cal. 2019), but the injunction was stayed by the Ninth Circuit, 
which authorized DHS to resume the practice while its legality is litigated, and 
more than 50,000 asylum-seekers have been relegated to Mexico. Dept of Homeland 
Sec., Assessment of the Migrant Protection Protocols (MPP), at 2 (Oct. 28, 2019), 
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/assessment_of_the_migrant_p
rotection_protocols_mpp.pdf (DHS has returned more than 55,000 aliens to Mexico 
under MPP); Mihir Zaveri, Rule Keeping Asylum Seekers in Mexico Can 
Temporarily Proceed, Court Says, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 17, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/12/us/trump-asylum-seekers-mexico.html (on 
file with the Columbia Human Rights Law Review); see Katie Shepherd, Federal 
Court Allows Controversial ‘Remain in Mexico’ Policy to Continue, Immigration 
Impact (May 15, 2019), http://immigrationimpact.com/2019/05/15/federal-court-
allows-remain-in-mexico-policy-continue/ [https://perma.cc/H4UP-QRDD].  
Migrants forced to remain in Mexico face violence and kidnappings as well as 
deprivation of the means for health and well-being. For a stunning description of 
the actual operation and impact of this program, please listen to the recordings of 
interviews of Asylum Officers and MPP-returned kidnapping victims at NPR, This 
American Life: The Out Crowd, (Nov. 15, 2019) https://www.thisamericanlife.org/ 
688/the-out-crowd [https://perma.cc/KG48-3HDY]. One study found that between 
21% and 24% of migrants in the Remain in Mexico program report receiving threats 
of violence while in Mexico, and of those, over 50% report that the threats turned 
into actual violence, including beatings, robbery, and extortion. Tom K. Wong, U.S. 
Immigration Policy Ctr., Seeking Asylum: Part 2 (2019), https://usipc.ucsd.edu/ 
publications/usipc-seeking-asylum-part-2-final.pdf [https://perma.cc/9PSF-VVNE]. 
Journalistic accounts and the State Department’s own Travel Advisory indicate 
that asylum-seekers face an even more frightening rate of violence, especially in 
Northern Mexican cities along the Texas border where kidnappings are rampant. 
See, e.g., Gus Bova, Nuevo Laredo Shelter Director Reportedly Kidnapped After 
Protecting Cuban Migrants, TEXAS OBSERVER (Aug. 11, 2019), https://www.texas 
observer.org/nuevo-laredo-shelter-director-reportedly-kidnappedafter-protecting-
cuban-migrants/ [https://perma.cc/X9DA-H8MU]; Mexico Travel Advisory, U.S. 
Dep’t of State (Apr. 9, 2019), https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/travel 
advisories/traveladvisories/mexico-travel-advisory.html [https://perma.cc/CN5L-
B4BS] (“violent crime, such as murder, armed robbery, carjacking, kidnapping, 
extortion, and sexual assault, is common”). On the “higher burden of proof” required 
to demonstrate the risk of danger in Mexico, see This American Life, supra. See also 
McAleenan v. Innovation Law Lab, Case No. 19-15716, Brief of Amicus Curiae 
Local 1924 in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellees’ Answering Brief and Affirmance of 
the District Court’s Decision (MPP violates non-refoulement obligation because 
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After being returned to Mexican border cities, which are 
completely unequipped to provide refugees any services or support, and 
among the most criminally violent and dangerous places on the globe, 
thousands of asylum-seekers have found it virtually impossible to 
participate in developing the necessary evidence for their asylum 
claims.73 They are mostly homeless and unemployed, and the Mexican 
government does not issue them work permits. They have no addresses 
or ways to communicate with Immigration Courts or with lawyers. The 
CBP or ICE often keeps their precious identification documents—e.g., 
birth, marriage, and death certificates—and other necessary original 
documents making it difficult for them to navigate any Mexican 
governmental systems.74 But they have no choice: if they are to pursue 
 
Mexico is not safe for most asylum-seekers from Central America, and not 
necessary to handle influx at border). 
73.  See After Observing Asylum Hearings, Amnesty International Calls to 
Stop Illegal Pushbacks of Asylum Seekers to Mexico, AMNESTY INT’L (Apr. 11, 2019), 
https://www.amnestyusa.org/press-releases/after-observing-asylum-hearings-
amnesty-international-calls-to-stop-illegal-pushbacks-of-asylum-seekers-to-
mexico/ [https://perma.cc/JXS9-XXZT] (discussing the violation of American and 
Mexican asylum law). As the Trump Administration is well aware, drug cartels 
function with impunity throughout Mexico. See, e.g., Dave Graham, Cartel Gunmen 
Terrorize Mexican City, Free El Chapo's Son, REUTERS (Oct. 17, 2019), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mexico-violence-sinaloa/cartel-gunmen-
terrorize-mexican-city-free-el-chapos-son-idUSKBN1WW34M [https://perma.cc/ 
SFX9-9K7G] (explaining how heavily armed fighters overpowered Mexican security 
forces and freed son of drug lord Joaquin ‘El Chapo’ Guzman; the capture triggered 
hours of gun battles and deaths of eight bystanders); David Brennan, Police Officer 
Involved In Operation Against El Chapo's Son Shot at More Than 150 Times In 
Daylight Assassination, NEWSWEEK (Nov. 8, 2019), https://www.newsweek.com/ 
police-officer-operation-el-chapo-son-shot-150-daylight-assassination-sinaloa-
culiacan-1470568 [https://perma.cc/853B-DDWD] (high-level Sinaloa State 
Preventive Police officer who had participated in response to escape of drug lord 
Joaquin "El Chapo" Guzman’s son was ambushed and killed by hail of bullets in 
about 30 seconds). See also U.S. ‘Remain in Mexico’ Policy Endangers Lives of 
Asylum Seekers in Tamaulipas State, MEDECINS SANS FRONTIERES/DOCTORS 
WITHOUT BORDERS (Sept. 5, 2019), https://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/what-
we-do/news-stories/news/us-remain-mexico-policy-endangers-lives-asylum-
seekers-tamaulipas [https://perma.cc/8SJL-ML4A].  
74. Tens of thousands of asylum-seekers live in street encampments, with no 
reliable sources of food, potable water, or sanitation, despite the best efforts of faith-
based and civic organizations. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, “WE CAN’T HELP YOU 
HERE”: U.S. RETURNS OF ASYLUM SEEKERS TO MEXICO 18–20 (2019). See Zolan 
Kanno-Youngs & Maya Averbuch, Waiting for Asylum in the United States, 
Migrants Live in Fear in Mexico, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 5, 2019) (outlining that twenty 
shelters and churches in Tijuana are housing around 3,000 migrants forced to 
remain in Mexico, with next to no room for future migrants; unable to find U.S. 
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their asylum cases, they must remain close to the border, able to attend 
their scheduled and rescheduled court appearances.  
Observers of the massive “MPP dockets” describe the San 
Diego Immigration Court as a chaotic epicenter of “aimless docket 
reshuffling.”75  Below are a few examples from a collection of near-
transcripts by attorneys and advocates at the Court that seem to 
strongly corroborate that image: 
 
(Baby crying during Immigration Court hearing for a 
mother and child forced to “Remain in Mexico”) 
Immigration Judge: Ma’am, didn’t I tell you that you 
didn’t need to bring your child to Court for this 
hearing[?] 
Mother with nursing baby: It’s just that . . . I don’t 
have any family. I don’t know anyone in Mexico. 
Immigration Judge: Okay, but you are going to need 
to be able to concentrate at your hearings so that you 
can provide the best testimony in your case. 
Mother with nursing baby: But if I have to stay in 
Mexico and come the United States for 
[C]ourt . . . where am I supposed to leave my baby? 
Immigration Judge: Ok[ay]. I just don’t want your 
baby to distract you. 
Immigration Judge to ICE Trial Attorney: Since 
you didn’t provide me with the brief I requested at the 
last hearing, what would you like me to do? 
ICE Trial Attorney: I’m sorry your [H]onor. I’m 
having trouble thinking over the crying baby. 
Immigration Judge: Well what exactly would you 
like me to do about it?76 
 
lawyers and are repeatedly robbed and kidnapped); Remain in Mexico Updates, 
HOPE BORDER INSTITUTE (last updated June 13, 2019), https://www.hopeborder. 
org/remain-in-mexico-052219 [https://perma.cc/CN2M-GFPS]. 
75. Former Immigration Court Judge Paul Schmidt seems to have coined the 
term in his blog: see Cruel, Yet Really Stupid: Trump’s “Remain in Mexico Policy” 
Denies Due Process While Creating Court Chaos—Enfeebled Judges Fume as 
“Aimless Docket Reshuffling” Bloats Backlogs!—Article IIIs Complicit!, 




76.  Brianna Rennix, This Week in Terrible Immigration News, CURRENT 
AFFAIRS (June 10, 2019), https://www.currentaffairs.org/2019/06/this-week-in-
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Can one truthfully declare that this practice comports with 
human rights and the United States’ international obligations toward 
refugees and asylum seekers or that it does not amount to a “penalty” 
within the meaning of Article 31 of the 1951 Refugee Convention?77 
 
terrible-immigration-news [https://perma.cc/7VXC-MD5M] (quoting Innovation 
Law Lab, FACEBOOK (June 6, 2019), https://www.facebook.com/innovationlawlab/ 
posts/2408081462758045 [https://perma.cc/X8AK-QTXF]); see also Taylor Levy 
(@taylorklevy), TWITTER (June 18, 2019), https://twitter.com/taylorklevy/status/ 
1141129449972408321 [https://perma.cc/4NEC-3G2V] (“A Honduran woman sent 
back to Mexico under Migrant Protection Protocol was kidnapped and raped in 
Juarez. The #MigrantPersecutionProtocols are directly at fault for this woman’s 
kidnapping & rape by men wearing Mexican Federal Police Uniforms. She had been 
returned to Mexico after having court in El Paso . . . .”) (citing Bob Moore 
(@BobMooreNews), TWITTER (June 18, 2019); Taylor Levy (@taylorklevy), TWITTER 
(June 12, 2019, 3:24 AM), https://twitter.com/taylorklevy/status/1138708709025 
222656 [https://perma.cc/H8ML-WJN7] (“Today in #MigrantPersecutionProtocols 
court; a crying, shaking mom showed off her 7[-year-old] daughter’s bloody scab 
from where she bumped her head while escaping armed attackers who broke into 
their migrant shelter in the middle of the night. [E]ven the judge looked shook.”); 
Bob Moore (@BobMooreNews), TWITTER (May 9, 2019), https://twitter.com/ 
BobMooreNews/status/1126608592822579201[https://perma.cc/T7B7-LFCR] 
(“Rene, a man from El Salvador, said on March 29 he was robbed and stabbed in 
Ciudad Juarez. He went to the police but was told that they couldn’t help him 
because he wasn’t Mexican. . . . Esdras, a man from Guatemala, was robbed twice 
at a church shelter. . . . Elvia, also from Guatemala, said she was robbed at a church 
shelter. Altogether, 9 of the 20 people in court told the judge they had a fear of 
returning to Mexico.”). 
One asylum officer eloquently described the Remain in Mexico policy and 
practice as follows: “People don’t have a right to asylum, sight unseen, but under 
international human rights law and our own immigration laws, they have the right 
to seek it. They have the right to knock on the door and say, “Help, a wolf is chasing 
me, let me in!” When that happens, we’re supposed to give them food and drink, 
and to let them sit by the fire and tell their story — and if it’s true that they’re in 
danger, we are supposed to give them shelter. It’s wrong to block their way and 
force them to wait on the front step, while we decide if we’re ready to listen.” Charles 
Tjersland Jr., I became an asylum officer to help people. Now I put them back in 
harm’s way. WASH. POST (July 19, 2019), https://wapo.st/33Pmvxq (on file with the 
Columbia Human Rights Law Review). 
77.  The former DHS Secretary’s rationale for how this policy manages not to 
violate the principle of non-refoulement, which she acknowledged might seem 
applicable, appears in a paragraph of her January 25, 2019 Policy Guidance 
Memorandum to the then-Directors of ICE, CBP, and USCIS. See Memorandum 
from Kirstjen Nielsen, Sec’y of Homeland Sec., to L. Francis Cissna, Director of U.S. 
Citizenship and Immigration Servs., et al. (Jan. 25, 2019), https://www.dhs.gov/ 
sites/default/files/publications/19_0129_OPA_migrant-protection-protocols-policy-
guidance.pdf [https://perma.cc/GF76-GUYT]; see also Guidance for Implementing 
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4. Charging Desperate Asylum-Seekers Filing Fees While 
Denying Work Authorization 
In a less cruel but counterproductive move, the Trump 
Administration is in the process of imposing new filing fees on asylum-
seekers. At the same time, the Administration has revoked eligibility 
for work permits from asylum-seekers who either enter, or try to enter, 
the United States in a way other than through a port of entry, even as 
CBP continues to block attempts to enter at those ports. 78  Very 
recently, this constriction has been augmented with a broader range of 
disqualifications for employment authorization aimed specifically at 
asylum-seekers. 79 
5. Politically Interfering in the State Department’s Human 
Rights Reports 
The Trump Administration has deliberately falsified through 
omission information in what had been the gold standard for factual 
claims about persecution in other countries: the State Department’s 
annual Country Reports on Human Rights Practices. These Reports are 
the bedrock documentation that asylum-seekers must both rely on and 
counter during the adjudication of their claims. They are utilized by 
United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”) asylum 
 
Section 235(b)(2)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act and the Migrant 
Protection Protocols, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. (Jan. 19, 2019), 
https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Laws/Memoranda/2019/2019-01-
28-Guidance-for-Implementing-Section-35-b-2-C-INA.pdf [https://perma.cc/JJ7M-
JM4V]; Memorandum from Ronald Vitiello, Deputy Dir. and Acting Dir. of U.S. 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement, to Executive Associate Directors (Feb. 12, 
2019), https://www.ice.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Fact%20sheet/2019/ICE-
Policy-Memorandum-11088-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/XK8R-ZBD4]. 
78.  See Zolan Kanno-Youngs & Caitlin Dickerson, Asylum Seekers Face New 
Restraints Under Latest Trump Orders, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 29, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/29/us/politics/trump-asylum.html (on file with 
the Columbia Human Rights Law Review) (“The entire idea of asylum is that it’s 
something that you need because you are fleeing some sort of violence or 
persecution,” said Michelle Brané, director of migrant rights and justice at the 
Women’s Refugee Commission, adding “to then say that it’s only accessible to people 
who can pay a fee doesn’t make sense. . . . There’s a reason that we give people work 
permits while they are waiting for asylum, so that they can support themselves and 
don’t have to be depending on government assistance during that time.” Speaking 
of the Trump administration’s broader approach to asylum, Ms. Brané said, “All of 
it has been aimed at reducing the number of people who can access the system as 
opposed to reducing the need for asylum by addressing root causes.”). 
79.  See discussion and authorities infra note 107. 
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officers, ICE and CBP officers at the border, Immigration Court 
Judges, the BIA, and by State Department officers in embassies and 
consulates abroad to test and evaluate the credibility, persuasiveness, 
and reliability of asylum-seeker accounts of persecution, as well as to 
establish, or controvert, whether individual reports of abuse are 
isolated criminal acts or governmental policies—a crucial distinction 
that makes or breaks almost every asylum claim.80 
For the vast majority of asylum-seekers who are unrepresented 
(and who often lack English proficiency and literacy, access to 
computerized resources or even books and newspapers, and 
increasingly are detained in remote facilities or now, cabined in 
Mexico), these official publications, routinely entered into evidence at 
asylum hearings, may be their sole means to corroborate the torture 
and persecution they have suffered or fear. In a campaign worthy of 
the Orwellian term “memory hole,” 81  State Department compilers 
obviously are being ordered to eliminate information specifically about 
the oppression of female and LGBTQ residents 82  including 
 
80.  See generally DREE K. COLLOPY, Chapter 6: Proving the Case: Burdens, 
Standards, and Evidence, in AILA’S ASYLUM PRIMER: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO U.S. 
ASYLUM LAW AND PROCEDURE 545–6 (8th ed. 2019); see also DEBORAH E. ANKER, 
Chapter 3: Evidence: Country Conditions and Human Rights Documentation, in 
THE LAW OF ASYLUM IN THE UNITED STATES (2018 ed.) (country conditions are 
perhaps the single most important factor in determining asylum applications, 
essential to explaining why asylum-seekers cannot safely relocate within their 
country of origin and escape persecution that way, and essential to establishing the 
validity, social distinction, and particularity of particular social groups, a necessary 
element for all asylum claims that are not based on racial, religious, ethnic or 
nationality discrimination, or political opinion). 
81.  George Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-Four (first published by Martin Secker 
& Warburg, London, 1949) (concept of and term “memory hole” a central feature of 
this dystopian and prophetic novel, in which the omnipresent, omniscient, 
omnipotent and monopolistic Party systematically and constantly destroys and re-
creates all documents, official and otherwise, to comport with the oft-changing 
current government propaganda—re-writing history and current events to match 
the official version, no matter how contrary to reality, and often entirely 
contradictory to the preceding version).  
82 .  For example, in 2018, Attorney General Jeff Sessions unilaterally 
overruled a BIA decision and decreed that women fleeing intimate partner violence 
would no longer be recognized as a “Particular Social Group” and therefore a 
protected category. See Matter of A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316 (A.G. 2018). But see 
Grace v. Whitaker, 344 F. Supp. 3d 96, 105 (D.D.C. 2018) (permanently enjoining 
Attorney General from effectuating his decision, albeit with respect solely to 
credible fear and reasonable fear interviews); see also Theresa A. Vogel, Critiquing 
Matter of A-B-: An Uncertain Future in Asylum Proceedings for Women Fleeing 
Intimate Partner Violence, 52 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 343, 373 (2019); Testimony of 
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governmental policies that deprive women of reproductive rights (not 
only the right to abortion, but also to contraception, to freedom from 
domestic violence, and access to health care).83 In 2019, as observed by 
many advocates and NGOs: 
[T]he Trump Administration released its annual 
Country Reports on Human Rights Practices without 
information on the full range of abuses and violations 
of reproductive rights experienced by women, girls and 
others around the world. The reports focus solely on 
coerced abortion or involuntary sterilization. These 
violations represent only a narrow slice of the coercive 
and harmful policies and other systemic challenges 
that women and girls face when trying to exercise their 
reproductive rights, including a lack of access to 
contraceptives and other sexual and reproductive 
health services.84 
 
Prof. Karen Musalo, Director, Ctr. for Gender and Refugee Studies, before 
Canadian Parliament Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration (May 
8, 2019) (contrasting President Trump’s attempted elimination of protection for 
survivors of gender-based violence with Canadian recognition of gender-based 
persecution as basis for asylum). For the most compelling account to date of the 
nearly inconceivable level of perversely vicious violence against women in 
Honduras, clearly tantamount to persecution, let alone torture, see Jill Filipovic, I 
Can No Longer Continue to Live Here, POLITICO (June 7, 2019), 
https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2019/06/07/domestic-violence-
immigration-asylum-caravan-honduras-central-america-227086 [https://perma.cc/ 
LVF8-ZXL9]. As the epigraph puts it, “What’s driving so many Honduran women 
to the U.S. border? The reality is worse than you’ve heard.” For an equally graphic, 
comparable article about El Salvador, see Tristan Clavel, Extortion and Sexual 




83.  See also Press Release, PAI, Trump Administration Erases Women in 
State Department Human Rights Report Once Again (Mar. 13, 2019), 
https://pai.org/press-releases/trump-Administration-erases-women-in-state-
department-human-rights-report-once-again/ [https://perma.cc/GDG3-6GKR]; 
State Department Human Rights Reports Selectively Criticize Abuses, HUMAN 
RIGHTS FIRST (Apr. 25, 2018), https://www.humanrightsfirst.org/press-release/ 
state-department-human-rights-reports-selectively-criticize-abuses [https://perma. 
cc/EGV4-3D7K] (noting that the preface to Trump’s Department of State Country 
Reports on Human Rights Practices criticize the human rights record of its enemies 
instead of “highlighting wider concerns at a time in which adherence to universal 
human rights is in retreat around the world”). 
84.  PAI Press Release, supra note 82. 
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In response, the “Reproductive Rights are Human Rights Act,” 
bicameral legislation that would require the United States to report on 
the full range of reproductive rights in the annual Country Reports on 
Human Rights Practices, has been introduced and is cosponsored by 
126 members of the House of Representatives and thirty Senators.85 
6. Drastically Reducing the Number of Refugees and Their 
Capacity to Present and Prove Their Claims 
President Trump’s original January 2017 executive order 
suspended the worldwide refugee program for 120 days and 
indefinitely halted the admission of Syrian refugees. 86  The United 
States is now admitting refugees again but at numbers among the 
lowest in decades. President Trump cut the refugee allocation from 
110,000 in Fiscal Year (“FY”) 2017 to 45,000 in FY 2018.87 Given all the 
additional restrictions imposed on migrants, the number of refugees 
actually admitted in 2018 was 22,491—less than half those allocated.88 
Secretary of State Michael Pompeo subsequently announced a further 
reduction to 30,000 for FY 2019, then the lowest on record. Recently, 
 
85.  See Reproductive Rights are Human Rights Act of 2019, H.R. 1581, 116th 
Cong. (2019). See Congresswoman Clark, Senator Menendez, Colleagues Announce 
Bicameral Reproductive Rights are Human Rights Act, KATHERINE CLARK, FIFTH 
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS (Mar 7, 2019), https://katherineclark.house.gov/ 
2019/3/congresswoman-clark-senator-menendez-colleagues-announce-bicameral-
reproductive-rights-are-human-rights-act [https://perma.cc/PNZ6-DUST] (quoting 
Amanda Klasing from Human Rights Watch) (“We all have universal human rights, 
which include deciding when to become parents, how many children to have and 
surviving childbirth. When governments limit women’s reproductive rights they 
also restrict their economic, social and political rights.”); 
86.  From February 2017 to September 2017, the Trump Administration 
admitted 21,268 refugees in total, including 1,673 from Syria. See DEP’T OF STATE, 
REFUGEE PROCESSING CENTER, REFUGEE ADMISSIONS REPORT (July 31, 2018). In 
the 2018 fiscal year, 18,214 refugees in total were admitted, but only 62 were from 
Syria. Id. In contrast, during the 2016 fiscal year, the Obama administration 
admitted 84,994 refugees in total, including 12,587 Syrian refugees, with another 
4,884 Syrians admitted through the end of his term on January 20, 2017. Id. 
87.  Julie Hirschfeld Davis, Trump to Cap Refugees Allowed into U.S. at 
30,000, a Record Low, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 17, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/ 
09/17/us/politics/trump-refugees-historic-cuts.html (on file with the Columbia 
Human Rights Law Review). 
88.  See DEP’T OF STATE, supra note 4; see also DEP’T OF STATE, REFUGEE 
PROCESSING CENTER, REFUGEE ADMISSIONS REPORT (June 30, 2018). 
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the Trump Administration announced that the allocation would be cut 
in the current fiscal year to 18,000.89 
In suspending the refugee program, President Trump 
principally argued that terrorists posing as refugees would come into 
the country. This was essentially the same argument that the United 
States raised against Jewish refugees in World War II. 90 This fear 
during World War II proved largely unfounded, 91  just as the 
President’s argument is now. As many have noted, none of the 
immigrants and visitors coming from the Muslim-majority countries 
designated in the Executive Orders 92  has been found to have 
committed any terrorist offenses in the United States.93 
 
89.  Davis, supra note 87; Michael D. Shear & Zolan Kanno Youngs, Trump 
Slashes Refugee Cap to 18,000, Curtailing U.S. Role as Haven, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 
26, 2019), https://nyti.ms/2OgF2w9 (on file with the Columbia Human Rights Law 
Review). 
90.  Radley Balko, The United States Also Denied Refuge to Jews Fleeing 
Hitler, Fearing They Might Be Nazis, WASH. POST (Jan. 25, 2017), https://www. 
washingtonpost.com/news/the-watch/wp/2017/01/25/the-united-states-also-denied-
refuge-to-jews-fleeing-hitler-fearing-they-might-be-nazis/ (on file with the 
Columbia Human Rights Law Review) (identifying the similarities between the 
Trump Administration’s claim that terrorists could pose as refugees and the 
Roosevelt Administration’s claim that Jewish refugees could be coerced spies for 
the Nazis). 
91.  Id. (finding that most of the concern about Jewish refugees entering as 
Nazi spies stemmed from a single story of an alleged Jewish refugee that after 
intense questioning admitted he was a Nazi spy). 
92.  Kyle Blaine & Julia Horowitz, How the Trump Administration Chose the 
7 Countries in the Immigration Executive Order, CNN (Jan. 30, 2017), 
https://www.cnn.com/2017/01/29/politics/how-the-trump-Administration-chose-
the-7-countries/index.html [https://perma.cc/K9FL-8WS9] (finding that the Obama 
Administration had imposed restrictions on Iran, Iraq, Sudan, Syria, Libya, 
Somalia, and Yemen in 2011 by eliminating the visa-waiver program that allowed 
dual citizens of these countries to travel back and forth without a United States 
visa whereas the Trump Administration’s order is broader by initially banning 
entry from Iran, Libya, North Korea, Somalia, Syria, Venezuela, and Yemen). 
93.  Alex Nowrasteh, TERRORISM AND IMMIGRATION: A RISK ANALYSIS, CATO 
INSTITUTE 1, 13 (Sept. 13, 2016), https://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/ 
pa798_2.pdf [https://perma.cc/38EQ-C37S] (finding that of the refugees admitted 
into the United States between 1975 and the end of 2015, 0.00062% were terrorists 
and only three ever succeeded in an attack; no other murders were recorded after 
the Refugee Act of 1980 implemented rigorous screening measures); see also Uri 
Friedman, Where America’s Terrorists Actually Come from, ATLANTIC (Jan. 30, 
2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/01/trump-
immigration-ban-terrorism/514361/ [https://perma.cc/R9BV-J469] (“Nationals of 
the seven countries singled out by President Trump have killed zero people in 
terrorist attacks on U.S. soil between 1975 and 2015.”); see also IntelBrief, supra 
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Another approach to reducing the number of refugees who 
reach the United States to claim asylum is to deter and prevent U.S. 
citizens from assisting them, whether by intimidation, surveillance, 
and harassment94 or by criminal prosecution. Attacks against all kinds 
of efforts to aid migrants, primarily asylum-seekers, have stepped up 
in both the United States and Mexico. Many appear to involve collusion 
between corrupt Mexican officials and Border Patrol officers, a 
constant problem since the CBP’s creation in 2003. 95  For example, 
Scott Warren, a volunteer for the humanitarian organization No More 
Deaths, was prosecuted (but not convicted by the jury) for “harboring” 
 
note 12 (finding in 2018 just one death in the United States as result of jihadi-
linked terrorism, while native-born right-wing terrorists killed fifteen Americans). 
94.  See supra note 15; see also Jefferson Sessions, Attorney General, Dep’t of 
Justice, Remarks to the Executive Office for Immigration Review (Oct. 12, 2017) 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-jeff-sessions-delivers-
remarks-executive-office-immigration-review [https://perma.cc/63TV-69SW] 
(Attorney General Sessions referred to asylum lawyers as “dirty immigration 
lawyers”); see also Nicole Lewis, Sessions’ Claim That ‘Dirty Immigration Lawyers’ 
Encourage Clients to Cite ‘Credible Fear,’ WASH. POST (Oct. 26, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/wp/2017/10/26/sessionss-
claim-that-dirty-immigration-lawyers-encourage-clients-to-cite-credible-fear/ (on 
file with the Columbia Human Rights Law Review) (demonstrating that former 
Attorney General Jeff Sessions’ claim that immigration attorneys are responsible 
for the increase in credible fear asylum cases is unsubstantiated). Authoritative 
commentators on the professional ethics of the immigration bar have expressed 
serious concern that this Administration may seek to prosecute lawyers under the 
“harboring doctrine” for “encourag[ing] . . . an alien to reside in the United 
States . . . in violation of law.” CYRUS MEHTA & ALAN GOLDFARB, EXECUTIVE 
DISORDER: ETHICAL CHALLENGES FOR IMMIGRATION LAWYERS UNDER THE TRUMP 
ADMINISTRATION (2017), https://www.houstonimmigration.org/wp-content/ 
uploads/2017/04/Ethics-under-Trump.pdf [https://perma.cc/CV45-B7MM]; see also 
8 U.S.C. § 1324 (a)(1)(A)(iv) (2018) (harboring statute); United States v. Lopez, 590 
F.3d 1238, 1243 (11th Cir. 2009) (upholding conviction of defendant charged under 
8 U.S.C. § 1324 (a)(1)(A)(iv) with “encouraging or inducing . . . aliens to enter the 
United States”). 
95.  AMNESTY INT’L, SAVING LIVES IS NOT A CRIME: POLITICALLY MOTIVATED 
LEGAL HARASSMENT OF MIGRANT HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS BY THE USA (2019), 
https://www.amnestyusa.org/reports/saving-lives-is-not-a-crime-politically-
motivated-legal-harassment-of-migrant-human-rights-defenders-by-the-usa/ 
[https://perma.cc/Y5DN-E8YL]) (USA authorities unlawfully targeting human 
rights defenders; DHS violations of domestic and international law; collaboration 
in abuses by USA and Mexican governments); see also NARCOS OVER THE BORDER: 
GANGS, CARTELS, AND MERCENARIES 226 (Robert J. Bunker ed., 2011); Jeremy L. 
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in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324. CBP agents set up surveillance at a 
humanitarian station and arrested Mr. Warren, a thirty-six-year-old 
geography teacher, on three felony charges because he helped a pair of 
migrants from Central America who were hungry, dehydrated, and 
struggling to walk on blistered feet. 96  At the same time, vigilante 
groups such as the United Constitutional Patriots, with no legal basis 
whatsoever, roam the border in full combat gear, intimidating, 
threatening, and even detaining large numbers of people whom they 
believe to be immigrants.97 
 
96.  Scott Warren, I Gave Water to Migrants Crossing the Arizona Desert. 
They Charged Me with a Felony, WASH. POST (May 28, 2019), https://www. 
washingtonpost.com/outlook/2019/05/28/i-gave-water-migrants-crossing-arizona-
desert-they-charged-me-with-felony/?utm_term=.28913cc994f2 (on filed with the 
Columbia Human Rights Law Review). 
The United States is still largely a Christian country, and often proclaimed as 
such by members of the Trump Administration, including the Secretary of State. 
See Michelle Boorstein, State Department’s First-Ever Employee Christian Faith 
Group Underscores Mike Pompeo’s Influence, WASH. POST (Nov. 1, 2019) https:// 
www.washingtonpost.com/religion/2019/11/01/highlighting-value-christians-state-
departments-first-ever-employees-faith-group-underscores-mike-pompeos-
influence/ (on file with the Columbia Human Rights Law Review) (Pompeo posts 
about being a “Christian Leader” on the State Department website, founded a 
Christian affinity group within the Department, etc.) But the prosecution of those 
who try to prevent unnecessary migrant deaths in this way seems to fly in the face 
of the Last Judgment, From the Gospel According to St. Matthew, Matthew 25:31-
46: 
'Come, you that are blessed by my Father, inherit the kingdom 
prepared for you from the foundation of the world; for I was 
hungry and you gave me food, I was thirsty and you gave me 
something to drink, I was a stranger and you welcomed me, I was 
naked and you gave me clothing, I was sick and you took care of 
me, I was in prison and you visited me.'  
Then the righteous will answer him, 'Lord, when was it that we 
saw you hungry and gave you food, or thirsty and gave you 
something to drink? And when was it that we saw you a stranger 
and welcomed you, or naked and gave you clothing? And when 
was it that we saw you sick or in prison and visited you?' And the 
king will answer them, 'Truly I tell you, just as you did it to one 
of the least of these who are members of my family, you did it to 
me.'  
Id. (emphasis added). 
97 .  Simon Romero, Militia in New Mexico Detains Asylum Seekers at 
Gunpoint, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 18, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/18/us/ 
new-mexico-militia.html (on file with the Columbia Human Rights Law Review); 
Sarah Lynch Parker, Armed Vigilantes Unlawfully Detaining Migrants Near U.S.-
Mexico Border, ACLU Says, CBS NEWS (Apr. 19, 2019), https://www.cbsnews.com/ 
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Perhaps the most preposterous, yet alarming, policy adopted 
by the Trump Administration is the initiative to substitute ICE and 
CBP officers for trained, experienced asylum officers to conduct 
reasonable and credible fear interviews.98 These interviews determine 
the crucial question of whether an asylum-seeker is eligible for bond, 
and if so, whether she or he will have to await a full Immigration Court 
hearing in Mexico. From our own experience as volunteer lawyers at 
the detention facilities in Dilley, Texas, and Folkston, Georgia, the 
authors are painfully aware of how difficult and delicate a challenge it 
 
news/united-constitutional-patriots-aclu-says-armed-vigilantes-unlawfully-
detaining-migrants-near-u-s-mexico-border/ [https://perma.cc/LH5X-KKDA].  
For more on the analogous broad policy initiative of the Trump Administration, 
first announced on January 25, 2017 in Section 9 of the Executive Order 
“Enhancing Public Safety in the Interior of the United States,” to defund federal 
grants for so-called “sanctuary cities,” municipalities that have adopted perfectly 
lawful ordinances to minimize diversion of local law enforcement resources to 
federal immigration enforcement. This policy has been largely repudiated by the 
federal courts. See City & Cty. of San Francisco v. Trump, 897 F.3d 1225, 1234–35 
(9th Cir. 2018) (based on the principle of Separation of Powers and the Spending 
Clause, which vests exclusive power in Congress to impose conditions on federal 
grants, the Executive Branch may not refuse to disperse the federal grants in 
question without congressional authorization); see also Priscilla Alvarez, Trump 
Cracks Down on Sanctuary Cities, ATLANTIC (Jan. 25, 2017), https://www.the 
atlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/01/trump-crack-down-sanctuary-city/514427/ 
(on file with the Columbia Human Rights Law Review); Laure Meckler, Sanctuary 
Cities to Be Barred from Justice Department Funds, Sessions Says, WALL ST. J. 
(Mar. 27, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/sanctuary-cities-to-be-barred-from-
justice-department-funds-sessions-says-1490637493 (on file with the Columbia 
Human Rights Law Review); see generally Christopher N. Lasch, Sanctuary Cities 
and Dog-Whistle Politics, 42 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 159, 162 
(2016) (explaining how ‘dog-whistle’ politics has contributed to the coded racial 
narratives within debates about sanctuary cities); Elizabeth McCormick, Federal 
Anti-Sanctuary Law: A Failed Approach to Immigration Enforcement and a Poor 
Substitute for Real Reform, 20 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 165 (2016)(arguing that anti-
sanctuary approach to immigration enforcement is a failed strategy which diverts 
attention from seeking comprehensive immigration reform). 
98 .  Molly O’Toole, Border Patrol Agents, Rather than Asylum Officers, 
Interviewing Families for ‘credible fear,’ WASH. POST (Sept. 19, 2019), 
https://lat.ms/2qRjVbG (on file with the Columbia Human Rights Law Review); 
Victoria Neilson & Anna Gallagher, Trump Administration Makes a Mockery of 
Asylum System, HILL (May 11, 2019), https://thehill.com/opinion/immigration/ 
443200-trump-administration-makes-a-mockery-of-asylum-system [https://perma. 
cc/WYL2-D5CA] (reporting that the Trump Administration is seeking to remove 
asylum officers from their core duties because they have been correctly applying 
the law: allowing those who have a credible fear of persecution to pursue protection 
in the United States, in accord with our international treaty obligations). 
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is to build a modicum of trust that will enable these highly traumatized 
women, children, and men to reveal their most painful, frightening, 
and sometimes shameful secrets about the events and people who 
made them give up everything at home to make the long dangerous 
trek across the border. Asylum-seekers cannot be expected to achieve 
even that inadequate level of rapport and communication (setting aside 
language and cultural barriers for the moment) with uniformed officers 
under no obligation of confidentiality, and with only a cursory 
knowledge of the multilayered, nuanced, immensely complex body of 
relevant asylum, immigration, and international human rights law.99 
 
99.  We do not mean to suggest that every CBP official, including Border 
Patrol agents, attempts to deny immigrants and asylum-seekers their rights or 
treats them inhumanely. However, one cannot ignore the revelation that at least 
9500—a very significant percentage—current and former CBP officers subscribe to 
and post on a secret, exclusive Facebook group page that is rife with revolting 
misogynistic, racist, and callous comments, expressing indiscriminate contempt 
and hatred for immigrants. This does nothing to enhance confidence in their ability 
to conduct effective threshold interviews of asylum-seekers. See A.C. Thompson, 
Inside the Secret Border Patrol Facebook Group Where Agents Joke About Migrant 
Deaths and Post Sexist Memes, PROPUBLICA (July 1, 2019), https://www. 
propublica.org/article/secret-border-patrol-facebook-group-agents-joke-about-
migrant-deaths-post-sexist-memes [https://perma.cc/6WN4-2A67] (detailing 
derogatory comments about, among others, Latina lawmakers published in secret 
Facebook group by current and former CBP officers). What is worse, CBP 
leadership had known for at least three years about the site, which included graphic 
images of agents simulating sexual acts with a training mannequin, defecating, and 
smiling at a human skull, but did nothing. Ted Hesson & Cristiano Lima, Border 
Agency Knew About Secret Facebook Group for Years, POLITICO (July 3, 2019), 
https://www.politico.com/story/2019/07/03/border-agency-secret-facebook-group-
1569572 [https://perma.cc/XR6K-TE3B]. 
For interesting discussion of the tension when self-styled devout Christians 
engage in work that seems antithetical to Jesus’ explicit teachings -- for example, 
separating and imprisoning children—see these articles, including most saliently 
the essay by former Border Patrol Agent Montoya: Julie Zauzmer and Keith 
McMillan, Sessions Cites Bible Passage Used to Defend Slavery in Defense of 
Separating Immigrant Families, WASH. POST (June 15, 2018), https://www. 
washingtonpost.com/news/acts-of-faith/wp/2018/06/14/jeff-sessions-points-to-the-
bible-in-defense-of-separating-immigrant-families/ (on file with the Columbia 
Human Rights Law Review); Ulrike Elisabeth Stockhausen, Evangelicals and 
Immigration: A Conflicted History, PROCESS: AMERICAN HISTORY (Mar. 18, 2019), 
http://www.processhistory.org/stockhausen-immigration/; Christopher Montoya 
[retired Border Patrol Agent], Between the Sacred and the Profane: The Border as 
a Contested Space, HARVARD DIVINITY SCHOOL BULLETIN (Spring/Summer 2018 - 
Vol. 46, Nos. 1 & 2), https://bulletin.hds.harvard.edu/articles/springsummer2018/ 
between-sacred-and-profane; Kristin Kobes Du Mez, Understanding White 
Evangelical Views on Immigration: For This Cultural Group, Militant Masculinity 
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As one commentator noted, assigning Border Patrol agents to this duty 
is like asking the security guard in a hospital to triage incoming 
patients in an emergency ward.100 It is, in fact, worse because many 
CBP agents view their jobs as arresting undocumented immigrants, 
including those with valid asylum claims, who have crossed without 
inspection; and because some of these “security guards” are already 
being sued for illegally repulsing and misinforming the exact people 
whose asylum claims they will now be screening.101  
 
Trumps the Bible, HARVARD DIVINITY SCHOOL BULLETIN (Spring/Summer 2018 - 
Vol. 46, Nos. 1 & 2), https://bulletin.hds.harvard.edu/articles/springsummer2018/ 
understanding-white-evangelical-views-immigration. 
100.  Neilson & Gallagher, supra note 95. 
101.  For another example of the type of behavior that suggests it is very 
unlikely that an asylum-seeker could ever communicate openly with these officers, 
see, e.g., the conduct alleged in the civil legal action Mejia Rios v. GEO Group, 5:19-
cv-00552 (W.D. Tex. May 24, 2019). Raices, Arent Fox LLP, and Aldea PJC Sue the 
GEO Group for Forcefully Re-separating Immigrant Families, RAICES (May 28, 
2019), https://www.raicestexas.org/2019/05/28/raices-arent-fox-llp-and-aldea-pjc-
sue-the-geo-group-for-forcefully-re-separating-immigrant-families/ [https://perma. 
cc/9SRE-85CG] (alleging that GEO sanctioned unlawful separation of thirteen 
children from their fathers): 
The [court] issued a nationwide preliminary injunction 
prohibiting the US Department of Homeland Security from 
separating families and requiring reunification of families 
previously separated. . . . Two months after the federal court 
injunction, and in direct violation of that order, [defendant] 
sanctioned the unlawful separation of these thirteen children 
from their fathers. With no prior notice, [defendant] permitted 
armed men to forcibly remove the fathers of these thirteen 
children from their rooms at the Karnes Detention Center by 
using bulletproof vests, shields, knee pads, boots, helmets, tear 
gas equipment and guns . . . ; loaded the fathers without their 
children onto buses and transported them . . . nearly two hours 
away . . . Fathers screamed and cried loudly for their children. 
Others vomited blood and shook uncontrollably.  
Because [defendant] told the fathers that they would never see 
their sons again and again all of the circumstances appeared to 
confirm it, one father attempted suicide. [Defendant] refused to 
inform the fathers where they were being taken, why they were 
again being separated from their children, where their children 
were located, whether their children were safe, and who would 
care for them. [Defendant] also told the fathers that they would 
be deported without their children, that their children would be 
adopted by families living in the United States, and that they 
would never again see their children. . . . [Defendant] 
intentionally traumatized families who came to the United 
States seeking refuge . . . When [defendant] received these 
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As Julie Veroff of the American Civil Liberties Union’s 
Immigrant Rights Project stated, “Credible fear interviews involve the 
discussion of sensitive, difficult issues. . . . Federal law thus requires 
that credible fear interviews be conducted in a ‘nonadversarial 
manner.’ . . . Credible fear interviews have always been conducted by 
professionals who specialize in asylum adjudication, not immigration 
enforcement.102 The Administration’s radical proposal is antithetical 
to principles of elemental fairness and due process and violates our 
obligations under international human rights and refugee law. 
To evaluate the extent to which the U.S. asylum process 
complies with the commitment not to “penalize” asylum-seekers, it is 
important to look to its overall functionality, reliability, and insulation 
from political pressure. The U.S. Immigration Courts and Board of 
Immigration Appeals have failed to fulfill the constitutional and 
statutory promise of fair and impartial case-by-case review, according 
to a report by the Innovation Law Lab, the largest network of pro bono-
based immigrant defenders, and the Southeast Immigrant Freedom 
Initiative of the Southern Poverty Law Center.103 Entitled The Attorney 
 
fathers and children, they did so fully aware of the deep 
traumatization these families experienced as a result of their 
initial separation. They knew the separation was illegal. They 
knew these children were extremely fragile, and their fear of 
permanent separation was still very real. Then [defendant] 
violently separated them again, showing callous disregard for 
the law and the families’ mental and physical health. 
Id. 
102 .  Nick Miroff, U.S. Asylum Screeners to Take More Confrontational 
Approach as Trump Aims to Turn More Migrants Away at the Border, WASH. POST 
(May 7, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/immigration/us-asylum-screeners-
to-take-more-confrontational-approach-as-trump-aims-to-turn-more-migrants-
away-at-the-border/2019/05/07/3b15e076-70de-11e9-9eb4-0828f5389013_story. 
html (on file with the Columbia Human Rights Law Review) (in response to 
pressure and comments from President Trump such as “the asylum program is a 
scam,” John Lafferty, director of the USCIS asylum division, sent all asylum officers 
a memorandum requiring them to adopt a much more challenging and adversarial 
approach to asylum-seekers; this memorandum is “among the most significant 
steps the administration has taken to limit access to the country for foreigners 
seeking asylum”). 
103 .  Southeast Immigrant Freedom Initiative, SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW 
CENTER (June 21, 2018), https://www.splcenter.org/our-issues/immigrant-justice/ 
southeast-immigrant-freedom-initiative-en [https://perma.cc/H8AT-F2T7] (noting 
that only one in six immigrants detained in the Southeast has access to an attorney 
in removal proceedings; for an immigrant in detention, legal representation means 
the difference between staying safe with his/her family and being forced to return 
to a place that is no longer home).  
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General’s Judges: How the U.S. Immigration Courts Became a 
Deportation Tool, the Report begins: 
The nation’s immigration courts have been 
dysfunctional since their inception. Today, the system 
has effectively collapsed. The attorneys general 
appointed by President Trump have used their 
authority over the immigration courts to weaponize 
them against asylum seekers and immigrants of color 
in support of Trump’s anti-immigrant policies. This 
report examines the system’s collapse and explains 
why it cannot be salvaged in its current form.104 
 
We recognize the many courageous and reputable Immigration Court Judges 
and the many fair and reasonable ICE trial counsel, but the policies that the Trump 
Administration has compelled them to implement undermine due process and 
fundamental fairness of these courts. 
104 .  INNOVATION LAW LAB & SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER, THE 
ATTORNEY GENERAL’S JUDGES: HOW THE U.S. IMMIGRATION COURTS BECAME A 
DEPORTATION TOOL 1 (2019), https://innovationlawlab.org/reports/the-attorney-
generals-judges/ (on file with the Columbia Human Rights Law Review). 
This is only one of several fierce critiques of the Trump Administration’s blatant 
politicization of what should be a system of apolitical adjudicators. See Aaron 
Reichlin-Melnick, Immigration Judges and Advocates Criticize Immigration Court 
System for ‘Propaganda’, American Immigration Council (May 16, 2019) 
(politicization of court system demonstrated by the Executive Office of Immigration 
Review’s sending to all Immigration Court Judges a fallacious, distorted document 
entitled “Myths vs. Facts About Immigration Proceedings,” plainly “aimed directly 
at opponents of the Trump administration’s crackdowns on asylum seekers”), 
http://immigrationimpact.com/2019/05/16/judges-criticize-immigration-court-
system-propaganda/#.XTD2cPJKjiw. 
 The “Myths vs. Facts” pastiche was denounced as raw propaganda by a group 
of 27 former Immigration Court Judges/BIA members known as the Round Table, 
which has taken issue with several of the changes in Immigration Court structure 
and practice instituted by the Trump Administration, but never before this 
strongly. Round Table Letter to James McHenry, Director of Executive Office of 
Immigration Review, dated May 19, 2019 (“issuance of such a document can only 
be viewed as political pandering, at the expense of public faith in the immigration 
courts” “nothing short of judicial independence, neutrality, and fairness is 
acceptable for courts that make life and death determinations”), 
https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B_6gbFPjVDoxSmZaaWw0ODctMkRZaTIyZWlpa
m5URDJmZDI4/view.  
See also AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, 2019 UPDATE REPORT: REFORMING THE 
IMMIGRATION SYSTEM: PROPOSALS TO PROMOTE INDEPENDENCE, FAIRNESS, 
EFFICIENCY, AND PROFESSIONALISM IN THE ADJUDICATION OF REMOVAL CASES 
(March 2019) (discussing major systemic issues facing the immigration courts such 
as political interference, lack of judicial independence, a chronic lack of resources, 
and “policies and practices that threaten due process,” as well as disparities in how 
and when Immigration Court judges grant asylum; lack of independence and 
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In a final example of political interference with the 
adjudication of asylum claims, in June 2019 the newly appointed 
Acting USCIS Director, Kenneth Cuccinelli (widely touted as likely to 
become Trump’s “immigration czar” and an official with extreme anti-
immigrant views), 105  emailed asylum officers, telling them to do a 
better job of rejecting asylum-seekers during their initial screenings at 
the border and noting USCIS needs to do its “part to help stem the 
crisis and better secure the homeland.”106 
The Acting Director (whose appointment without Senate 
confirmation attracted broad bipartisan opposition and was criticized 
by legal scholars as unconstitutional and illegal)107 cited grossly false 
 
politicized hiring practices in the immigration court so problematic that the ABA 
calls for suspension of hiring of new immigration judges until the immigration 
courts become more independent, even in light of historic backlogs; best solution is 
to make immigration courts an “Article I” court, similar to federal tax or bankruptcy 
courts, which would insulate the judges from the Attorney General’s current 
authority to directly overrule them, to create new precedent, and to discipline 
judges for failing to meet case completion quotas), https://www.americanbar.org/ 
content/dam/aba/publications/commission_on_immigration/2019_reforming_the_i
mmigration_system_volume_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/G8HD-4J5Q]. 
105.  Eli Stokols, Trump Expected to Pick Hard-Liner Ken Cuccinelli for New 
Post of ‘Immigration Czar,’ L.A. TIMES (May 22, 2019), https://www.latimes.com/ 
politics/la-na-pol-trump-cuccinelli-immigration-czar-20190522-story.html [https:// 
perma.cc/KR42-5W7W]. Mr. Cuccinelli, who has no professional background or 
experience in immigration law, later gained some notoriety when he rewrote Emma 
Lazarus’s famous poem on the Statue of Liberty to say, “[g]ive me your tired and 
your poor who can stand on their own two feet and who will not become a public 
charge.” Cuccinelli Rewrites Statute of Liberty Poem to Defend Immigration Stance, 
N.Y. TIMES POST (Aug. 13, 2019), https://nytimespost.com/cuccinelli-rewrites-
statue-of-liberty-poem-to-defend-immigration-stance/ [https://perma.cc/HYU9-
6HPT].  
106 . Hamid Aleaziz, A Top Immigration Official Appears to Be Warning 
Immigration Officials About Border Screenings, BUZZFEED (June 18, 2019), 
https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/hamedaleaziz/uscis-director-asylum-
officers-email [https://perma.cc/NMW3-WGYN]. 
107.  See also Devan Coles & Geneva Sands, Union Chief Blasts Trump Pick 
to Lead Citizenship Agency, Says Choice Signals 'End Of Legal Immigration', CNN 
(May 27, 2019), https://www.cnn.com/2019/05/27/politics/danielle-spooner-ken-
cuccinelli-uscis/index.html [https://perma.cc/F6P6-B7Y6]; Dominique Mosbergen, 
Trump Gives Hard-Liner Ken Cuccinelli Top Immigration Job Despite Bipartisan 
Opposition, HUFFINGTON POST (June 11, 2019), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/ 
ken-cuccinelli-citizenship-and-immigration-services-director_n_5cff6895e4b06d 
839dc4799e; Mark Scarcella, Trump Picks Cuccinelli, Former Virginia Attorney 
General, for Immigration Post, NATIONAL LAW JOURNAL (June 10, 2019), 
https://www.law.com/nationallawjournal/2019/06/10/trump-picks-cuccinelli-
former-virginia-attorney-general-for-immigration-post/; Raul Reyes, Ken Cuccinelli 
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statistics about the percentage of asylum-seekers who do not appear in 
Immigration Court108 and admonished asylum officers that the gap 
between the number who pass a Credible Fear Interview and the 
number who eventually are denied asylum in Immigration Court was 
 
Neither Deserving nor Qualified to Play Any Role in Immigration Policy, THE HILL 
(May 29, 2019) https://thehill.com/opinion/immigration/445910-ken-cuccinelli-
neither-deserving-nor-qualified-to-play-any-role-in [https://perma.cc/23P5-3DD8]. 
On November 13, 2019, Mr. Cuccinelli was elevated by Mr. Trump’s newest 
Secretary of Homeland Security, Chad Wolf, to Acting Deputy Director of the 
Department, despite “profound doubts over Cuccinelli's ability to win a 
confirmation vote in the Republican-led Senate.” Bill Chappell, Chad Wolf Becomes 




This makes Mr. Cuccinelli’s active hostility toward asylum-seekers and the U.S. 
asylum system of even greater concern. He celebrated his new office with a guest 
op-ed entitled “We Need to Tighten up Loopholes in Our Asylum Laws” in which he 
announced further restrictions on the eligibility of asylum-seekers for employment 
authorization. See THE HILL (Nov. 15, 2019) https://thehill.com/opinion/ 
immigration/470596-ken-cuccinelli-we-need-to-tighten-up-loopholes-in-our-
asylum-laws [https://perma.cc/GE7U-33DL]. See also Dep’t of Homeland Security, 
Notice of Proposed Rule-Making, Asylum Application, Interview, and Employment 
Authorization for Applicants, 84 FR 62374 (11/14/2019) (new restrictions would 
block, with limited exceptions, employment authorization for aliens who entered 
the United States illegally, who did not meet the one-year deadline for filing an 
asylum application, or who are convicted of certain offenses). 
108.  President Trump and his surrogates have been trumpeting (no other 
word will do, alas) the false statistic, with no source cited, that 90% of asylum-
seekers don’t show up for Immigration Court. See, e.g., Jack Crowe, DHS Secretary: 
90 Percent of Recent Asylum-Seekers Skipped Their Hearings, NAT’L REV. (June 11, 
2019), https://www.nationalreview.com/news/dhs-secretary-90-percent-of-recent-
asylum-seekers-skipped-their-hearings/ [https://perma.cc/NBE7-XZJS] (quoting 
the DHS Secretary’s assertion that 90% of recent asylum-seekers failed to appear 
in court). The converse reality was investigated and is reported by TRAC. See, e.g., 
Most Released Families Attend Immigration Court Hearings, TRANSACTIONAL 
RECORDS ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE (June 18, 2019), https://trac.syr.edu/ 
immigration/reports/562 [https://perma.cc/6732-PWQ6] (finding that, from 
September 2018 to May 2019, based on over 47,000 Immigration Court hearing 
records, almost 100% of represented families, and about 70%–80% of unrepresented 
families, attend Immigration Court hearings); Obed Manuel, Almost 100% of 
Asylum-Seeking Families with Legal Aid Are Showing up to Court, Analysis Finds, 
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wider than the “two legal standards would suggest.”109 Acting Director 
Cuccinelli’s email then stated: 
“Therefore, USCIS must, in full compliance with the 
law, make sure we are properly screening individuals 
who claim fear . . . .” He added that officers have tools 
to combat “frivolous claims” and to “ensure that [they] 
are upholding our nation’s laws by only making 
positive credible fear determinations in cases that have 
a significant possibility of success.”110 
Despite the facially innocuous sounding of this language, 
former immigration officials said in the current political context the 
email was clearly a threat. “I read this only in one way—a threat. A 
threat that asylum officers will be blamed by their new boss for the 
repeated failures of the Trump administration,” Ur Jaddou, a former 
chief counsel at USCIS, told BuzzFeed News. “This is an unbelievable 
threat and not something a director would normally ever send.”111 
The severe policies of the new Administration are particularly 
troubling given the human rights catastrophe occurring not only in 
distant countries such as Syria and Myanmar, but also in Venezuela 
and the nearby countries in Central America.112 Extensively networked 
 
109.  Aleaziz, supra note 106. 
110 .  Id. One official at the Department of Homeland Security—of which 
USCIS is a part—said the email was “insane.” Id. Sarah Pierce, a policy analyst at 
the Migration Policy Institute, stated that Cuccinelli was trying to ramp up the 
pressure on officers in whatever way he could, and that his understanding of 
asylum law is at best misguided: “The acting director is trying to place the burden 
of reducing the difference between the high level of credible-fear acceptances and 
the low level of ultimate asylum approvals on the shoulders of asylum 
officers". . . . However, the reason for this difference can be traced back to 
Congress—which purposefully made a low bar for the credible-fear process—and 
the failure to provide counsel for asylum-seekers, which all but guarantees the 
majority will fail in the court system.” Id. 
111.  Id. See also Nick Miroff, Chief of U.S. Asylum Office Reassigned as White 
House Pushes for Tighter Immigration Controls, WASH. POST. (Sept. 4, 2019), 2019 
WLNR 26927891 (Trump administration replacing career official John Lafferty, 
Asylum Office Director, with an acting director presumably with far more 
restrictionist views). 
112.  The authoritarian regime in Venezuela and resulting chaos, violence, 
and economic distress have also led to increased asylum applications by 
Venezuelans to the United States. See Jens Manuel Krogstad & Gustavo López, 
Venezuelan Asylum Applications to U.S. Soar in 2016, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Aug. 
4, 2016), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/08/04/venezuelan-asylum-
applications-to-u-s-soar-in-2016/ [https://perma.cc/N65D-DMP3]. In the 2016 fiscal 
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quasi-governmental entities (“the Maras”) have taken on quasi-state 
authority in Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador, often referred to 
collectively as “the Northern Triangle.”113 Those countries have among 
the highest homicide rates in the world, and their governments are 
manifestly either unable or unwilling to protect a large proportion of 
their population from persecution.114 
 
year, Venezuelan asylum applications increased 168% compared to the previous 
year (10,221 versus 3,810). Id. 
113.  UNITED NATIONS, THE GLOBALIZATION OF A CRIME: A TRANSNATIONAL 
ORGANIZED CRIME THREAT ASSESSMENT 240 (2010) (stating that gangs in the 
Northern Triangle have corrupted and outgunned civilian police forces); see also 
Nelson Rauda Zablah, Sala de lo Constitucional declara ilegal negociación con 
pandillas y las nombra grupos terroristas, EL FARO (Aug. 25, 2015), 
https://elfaro.net/es/201508/noticias/17307/Sala-de-lo-Constitucional-declara-
ilegal-negociaci%2525C3%2525B3n-con-pandillas-y-las-nombra-grupos-
terroristas.htm [https://perma.cc/ZNT4-84Q5] (El Sal.) (reporting decision of 
Constitutional Chamber of Supreme Court of El Salvador to declare that MS-13 
and Barrio 18 are terrorist organizations wielding political power over people and 
territory; the decision is available at http://www.csj.gob.sv/Comunicaciones/2015/ 
AGO_15/COMUNICADOS/Sentencia%2022-2007%20versi%C3%B3n%20final.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/W8VZ-MCU4]). “Mara” is typically translated as “gang” in 
English, but that is overly simplistic. Numerous experts in Immigration Court 
hearings and scholarly articles attest that “gang” is a complete misnomer for these 
entities. “Gang” in no way denotes or connotes these sophisticated, powerful 
organizations that have seized political power and rule their fiefdoms as warlords, 
constituting de facto governments not only in their local strongholds, but 
throughout such extensive regions that no one can hope to escape them anywhere 
in these countries. See, e.g., MAX G. MANWARING, STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE, 
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE, A CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGE TO STATE SOVEREIGNTY: 
GANGS AND OTHER ILLICIT TRANSNATIONAL CRIMINAL ORGANIZATIONS IN CENTRAL 
AMERICA, EL SALVADOR, MEXICO, JAMAICA, AND BRAZIL 7 (Dec. 2007), 
https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pdffiles/pub837.pdf [https://perma.cc/H5ZW-
VUKD]. Translating “mara” as “gang” may serve the interest of de jure 
governments that seek to mischaracterize, and thus, minimize, the threat posed by 
these formidable political opposition forces. For the acknowledgement of this reality 
by the United States Ambassador to Mexico, see “Parallel Narco-Governments Need 
to be Stopped, Warns US Ambassador,” MEXICO DAILY NEWS (Nov. 15, 2019), 
https://mexiconewsdaily.com/news/narco-governments-power-will-increase-
without-action/ [https://perma.cc/W2LZ-MGL6]. 
114.  For extensive documentation of the rampant unpoliced (or perpetrated 
by law enforcement) violence in the Triangle against distinctive target groups such 
as women, young men who reject forced induction into Mara service, etc. there are 
a multitude of sources. For basic data, see UNHCR Country Conditions Reports, 
UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, https://www.unhcr.org/en-
us/country-reports.html [https://perma.cc/FSD9-WWYF]; AMNESTY INT’L, 
AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT 2017/18: THE STATE OF THE WORLD’S HUMAN 
RIGHTS 156–58, 180–81, 185–87 (2018), https://www.amnesty.org/download/ 
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II. THE OBLIGATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES TO ASYLUM-SEEKERS 
UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 
From the rise of Nazi Germany in 1933 to nearly the end of 
World War II, most Western nations, including the United States, 
refused to admit Jewish refugees and others who were attempting to 
escape the fatal grasp of the Third Reich. 115  The world’s failure to 
 
Documents/POL1067002018ENGLISH.PDF [https://perma.cc/Y7P5-FWW8]. For 
some of the most current and compelling reports, see, e.g., INSIGHTCRIME, 
https://www.insightcrime.org/ (last visited Sept. 19, 2019) (an organization of 
journalists and academic researchers seeking to document the phenomenon of 
political violence in Latin American and the Caribbean); BLOG OF DR. ELIZABETH 
KENNEDY, https://elizabethgkennedy.com/ (last visited Sept. 19, 2019) (renowned 
University of San Diego researcher currently living and working in Triangle 
countries, compiling a report on the number of U.S. deportees murdered by the 
Mara after their deportation) ) (“World Health Organization classifies a homicide 
rate higher than 10 per 100,000 as an epidemic, every bit as harmful to children, 
mothers, fathers and their communities as diseases like Ebola, swine flu, or Zika. 
El Salvador finished 2015 with a rate of 103, Honduras with a rate of 57, and 
Guatemala with a rate of 30. Parts of each country have double the national rate. 
These homicide rates are among the highest in the world—including war zones. El 
Salvador’s rate is second only to Syria’s. Honduras’ is in the top five, and 
Guatemala’s is in the top 20“), https://elizabethgkennedy.com/. ; see also Cinthya 
Alberto & Mariana Chilton, Transnational Violence Against Asylum-Seeking 
Women and Children: Honduras and the United States-Mexico Border, 20 HUM. 
RTS. REV. 205 (June 2019), https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s12142-019-
0547-5 [https://perma.cc/QNZ4-2RHA] (documenting dangers to women and 
children in Honduras); Karen Musalo, El Salvador—A Peace Worse Than War: 
Violence, Gender and a Failed Legal Response, 30 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 3, 4-8 
(2019)(explaining the high levels of gendered violence in El Salvador and critiquing 
the laws meant to address them); Thomas Boerman & Jennifer Knapp, Gang 
Culture and Violence Against Women in El Salvador, Honduras and Guatemala, 
IMMIGRATION BRIEFINGS, March 2017, at 8 (highlighting gang activity as the most 
extreme risk of violence against women). Presumably as a result of this level of 
uncontrolled violence, the number of immigrants from the small Triangle countries 
has rivaled the number from neighboring Mexico. See D’vera Cohn, Jeffrey Passel 
& Ana Gonzales-Barrera, Rise in U.S. Immigrants from El Salvador, Guatemala 
and Honduras Outpaces Growth from Elsewhere, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Dec. 7, 
2017), http://www.pewhispanic.org/2017/12/07/rise-in-u-s-immigrants-from-el-
salvador-guatemala-and-honduras-outpaces-growth-from-elsewhere/ [https:// 
perma.cc/C4JA-JC83]. Data from the U.S. Census Bureau shows 115,000 
immigrants from the Northern Triangle came to the United States in 2014 as 
compared to only 60,000 in 2011. Id. In comparison, 175,000 immigrants migrated 
from Mexico in 2011 and that number declined by 10,000 in 2014. Id. 
115.  See Laura Tavares, Text to Text: Comparing Jewish Refugees of the 
1930s with Syrian Refugees Today, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 4, 2017), https://www. 
nytimes.com/2017/01/04/learning/lesson-plans/text-to-text-comparing-jewish-
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provide a safe haven for those facing the Holocaust led to the adoption 
of the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees in 1951. The 
Convention prohibits returning refugees to a country where they might 
face persecution “for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership 
of a particular social group, or political opinion.”116 The Convention also 
prohibits receiving countries from discriminating among refugees on 
the basis of their religion.117 Most saliently, the Convention generally 
prohibits penalizing a refugee for unlawful presence or illegal entry.118 
The Convention recognizes the extraordinary circumstances refugees 
may encounter in fleeing a country where they run a high risk of 
persecution. The Convention plainly contemplates that refugees may 
have no realistic choice but to enter a country illegally without a visa 
or passport and requires, at least where certain conditions are met, 
that the countries that have joined the Convention (“States Parties”) 
forego imposing penalties on such refugees.119 
In 1967, the international community formed the Refugee 
Protocol, which expanded both the temporal and geographic scope of 
the 1951 Convention.120 In 1968, the United States Senate gave its 
 
refugees-of-the-1930s-with-syrian-refugees-today.html (on file with the Columbia 
Human Rights Law Review) (writing about the similarities between Syrian 
refugees and Jewish refugees and noting that the United States was unwilling to 
accept Jewish refugees because of the fear of Nazi spies, economic hardship, and 
the desire to maintain “American” ethnic identity). 
116.  1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 17, art. 1. 
117.  Id. art. 4. 
118.  Id. art. 31(1). 
119.  As the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
stated in its introduction to the 1951 Refugee Convention, “The Convention is both 
a status and rights-based instrument and is underpinned by a number of 
fundamental principles, most notably non-discrimination, non-penalization and 
non-refoulement.” Introductory Note, 1951 UN Convention on Refugees and 1967 
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, at 3, UNHCR, http://www.unhcr.org/en-
us/3b66c2aa10 [https://perma.cc/EJ2D-ZU9Z] (emphasis added). In 1968, the 
United States agreed to comply with the substantive provisions of Articles 2 
through 34 of the 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, art. 1, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 
6259–6276, T.I.A.S. No. 6577 (1968); see also I.N.S. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 
421, 449 (1987) (holding that to show a “well-founded fear of persecution,” asylum-
seeking aliens need not prove that it is “more likely than not” they will be 
persecuted in their home country). 
120.  The 1951 Refugee Convention was limited to events occurring before 
January 1, 1951, essentially to refugees compelled to flee their countries because of 
World War II and its aftermath. See 1967 Refugee Protocol, supra note 17, art. 1. 
The Protocol eliminated that date restriction and clarified that the key provisions 
of the 1951 Refugee Convention applied world-wide. Id.; see also Ira Frank, Effect 
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advice and consent to the Protocol, which President Lyndon B. Johnson 
subsequently ratified. Although the United States did not originally 
join the 1951 Convention, the Protocol incorporates all the critical 
provisions of the Convention, namely, Articles 2 to 34. 
A. The Plain Meaning of the 1951 Refugee Convention’s Articles 
Prohibiting Non-Refoulement and Penalization of Asylum-
Seekers 
Two provisions of the 1951 Refugee Convention work in 
tandem with each other. First, the Convention prohibits refoulement—
the receiving state’s returning the refugee to a country where he or she 
might be persecuted. Second, the States Parties to the Convention have 
an obligation generally not to penalize asylum-seekers for entering its 
country without authorization. The non-refoulement obligation is 
contained in Article 33(1): 
No Contracting State shall expel or return (“refouler”) 
a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of 
territories where his life or freedom would be 
threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, 
membership of a particular social group or political 
opinion.121 
The wording of Article 33 expresses an intent to protect 
refugees virtually absolutely from expulsion to a country where their 
“life or freedom” would be threatened for any of the five given grounds: 
race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or 
political opinion. The words, “No Contracting State shall expel or 
return (‘refouler’),” constitute mandatory language prohibiting the 
return of a refugee. The phrase “in any manner whatsoever” underlines 
the absolute nature of the prohibition. The only exception is found in 
subsection 2 of Article 33: 
The benefit of the present provision may not, however, 
be claimed by a refugee whom there are reasonable 
grounds for regarding as a danger to the security of the 
country in which he is, or who, having been convicted 
by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime, 
 
of the 1967 United Nations Protocol on the Status of Refugees in the United States, 
11 INT’L LAW. 291, 294 (1977) (asserting the Protocol was designed to remove the 
time limitation on the Convention). 
121.  1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 17, art. 33(1) (emphasis added). 
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constitutes a danger to the community of that 
country.122 
Note that the language requires a showing that the particular 
refugee is a danger to the national security or has been so convicted. A 
receiving state is prohibited from banning classes of refugees, whether 
on the basis of nationality or religion.123 
An exception to Article 32 explains the “national security” 
rationale, emphasizing that the state may exclude a refugee only for 
“compelling reasons of national security.” 124  Dr. Paul Weis’s 
commentary on the drafting history notes that at the negotiation 
conference the official representatives wished to impose on receiving 
states a high bar for excluding refugees on grounds of national 
security.125 
To help effectuate this strict prohibition on returning refugees, 
the Convention imposes a corresponding obligation on receiving states 
to refrain from penalizing asylum-seekers. Penalizing asylum-seekers 
would deter them from seeking asylum in the first place, thereby 
undermining the non-refoulement obligation, a fundamental obligation 
in international refugee and human rights law.126 Penalizing asylum-
seekers by taking their children from them likewise runs afoul of 
United States human rights obligations under the Convention against 
Torture (“UNCAT”), the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (“ICCPR”), the Convention for the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination (“CERD”), 127  the Universal Declaration of Human 
 
122.  Id. art. 33(2) (emphasis added). 
123.  Id. art. 3 (“The Contracting States shall apply the provisions of this 
Convention to refugees without discrimination as to race, religion or country of 
origin.”) (emphasis added). 
124.  Id. art. 32. 
125.  THE REFUGEE CONVENTION, 1951, THE TRAVAUX PREPARATOIRES 278–
304 (Paul Weis ed., Cambridge University Press 1995) (emphasis added). 
126.  Cf. JAMES C. HATHAWAY & MICHELLE FOSTER, THE LAW OF REFUGEE 
STATUS 26 n.56 (2d ed. 2014) (noting that refugee rights including the “right to non-
penalization for illegal entry or presence” would be undermined if “a state could 
avoid its responsibility to protect by the simple expedient of refusing ever to assess 
a claim.”). 
127.  The International Court of Justice has recently granted precautionary 
measures to Qatar and ordered the United Arab Emirates “pending the final 
decision in the case and in accordance with its obligations under CERD [Convention 
for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination], [to] ensure that families that include 
a Qatari, separated by the [deportation] measures adopted by the UAE on 5 June 
2017, are reunited . . . .” Application of International Convention on Elimination of 
 
62 COLUMBIA HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW [51.1 
Rights, the Declaration on the Rights of Man, 128  and customary 
international law. 129  The spokesperson for the U.N. High 
 
all Forms of Racial Discrimination (Qatar v. UAE) Request for Provisional 
Measures, 2018 I.C.J. 172, ¶ 75 (July 23, 2017). 
128.  See also Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R. Res. 63/2018, Vilma Aracely Lopez Juc 
de Coc and Others Regarding the United States of America (Aug. 16, 2018). There, 
the Commission noted that “a rupture in the family unit can occur from the 
expulsion of one or both progenitors [parents] in such a way that separating families 
due to the violation of immigration laws results in a disproportionate restriction” 
on the right to family protection under Article 17 of the American Convention on 
Human Rights and under Article VI of the American Declaration on the Rights of 
Man. Id. ¶ 27 (citing Committee on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant 
Workers and Members of Their Families, and the Committee on the Rights of the 
Child, Joint General Comment No. 4 (2017) on State Obligations Regarding the 
Human Rights of Children in the Context of International Migration, ¶ 29 (Nov. 16, 
2017), CMW/C/GC/4-CRC/C/GC/23). 
129 .  See, e.g., Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, ¶ 45, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/37/50 
(Nov. 23, 2018) (describing states’ international obligations to uphold the “absolute 
and non-derogable right of migrants not to be subjected to torture and ill-
treatment”). States increasingly subject migrants to unnecessary, disproportionate 
and deliberately harsh reception conditions designed to coerce them to “voluntarily” 
return to their country of origin, regardless of their need of non-refoulement 
protection. This approach “may include measures such as the criminalization, 
isolation and detention of irregular migrants, the deprivation of medical 
care . . . and adequate living conditions, the deliberate separation of family 
members and . . . excessive prolongation of status determination . . . Deliberate 
practices such as these amount to “refoulement in disguise” and are “incompatible 
with the principle of good faith.” Id. ¶ 43. President Trump’s policy of taking 
children from their parents also violates the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
(“CRC”) and the American Convention on Human Rights (“ACHR”). Because the 
United States Senate attached an understanding to both the UNCAT and the 
ICCPR making most, if not all of their provisions, non-self-executing, because the 
United States is not a party to the CRC or the ACHR, and because the UDHR is a 
UN General Assembly resolution, not a treaty, federal courts cannot rely on these 
instruments as the rule of decision. All these instruments are, however, strong 
evidence of customary international law, and federal courts can invoke them as 
such or do so under the Charming Betsy canon discussed infra at notes 229–245 
and accompanying text. See Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900); Sonja Starr & 
Lea Brilmayer, Family Separation as a Violation of International Law, 21 
BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 213, 229–58 (2002); see also Nick Cumming-Bruce, Taking 
Migrant Children from Parents Is Illegal, U.N. Tells U.S., N.Y. TIMES (June 5, 
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/05/world/americas/us-un-migrant-
children-families.html (on file with the Columbia Human Rights Law Review) 
(quoting Ravina Shamdasani, spokeswoman for the Office of the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Human Rights: “The U.S. should immediately halt this 
practice of separating families and stop criminalizing what should at most be an 
administrative offense—that of irregular entry or stay in the U.S.”). 
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Commissioner for Human Rights (“UNHCR”) noted, “The practice of 
separating families amounts to arbitrary and unlawful interference in 
family life, and is a serious violation of the rights of the child.”130 
Article 31 of the 1951 Convention prohibits States from 
criminalizing the presence of refugees and prohibits unnecessary 
restrictions on refugees’ free movement. The Refugee Convention of 
1951 is official in both English and French. The English version of 
Article 31 provides: 
The Contracting States shall not impose penalties, on 
account of their illegal entry or presence, on refugees 
who, coming directly131 from a territory where their life 
or freedom was threatened in the sense of article 1, 
enter or are present in their territory without 
authorization, provided they present themselves 
without delay to the authorities and show good cause 
for their illegal entry or presence.132 
The French version adds the word “pénales” to modify 
“sanctions”—or “penalties” in English in the first part of Article 31. 
Thus, in French, Article 31 reads, “Les Etats Contractants 
n’appliqueront pas de sanctions pénales, du fait de leur entrée ou de 
leur séjour irréguliers aux réfugiés.”133 The Council of Europe’s French-
 
130.  Office of the U.N. High Comm’r for Human Rights, Press Briefing Note 
on Egypt, United States and Ethiopia (June 5, 2018), https://www.ohchr.org/ 
EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=23174&LangID=E [https:// 
perma.cc/3243-NGYY]. 
131.  For the interpretation of the term “directly” as it may be applied in the 
case of refugees who traverse Mexico or other countries to reach the United States, 
see infra text accompanying notes 167–170. 
132.  Subsection 2 of Article 31 of the 1951 Refugee Convention attempts to 
limit restrictions on the movement of refugees once they enter the receiving 
country: 
2. The Contracting States shall not apply to the movements of 
such refugees restrictions other than those which are necessary 
and such restrictions shall only be applied until their status in 
the country is regularized or they obtain admission into another 
country. The Contracting States shall allow such refugees a 
reasonable period and all the necessary facilities to obtain 
admission into another country. 
1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 17, art. 31(2) (emphasis added). 
133 .  Convention et Protocole Relatifs au Statut des Réfugiés, art. 31, 
http://www.unhcr.org/fr/4b14f4a62 (emphasis added). The full French text of article 
31 is as follows: 
1. Les Etats Contractants n’appliqueront pas de sanctions 
pénales, du fait de leur entrée ou de leur séjour irréguliers aux 
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English Legal Dictionary defines “pénale” as “criminal, penal.”134 The 
dictionary defines “sanction” as relevant here as “penalty.”135 Google 
Translate gives the first line of Article 31 in French as meaning, “The 
Contracting States shall not apply penal sanctions . . .”136 Others have 
argued that reading the English and the French versions of Article 31 
together along with ICCPR’s ban on “arbitrary detention” requires a 
broader meaning, namely, to include not only criminal penalties but 
 
réfugiés qui, arrivant directement du territoire où leur vie ou 
leur liberté était menacée au sens prévu par l’article premier, 
entrent ou se trouvent sur leur territoire sans autorisation, sous 
la réserve qu’ils se présentent sans délai aux autorités et leur 
exposent des raisons reconnues valables de leur entrée ou 
présence irrégulières. 
2. Les Etats Contractants n’appliqueront aux déplacements de 
ces réfugiés d’autres restrictions que celles qui sont nécessaires; 
ces restrictions seront appliquées seulement en attendant que le 
statut de ces réfugiés dans le pays d’accueil ait été régularisé ou 
qu’ils aient réussi à se faire admettre dans un autre pays. En vue 
de cette dernière admission les Etats Contractants accorderont à 
ces réfugiés un délai raisonnable ainsi que toutes facilités 
nécessaires. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
134 .  F.H.S. BRIDGE, THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE FRENCH-ENGLISH LEGAL 
DICTIONARY 230 (1994). 
135.  Id. at 280; see also Sanction, CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY, https://dictionary. 
cambridge.org/dictionary/english/sanction [https://perma.cc/VX2C-V6YE]. 
136.  Translation of First Line of French Version of Article 31 of the 1951 
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civil ones as well. 137  Nevertheless, under either interpretation, 
criminal prosecution is definitely barred.138 
B. Drafting History (Travaux Préparatoires) of the Non-
Refoulement and No Penalty Provisions of the 1951 
Refugee Convention 
In drafting Articles 31 and 33, the framers of the Refugee 
Convention intended to ensure that states parties would not return 
refugees to a country where they might be persecuted. The framers also 
intended that asylum-seekers would generally not be penalized for 
entering a country illegally. The first draft of what is now Refugee 
Convention Article 31 captures the latter theme: 
The penalties enacted against foreigners entering the 
territory of the Contracting Party without prior 
permission shall not be applied to refugees seeking to 
escape from persecution, provided that such refugees 
present themselves without delay to the authorities of 
 
137.  See GUY S. GOODWIN-GILL, THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 248 
(2d ed. 1996). (“[A]ll detention must be in accordance with and authorized by 
law; . . . detention should be reviewed as to its legality and necessity, according to 
the standard of what is reasonable and necessary in a democratic society. Arbitrary 
embraces not only what is illegal, but also what is unjust.”) (emphasis added) (citing 
U.N. Comm’n on Human Rights, Study on the right of everyone to be free from 
arbitrary arrest, detention, and exile, UN Doc. E/CN.4/826/Rev.1. (1964)); see also 
U.N. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 9.1, opened for 
signature Dec. 9, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976; adopted 
by the United States, Sept. 8, 1992, 6 I.L.M. 368) (“No one shall be subjected to 
arbitrary arrest or detention.”); G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, art. 9 (Dec. 10, 1948) (“No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, 
detention or exile.”). 
138.  Under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, the interpreter of 
co-official texts in two or more languages should do as follows when the meanings 
differ in the two (or more) texts: “[W]hen a comparison of the authentic texts 
discloses a difference in meanings which the application of Articles 31 and 32 
[governing treaty interpretation generally] does not remove, the meaning which 
best reconciles the texts, having regard to the object and purpose of the treaty, shall 
be adopted.” Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 33(4), May 23, 1969, 
1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (emphasis added). Subsection 1 of Article 33 notes an exception 
to the above rule, namely, where a treaty provides that in case of “divergence, a 
particular text shall prevail.” Id. art. 33(1). No such provision is present in the 1951 
Convention on Refugees. In addition, Article 33(3) provides that ‘[t]he terms of the 
treaty are presumed to have the same meaning in each authentic text.’” Id. art. 
33(3). 
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the reception country and show good cause for their 
entry.139 
The official commentary on this draft explained its purpose: 
A refugee whose departure from his country of origin is 
usually a flight, is rarely in a position to comply with 
the requirements for legal entry (possession of national 
passport and visa) into the country of refuge. It would 
be in keeping with the notion of asylum to exempt from 
penalties a refugee, escaping from persecution, who 
after crossing the frontier clandestinely, presents 
himself as soon as possible to the authorities of the 
country of asylum and is recognized as a bona fide 
refugee.140 
The original draft was modified only slightly. As noted above, 
the French representative proposed the term “sanctions pénales” for 
“penalties.” According to the French representative, the penalties in 
subsection 1 meant judicial, not administrative, penalties: 
The French representative said that the penalties 
mentioned should be confined to judicial penalties only. 
But in so far as non-admission or expulsion had to be 
regarded as sanctions, they were in the vast majority 
of cases administrative measures, especially where 
they were applied at very short notice.141 
 
139.  Weis, supra note 125 at 278 (emphasis added). The first draft was 
proposed by the U.N. Secretariat. Id. See also GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 137, at 
305 (“Such refugees are not to be subjected to ‘penalties’, which appear to 
comprehend prosecution, fine, and imprisonment, but not administrative 
detention.”) (citing travaux préparatoires). 
140.  Weis, supra note 125 at 279 (emphasis added). 
141.  Id. at 294 (emphasis added). At the negotiation conference, the Belgian 
representative and the French representative engaged in a colloquy on this issue. 
The Belgian representative stated: 
With regard to the presence of a refugee in a given territory, a 
case might arise of a refugee who had been on foreign soil for a 
certain length of time being discovered by the authorities. The 
moment he was discovered he could present himself to the local 
authorities, explaining the reasons why he had taken refuge in 
that territory. In such cases, the text would not necessarily cover 
the case of prolonged illegal presence. 
Id. The French representative responded, “The first paragraph of the Article 
involved a voluntary act. A person who presented himself to the authorities after 
he had been discovered could no longer benefit by the provisions of Article 26 
[Article 31 in the final act].” Id. at 295. But see Kriel, supra note 12 (noting that a 
wave of immigrants at their first opportunity have surrendered to the United States 
immigration or other U.S. officials). 
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There can be no doubt that the states parties at the conference 
did intend to impose a legal obligation on states to refrain from 
penalizing asylum applicants. Taking the opposite position, Pakistan 
proposed that states should have the right to determine whether to 
impose penalties: 
The Contracting States may at their discretion exempt 
from penalties on account of his illegal entry or 
presence a refugee who enters or who is present in their 
territory without authorization, and who presents 
himself without delay to the authorities and shows 
good cause for his illegal entry or presence.142 
In the first line of its proposal, Pakistan attempted to give 
states parties the unfettered discretion whether to penalize asylum-
seekers. Pakistan’s proposed language, however, was rejected. Article 
31 (and Article 33 and the Convention as a whole) was enacted to 
protect asylum-seekers from being returned to the country of 
persecution and from being mistreated by the receiving state.143 
As noted above, many scholars have argued that Article 31(2) 
should be interpreted to bar extended incarceration of asylum-seekers 
in administrative detention. 144  The French representative, whose 
 
So, for example, an asylum-seeker would be protected under Article 31 where he 
or she has entered the receiving state without inspection but sees an immigration 
officer or other law enforcement official and voluntarily surrenders to that person. 
On the other hand, an asylum-seeker who enters without inspection and attempts 
to evade immigration or other law enforcement would presumably have a more 
difficult case under Article 31. Note, however, that the UNHCR calls for a more 
nuanced interpretation of this language of Article 31. See infra notes 157, 165, 175, 
and accompanying text. 
142.  Weis, supra note 125 at 295. 
143.  In this regard, note that Article 33(2) attempts to prevent receiving 
states from overly restricting the movement of refugees. As observed above, the 
Convention expressly prohibits discrimination in the asylum procedural and 
substantive processes on the basis of race, religion or country of origin. See 1951 
Refugee Convention, supra note 17, art. 3. 
144.  See GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 137, at 248; see also UNHCR, SUMMARY 
CONCLUSIONS: ARTICLE 31 OF THE 1951 CONVENTION ¶ 11 (November 8–9, 2001), 
http://www.unhcr.org/419c783f4.pdf [https://perma.cc/B6T4-9PZ7] (finding that 
Article 31(2) intended that detention should not be extended for the purpose of 
punishment or deterrence). See also Anita Sinha, Defining Detention: The 
Intervention of the European Court of Human Rights in the Detention of Involuntary 
Migrants, 50.3 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REVIEW 176 (2019) (comprehensive analysis 
of the post-crisis migrant detention decisions of the European Court of Human 
Rights reveals that the Court has upheld the applicability of the prohibition of 
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language was adopted in the co-official French version of the 
Convention, asserted that the Convention only bars criminal penalties 
imposed by a court, not administrative ones imposed by immigration 
control bodies. 
The English version of Article 31, however, makes no mention 
that only “penal” or “criminal” penalties are prohibited. While a 
reasonably brief period of administrative detention may be required to 
determine whether the asylum seeker can make out a prima facie case 
of asylum, lengthy or indefinite detention of asylum-seekers certainly 
constitutes a penalty.145 Such detention, or the threat of such lengthy 
detention, may not only effectively punish the asylum-seeker, but it 
may also coerce a great many asylum-seekers to relinquish their 
asylum claims and “accept” deportation.146 Such coercion undermines 
the receiving state’s obligation of non-refoulement and the general 
obligation of receiving states to protect refugees—the central purposes 
of the 1951 Refugee Convention and 1967 Protocol. 
In case of conflict between two or more official languages 
(versions of a treaty), the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
instructs that “the meaning which best reconciles the texts, having 
regard to the object and purpose of the treaty, shall be adopted.”147 In 
addition, Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
states that the interpreter should consider “the ordinary meaning to be 
given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its 
object and purpose.”148 
The purpose of the Refugee Convention is to protect refugees 
from persecution and “to assure refugees the widest possible exercise 
of [their] fundamental rights and freedoms.” 149  Since the plain 
 
deprivation of liberty in the European Convention of Human Rights to migrant 
detention).  
145 .  Of course, the authorities can continue to detain individuals with 
serious criminal records or those who pose a definite national security risk. Even 
such individuals, however, should have a bond hearing at which the immigrant may 
contest the government’s arguments for keeping the individual detained. Sajous v. 
Decker, No. 18-cv-2447, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86921, at *1–47, *25–26 (S.D.N.Y. 
May 23, 2018) (holding that prolonged detention without a bond hearing would 
violate due process protections). But see infra note 158 on Jennings v. Rodriguez, 
138 S. Ct. 830 (2018). 
146 .  See supra note 61 (relating co-author’s experience with this 
phenomenon). 
147.  Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 138, art. 33(4). 
148.  Id. art. 31(1) (emphasis added). 
149.  1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 17, pmbl. ¶ 2. 
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meaning of “penalties” in English includes both criminal and civil 
sanctions, and because the central purpose of the 1951 Refugee 
Convention and the 1967 Protocol is to protect refugees, the two official 
versions are best reconciled by reading “penalties” not only to include 
criminal prosecution and punishment, but also lengthy civil 
incarceration. 150  Thus, the ordinary meaning of “penalties” 
contemplates both civil and criminal ones. 151  The U.N. agency 
responsible for monitoring compliance with the Convention and the 
Protocol, the UNHCR, has reached the same conclusion.152 
Weighing against that interpretation, the travaux 
préparatoires shows that “sanctions pénales” in the French version 
 
150 .  The UNHCR has noted, “The national laws in Argentina, Bolivia, 
Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, and Nicaragua [among others] specify that protections 
against penalization applies as regards both ‘criminal and administrative 
sanctions.’” Cathryn Costello et al., Article 31 of the 1951 Convention Relating to 
the Status of Refugees, U.N. Doc. PPLA/2017/01, at 33 (July 2017), 
https://www.refworld.org/docid/59ad55c24.html (on file with the Columbia Human 
Rights Law Review) (citing Argentina, Ley General de Reconocimiento y Protección 
al Refugiado (2006), art. 40; Bolivia, Ley de Protección a Personas Refugiadas 
(2012), art. 7; Brazil, Ley No. 9.474 (22 July 1997), art. 10; Chile, Ley No. 20.430 
(2010), art. 8; Costa Rica, Reglamento de Personas Refugiados (2011), art. 137; 
Nicaragua, Ley No. 655 de la Protección a Refugiados (2008), art. 10; Uruguay, Ley 
del Refugiado, art. 15. But see, GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 137, at 305 (“Such 
refugees are not to be subjected to ‘penalties’, which appear to comprehend 
prosecution, fine, and imprisonment, but not administrative detention.”) (citing 
travaux préparatoires). 
151 .  See Penalty Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S LAW DICTIONARY, 
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/penalty [https://perma.cc/K2JS-
YSYZ] (defining penalty as including “the suffering or the sum to be forfeited to 
which a person agrees to be subjected in case of nonfulfillment of stipulations. 
[‘]A penalty was imposed on the contractor for breach of contract.[’]”). Anglo-
Saxon law is replete with statutes and regulations that impose civil penalties. See, 
e.g., Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services, Inc. 528 U.S. 
167, 209 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The Court . . . has promulgated a 
revolutionary new doctrine of standing that will permit the entire body of public 
civil penalties to be handed over to enforcement by private interests”) (emphasis 
added); U.S. Dep’t of Energy v. Ohio, 503 U.S. 607, 633 (1992) (“Certainly this 
special definition [of the citizen suit provision] applies to the civil penalty 
enforcement provisions it incorporates.”) (emphasis added). 
152 .  See also UNHCR, GUIDELINES ON THE APPLICABLE CRITERIA AND 
STANDARDS RELATING TO THE DETENTION OF ASYLUM-SEEKERS AND 
ALTERNATIVES TO DETENTION, ¶ 31 (2012) [hereinafter UNHCR Detention 
Guidelines], https://www.unhcr.org/publications/legal/505b10ee9/unhcr-detention-
guidelines.html (on file with the Columbia Human Rights Law Review) 
(“[d]etention as a penalty for illegal entry and/or as a deterrent to seeking asylum” 
is arbitrary and thus unlawful). 
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referred only to criminal penalties and none of the representatives at 
the conference argued against that view. If, however, the parties at the 
conference intended to endorse the French version, they could have 
simply inserted “criminal” before “penalties.” The proponents of the 
French interpretation do have a second argument: the parties must 
have considered temporary administrative detention necessary so that 
authorities could have a reasonable opportunity to determine whether 
a given immigrant is a bona fide or a prima facie bona fide refugee.153 
Both of these arguments are valid. Nevertheless, looking at the purpose 
of the Convention, from its constant theme of protecting refugees from 
discrimination, expulsion, and other violations of international human 
rights law, 154  one has to conclude that administrative detention at 
some point undermines the fundamental purpose of the Convention 
 
153.  See id. ¶ 24 (“Minimal periods in detention may be permissible to carry 
out initial identity and security checks in cases where identity is undetermined or 
in dispute, or there are indications of security risks.”). In the United States, a prima 
facie showing of asylum status is made through the “credible fear” interviewing 
process. Jason Boyd, The President’s Proposal to Eliminate Due Process at the 
Border, THINK IMMIGRATION (July 16, 2018), http://thinkimmigrationorg/blog/ 
2018/07/16/the-presidents-proposal-to-eliminate-due-process-at-the-border/ 
[https://perma.cc/3KYT-JCBE] (writing that Congress created the credible fear 
interviewing process in 1996 as a low-threshold, preliminary screening process to 
ensure bona fide claims to asylum); 8 C.F.R. § 208.30 (2019); see also Alvaro Peralta, 
Bordering Persecution: Why Asylum Seekers Should Not Be Subject to Expedited 
Removal, 64 AM. U. L. REV. 1303, 1313–14 (2015) (arguing that credible fear 
interviews have become “cursory in nature” thus preventing proper screening of 
asylum screeners while “imped[ing] asylees’ statutory, regulatory, and 
constitutional rights to a fair and meaningful hearing”); Dree K. Collopy, Crisis at 
the Border, Part II: Demonstrating a Credible Fear of Persecution or Torture, 16–04 
IMMIGR. BRIEFINGS 1 (2016) (explaining that credible fear interviews are not meant 
to be full asylum interviews but are intended to prevent asylum seekers from being 
returned to places where they may be subjected to persecution or torture); Denise 
Gilman, Realizing Liberty: The Use of International Human Rights Law to Realign 
Immigration Detention in the United States, 36 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 243, 305–306 
(2013) (“Detention under expedited removal for a brief . . . time is likely not itself 
incompatible with . . . standards relation to immigration detention. . . . [E]ven the 
UNHCR standards permit detention of asylum seekers for the brief period 
necessary to confirm identity and initially screen the claim, which is essentially 
what the credible fear interview does.”). 
154.  See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 137, art. 9 (requiring habeas corpus); UN 
Human Rights Committee General Comment No. 35, ¶ 18, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/GC/35 (Dec. 16, 2014) (noting that article 9 applies to asylum-seekers); 
Rights and Guarantees of Children in the Context of Migration and/or in Need of 
International Protection, Advisory Opinion OC-21/14, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 
No. 21 ¶¶ 191–198 (Aug. 13, 2014); Council Directive 2013/33, art. 9, 2013 O.J. (L. 
180) 96, 102 (EU) (requiring speedy judicial review of detention). 
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and crosses the line into a “penalty” within the meaning of Article 
31(1). 
The Trump Administration intended to deter and possibly to 
punish asylum-seekers by keeping them in prolonged immigration 
(administrative) detention (as well as by criminal prosecution and 
punishment). While the Administration may continue trying to deny 
its intentions, it cannot credibly deny that its interwoven criminal 
prosecution/prolonged detention imperative and concomitant family 
separation policy have the effect of coercing asylum-seekers to give up 
their asylum claims, however strong.155 The Administration’s “Remain 
in Mexico” policy, distortion of Human Rights Reports, and political 
interference with and retaliation against advocates and adjudicators 
render it nearly impossible for any asylum-seeker to meet the high 
burden of proof required by the Real ID Act of 2005.156 When one adds 
substandard conditions in the immigrant detention facilities, including 
inadequate food, housing, medical care, and the failure of ICE to stop 
private detention personnel from subjecting immigrants to the risk of 
sexual assault, one could conclude that immigration detention beyond 
a short period does indeed constitute a penalty within the meaning of 
Article 31. 
Although brief detention of asylum-seekers is permissible, it 
should be avoided except in the case of a threat to “public order, public 
health or national security.”157 Even in one of those cases, detention 
should be relatively short and should only occur to ensure the asylum-
seeker is not a threat. Generally, twenty days should be more than 
enough to conduct credible fear interviews or their equivalent. Six 
months unquestionably constitutes “prolonged” immigration 
detention.158 Six months is more than adequate for the government to 
 
155.  See supra note 61 (discussing co-author’s observation of this type of 
coercion). 
156.  Real ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109–13, 119 Stat. 302. 
157.  Costello et al., supra note 150, ¶ 21. 
158 .  See, e.g., Abdi v. Duke, 280 F. Supp. 3d 373, 411 (W.D.N.Y. 2018) 
(ordering ICE to provide members of putative class of immigrant detainees who had 
been detained for six months or more with individualized bond hearings); Lora v. 
Shanahan, 804 F.3d 601, 616 (2d Cir. 2015) (holding that an immigrant detained 
pursuant to INA § 236(c) [8 U.S.C.A. § 1226(c)], which requires mandatory 
detention of certain aliens awaiting removal proceedings, has a right to a bail 
hearing before an immigration judge within six months of his or her detention), 
vacated, 138 S. Ct. 1260 (2018); Reid v. Donelan, 819 F.3d 486, 498–99 (1st Cir. 
2016) (finding that the Due Process clause imposes an implicit reasonableness 
limitation on the statute that requires mandatory detention of certain criminally 
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provide an appropriate credible fear interview and allow an appeal to 
an immigration court. Immigrants have the right to make an asylum 
claim. Lengthy incarceration of asylum-seekers undermines that right. 
Even under United States law, a first-time illegal entrant is at most 
criminally responsible for committing a misdemeanor, a minor offense. 
Incarcerating such an individual for a lengthy period—including in 
immigration detention—violates the principle of proportionality.159 
It is difficult to imagine anything more inherently punitive 
than forcible removal of children from their families that was concealed 
until it was useful to be publicized as an explicit deterrent to asylum-
seekers. These actions are compounded by the Administration’s failure 
to keep track of the whereabouts and condition of the children so that 
 
convicted aliens in removal). But see Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 846 
(2018) (applying INA provisions primarily to detention of aliens seeking entry to 
United States and defining narrow conditions under which the Attorney General 
may release on bond aliens in removal proceedings (based on criminal offenses or 
terrorist activities) preclude the provision from being plausibly interpreted as 
placing an implied six-month limit on detention or as requiring periodic bond 
hearings); Shanahan v. Lora, 138 S. Ct. 1260, 1260 (2018) (vacating Lora v. 
Shanahan, 804 F.3d 601, 601 (2d Cir. 2015); Reid v. Donelan, 2018 WL 4000993 
(1st Cir. 2018) (opinion below withdrawn on reconsideration); Matter of M-S-, 27 I. 
& N. Dec. 509, 518–19 (A.G. 2019) (AG withdrawing Matter of X-K-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 
731 (B.I.A. 2005), holding that noncitizens initially placed in expedited removal 
proceedings who establish credible fear of persecution (i.e., significant possibility 
that the noncitizen is eligible for asylum, withholding of removal or protection 
under the Convention Against Torture, 8 C.F.R. § 208.30, § 1208.30) are statutorily 
subject to mandatory detention throughout proceedings—without addressing 
constitutional limits). Contra Jennings, 138 S. Ct. at 860 (Breyer, J., dissenting) 
(criticizing the majority for upholding denial of bond hearings for noncitizens held 
beyond six months and finding such denial unconstitutional for treating them worse 
than individuals charged with major crimes). See also Shanahan v. Lora, 138 S. Ct. 
1260, 1260 (2018) (vacating Lora v. Shanahan, 804 F.3d 601, 601 (2d Cir. 2015); 
Reid v. Donelan, 2018 WL 4000993 (1st Cir. 2018) (opinion below withdrawn on 
reconsideration); Matter of M-S-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 509, 518–19 (A.G. 2019) (AG 
withdrawing Matter of X-K-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 731 (B.I.A. 2005), holding that 
noncitizens initially placed in expedited removal proceedings who establish credible 
fear of persecution (i.e., significant possibility that the noncitizen is eligible for 
asylum, withholding of removal or protection under the Convention Against 
Torture, 8 C.F.R. § 208.30, § 1208.30) are statutorily subject to mandatory 
detention throughout proceedings—without addressing constitutional limits). 
159 .  See Alice Ristroph, Proportionality as a Principle of Limited 
Government, 55 DUKE L.J. 263, 263 (2005) (“In doctrinal contexts other than 
criminal sentencing, proportionality is frequently used as a mechanism of judicial 
review to prevent legislative encroachments on individual rights and other 
exercises of excessive power.”). 
 
2019] Enter at Your Own Risk: Criminalizing Asylum Seekers 73 
reunification is not readily possible.160 Any parent who has lost her 
child for five minutes in a benign and secure department store or mall 
has experienced a depth of terror and wretched, self-blaming panic, an 
absolute inability to concentrate on or attend at all to anything else but 
the missing child that is hard to match. How then should we 
characterize that agony when it is coupled with the knowledge that as 
parents are helplessly incarcerated, their children are suffering from 
extreme distress, loneliness, depression, and fear of physical and 
sexual abuse? Their children may be kept in isolation or thrown 
together with strangers of all ages, with no guarantee of 
communication or contact with counsel and family, in substandard and 
unacceptable detention facilities. 
Furthermore, the refusal to release detained children to 
potential sponsors—usually other relatives—leaves children 
questioning whether their loved ones are jailed, safe, or deported. Any 
other potential sponsors who step forward to provide the children with 
a home while they seek asylum might be prevented from doing so, or 
may be targeted and be deported themselves. The wholesale cover-up, 
denial, and attempt to ascribe blame for this shameful policy to the 
Obama Administration by Trump officials further highlights the 
hypocrisy of the Trump Administration’s defense of this harmful 
treatment, or, at the very least, its willful blindness. 
As the UNHCR notes, “The term ‘penalties’ includes, but is not 
limited to, prosecution, fine, and imprisonment.”161  Article 1 of the 
Convention against Torture prohibits meting out not only severe 
physical pain, but also “severe . . . mental pain or 
suffering . . . intentionally inflicted . . . for any reason based on 
discrimination of any kind.” 162  ICE and CBP officials separated 
 
160.  For a stunning illustration of how forcible separation and the inability 
to determine the whereabouts of a five-year-old put one young immigrant mother 
in the hospital and led to the child’s uncounseled “waiver” of her right to a bond 
hearing, see Sarah Stillman, The Five-Year-Old Who Was Detained at the Border 
and Persuaded to Sign Away Her Rights, NEW YORKER (Oct. 11, 2018), https://www. 
newyorker.com/news/news-desk/the-five-year-old-who-was-detained-at-the-
border-and-convinced-to-sign-away-her-rights (on file with the Columbia Human 
Rights Law Review). 
161.  Advisory Opinion on Criminal Prosecution of Asylum-Seekers for Illegal 
Entry, UNHCR (Mar. 2, 2006), https://www.refworld.org/docid/4721ccd02.html (on 
file with the Columbia Human Rights Law Review) (emphasis added). 
162.  Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1984, art. 1 S. Treaty Doc. 
No. 100-20, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 (entered into force June 26, 1987) (emphasis added). 
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children from their parents because of their parents’ immigration 
status or nationality, which falls within “discrimination of any kind.” 
The severe mental pain or suffering must be committed by a “public 
official or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a 
public official”—unquestionably satisfied here. Government officials 
deliberately took children from their parents to deter asylum-seekers, 
anticipating the mental pain and suffering their premeditated policy 
would cause both the children and their parents. Inflicting pain to 
deter immigrants from coming to the United States was the goal, thus 
satisfying both the “intentionality” element of the UNCAT and also the 
“specific intent” element of the understanding that the U.S. Senate 
attached to the UNCAT. 163  Amnesty International, whose major 
mission is to prevent torture in all parts of the world, stated, “[T]his is 
a spectacularly cruel policy, where frightened children are being ripped 
from their parents’ arms . . . . This is nothing short of torture. The 
severe mental suffering that officials have intentionally inflicted on 
these families for coercive purposes means that these acts meet the 
definitions of torture under both US and international law.”164 Is it 
even possible to claim that such treatment does not constitute a 
“penalty?” 
C. Presenting Oneself to Authorities Without Delay and Showing 
Good Cause for Entering Without Inspection 
Article 31(1) prohibits imposing penalties on refugees, but only 
“provided that such refugees present themselves without delay to the 
authorities and show good cause for their illegal entry or presence.”165 
For example, Canadian courts have stressed the concern about 
protecting refugees and have refused to penalize immigrants in such 
situations: 
It does not stand to the applicant’s credit that, after 
entering Canada as visitors, they illegally obtained 
Canadian social security cards, worked illegally for 
approximately a year before they were found out and 
 
163.  See supra notes 38–51 and accompanying text. 
164.  Nick Cumming-Bruce, U.N. Rights Chief Tells U.S. to Stop Taking 
Migrant Children from Parents, N.Y. TIMES (June 18, 2018), https://www.nytimes. 
com/2018/06/18/world/europe/trump-migrant-children-un.html (on file with the 
Columbia Human Rights Law Review). 
165.  1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 17, art. 31(1) (emphasis added); 
Weis, supra note 125, at 278. The first draft of the Convention was proposed by the 
U.N. Secretariat. Id. 
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arrested, and then claimed refugee status. 
Nevertheless, since the law allows them to apply as 
refugees even in such circumstances, we must conclude 
that it does not intend that their refugee claims should 
be determined on the basis of these extraneous 
considerations.166 
Similarly, a British court stated that it has long been settled 
that “those fleeing from persecution or threatened persecution . . . may 
have to resort to deceptions of various kinds (possession and use of 
false papers, forgery, misrepresentation, etc.) in order to make good 
their escape.”167 The obligation not to impose penalties on refugees who 
present themselves without delay and show good cause “is perhaps the 
most contentious element of Article 31”168 as the grant of protection is 
contingent on qualifying conditions: directness, promptness, and good 
cause.169 As to “directness,” refugees are afforded asylum protection 
after “coming directly from a territory where their life or freedom was 
threaten[ed].”170 But, as Britain’s High Court of Justice concluded, a 
“short term stopover en route to such intended sanctuary cannot forfeit 
the protection of the Article.”171 
With respect to “promptness,” the 2001 Expert Round Table, 
organized by the UNHCR and the Migration Institute, and composed 
of governmental officials, scholars, and NGO representatives, 
explained that it is “a matter of fact and degree” that “depends on the 
circumstances of the case[.]”172 Moreover, the UNHCR has stressed 
 
166.  HATHAWAY & FORSTER, supra note 126, at 29 n.77 (quoting Surujpal v. 
Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1985] 60 NR 73 (Can. FCA) 
at 73–74, per MacGuigan J. (in obiter)); see also GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 137, at 
305 (“Such refugees are not to be subjected to ‘penalties’, which appear to 
comprehend prosecution, fine, and imprisonment, but not administrative 
detention.”) (citing travaux préparatoires). 
167.  R v. Asfaw [2008] UKHL 31[9]. 
168.  Costello et al., supra note 150, at 17. 
169.  See SXH v. CPS, [2014] EWCA Civ 90 [¶ 16, n. 26] (appeal taken from 
Eng.) (quoting speech of Lord Bingham of Cornhill explaining the application of 
article 31 of the Refugee Convention as not “limited to offences attributable to a 
refugee’s entry into or presence in this country, but should provide immunity, if the 
other conditions are fulfilled, from the imposition of criminal penalties [for] offences 
attributable to the attempt of a refugee to leave the country in the continuing course 
of a flight from persecution even after a short stopover in transit”). 
170.  1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 17, art. 31(1). 
171.  R v. Uxbridge Magistrates’ Court and Another, ex parte Adimi [1999] 
EWHC (Admin) 765 [para. 18] (Lord Justice Simon Brown), https://www.refworld. 
org/cases,GBR_HC_QB,3ae6b6b41c.html [https://perma.cc/N6UJ-APP2]. 
172.  UNHCR, supra note 144. 
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that “no strict time limit” should be applied to the “without delay” 
language.173 Noting that an asylum seeker may have many reasons for 
not immediately going to the receiving state’s authorities, the UNHCR 
stated: 
[Asylum-seekers] may fear authority figures because of 
the persecution they have suffered or because of a 
language barrier. They may have been advised not to 
come forward immediately or fear immediate removal 
to the country of feared persecution. They may wish to 
first consult with an attorney or organization familiar 
with the country’s asylum laws. Trauma victims may 
be particularly fearful of revealing themselves 
immediately. Some asylum-seekers may wish to 
reunite with family members in the country of asylum 
before approaching the authorities.174  
To the extent a refugee must show “good cause,” the 2001 
Expert Round Table concluded that having a well-founded fear 
establishes this requirement: 
Having a well-founded fear of persecution is recognized 
in itself as ‘good cause’ for illegal entry. To ‘come 
directly’ from such a country or countries in which s/he 
is at risk or in which generally no protection is 
available, is also accepted as ‘good cause’ for illegal 
entry. There may, in addition, be other factual 
circumstances which constitute ‘good cause.’175 
The United States has adopted a catch-22 immigration policy: 
a refugee is faced with the choice either to cross the border without 
inspection and be subject to an inevitable criminal prosecution or to 
attempt admission “the right way” through a port of entry and 
encounter CBP officers who “don’t tell the [refugee] they can’t apply for 
asylum, just that they cannot apply right now because the port of entry 
 
173.  Costello et al., supra note 150, at 19. See also Kriel, supra note 12 
(noting that a wave of immigrants have, at their first opportunity, surrendered to 
United States immigration or other U.S. officials). 
174.  Advisory Opinion on Criminal Prosecution of Asylum-Seekers for Illegal 
Entry, supra note 161. 
175.  UNHCR, supra note 144, at 10(e); see also R v. Zanzoul [2006] CA297/06 
(N.Z.) (holding that applicant “was not in the situation of many refugee claimants 
who . . . travel[led] on false documentation because their country of origin would 
not issue passports. On the facts, his possession . . . of a false Australian passport 
was completely irrelevant to any genuine belief he may have had a claim of refugee 
status.”). 
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is at capacity.”176 Eleanor Acer, Senior Director of Refugee Protection 
for Human Rights First, cautions that the United States “has 
increasingly illegally turned away refugees at official border points, 
driving them to make the dangerous crossing between points.”177 The 
Trump Administration’s policies of largely rejecting presumptive 
asylum-seekers at its ports of entry, separating families, and 
indefinitely detaining refugees, raise the question: might refugees have 
good cause for not presenting themselves without delay to obviously 
adverse authorities eager to impose harsh punishments? 
III. THE SELF-EXECUTING NATURE OF KEY ARTICLES OF THE 1951 
REFUGEE CONVENTION AND 1967 PROTOCOL 
The Framers of the United States Constitution intended 
treaties to be the supreme law of the land, to supersede inconsistent 
state statutes and state court rulings, and, when applicable, to be a 
state or federal court’s rule of decision. The Framers were particularly 
concerned that states would violate the rights of British nationals and 
other foreigners, and specifically would refuse to ensure that British 
nationals would be paid in pound sterling for debts that American 
nationals owed them. Article IV of the 1783 Treaty of Peace with 
Britain required such payment: “It is agreed that creditors on either 
side, shall meet with no lawful impediment to the recovery of the full 
value in sterling money, of all bona fide debts heretofore contracted.”178 
During the Revolutionary War, several of the newly declared 
independent states printed their own currency and permitted 
Americans to use such currency (generally with little actual value) to 
pay off their mortgages and other debts owed to British nationals. For 
example, the Virginia Legislature during the War of Independence 
passed a statute “contemplating to prevent the enemy [the British and 
 
176.  Robert Moore, At the U.S. Border, Asylum-Seekers Fleeing Violence Are 
Told to Come Back Later, WASH. POST (June 13, 2018), https://www.washington 
post.com/world/national-security/at-the-us-border-asylum-seekers-fleeing-
violence-are-told-to-come-back-later/2018/06/12/79a12718-6e4d-11e8-afd5-778aca9 
03bbe_story.html (on file with the Columbia Human Rights Law Review). 
177 .  Statement in Response to President Trump’s Attacks on Refugees, 
HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST (Nov. 1, 2018), https://www.humanrightsfirst.org/press-
release/statement-response-president-trumps-attacks-refugees [https://perma.cc/ 
HDC9-KTEW]. 
178.  Definitive Treaty of Peace Between the United States of America and 
his Britannic Majesty, Gr. Brit.–U.S., art. IV, Sept. 30, 1783, 8 U.S.T. 80 
[hereinafter The Paris Peace Treaty] (emphasis added). 
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British creditors] [from] deriving strength by the receipt of [payments 
of debts].”179 The statute provided that if any debtor “pa[id] his debt 
into the [Virginia] Loan Office, obtain[ed] a certificate and receipt as 
directed, he shall be discharged from so much of the debt.”180 After the 
war ended in 1781 and the Treaty of Peace was signed in 1783, the 
State of Virginia did nothing to ensure that the British creditors’ debts 
were paid in pound sterling as the Treaty of Peace required. Virginia’s 
and other states’ failure to abide by the Treaty threatened to unravel 
the hard-won victory by the fledgling United States over the then-
superpower British.181 
To address these and related issues, the Constitutional 
Convention convened in Philadelphia in 1787, and ultimately crafted 
Article 6, section 2 of the Constitution—the Supremacy Clause: 
This Constitution, and the laws of the United States 
which shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all 
treaties made, or which shall be made, under the 
authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law 
of the land; and the judges in every state shall be bound 
thereby, anything in the Constitution or laws of any 
State to the contrary notwithstanding.182 
Correspondingly, the Constitutional Convention expressly 
granted federal courts jurisdiction over treaty claims. “The judicial 
power shall extend to all cases, in law and equity, arising under this 
Constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties made, or which 
shall be made, under their authority. . . .”183 
In 1796, the Supreme Court had its first opportunity to 
interpret a treaty of the United States, namely, the Treaty of Peace 
with Britain. In Ware v. Hylton, the Court held that Article IV of the 
 
179.  Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 281 (1796) (Cushing, J.). 
180.  Id. at 281–82. 
181.  See David M. Golove, Treaty-Making and the Nation: The Historical 
Foundations of the Nationalist Conception of the Treaty Power, 98 MICH. L. REV. 
1075, 1115–16 (2000) (discussing states’ reticence to pay British creditors their 
owed debt, leading to severe tensions and the possibility of war); Colin G. Calloway, 
Suspicion and Self-Interest: The British-Indian Alliance and the Peace of Paris, 48 
HISTORIAN 41, 54 (1985) (discussing how Britain justified its refusal to turn 
Northwest frontier posts over to the United States by pointing to its failure to pay 
British debts). The Framers were also concerned with foreign powers playing one 
American state off another leading to a resultant weak, balkanized foreign policy. 
Golove, supra, at 1128–30. 
182.  U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2. (emphasis added). 
183.  Id. art. III, § 2 (emphasis added). 
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Treaty provided a remedy to the British creditor for money owed but 
denied by the Virginia sequestration statute discussed above. 184 
Supreme Court Justice Cushing noted that Article IV was definite and 
mandatory: “The provision, that ‘Creditors shall meet with no lawful 
impediment,’ etc (sic) is as absolute, unconditional, and peremptory, as 
words can well express, and made not to depend on the will and 
pleasure, or the optional conduct of any body of men whatever.”185 
Justice Cushing, however, went on to imply that Article V of 
the treaty might not have established a legally enforceable obligation. 
That article states in relevant part, “It is agreed that the Congress 
shall earnestly recommend it to the legislatures of the respective states, 
to provide for the restitution of all [confiscated] estates, rights, and 
properties . . . .”186 The words “shall earnestly recommend” are plainly 
hortatory and strikingly contrast with “[c]reditors shall meet with no 
lawful impediment.” A party receiving a recommendation implicitly 
has the right to reject it. Article IV, on the other hand, is more than 
sufficiently definite to require the party or parties to whom it is 
directed to comply. 
The Court’s first treaty case thus clarifies perhaps the most 
important strand of what became known as the self-executing treaty 
doctrine. That strand presumes that treaty provisions are self-
executing and may therefore serve as the rule of decision, but makes 
an exception for a treaty provision that is insufficiently definite. By 
framing Article V in the Treaty of Peace as a recommendation, the 
parties did not create nor intend to create a legally binding obligation. 
Consequently, the Court implied that Article V was not enforceable. 
Like Article IV of the Treaty of Peace, the relevant treaty 
articles of the 1951 Convention impose definite legal obligations. 
Article 31(1), for instance, uses mandatory language and is stated in 
the negative. “The Contracting States shall not impose penalties, on 
account of their illegal entry or presence . . . .” 187  Negatively stated 
treaty provisions are more readily found to be self-executing, probably 
because “negatively drafted provisions are often more precise than are 
 
184.  Ware, 3 U.S. at 284 (pointing out that the new nation, in exchange for 
its promises to pay debts in pound sterling, got much from the British with the 1783 
Treaty of Peace). 
185.  Id. at 284. 
186.  The Paris Peace Treaty, supra note 178, art. V (emphasis added). 
187.  1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 17, art. 31(1) (emphasis added). 
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affirmative ones188 and [because] the negative nature of such a treaty 
term implicitly eliminates the need for implementing legislation.”189 
Article 33 of the Refugee Convention likewise uses mandatory 
language, imposes a negative obligation, and is similarly precise and 
definite: 
No Contracting State shall expel or return (“refouler”) a 
refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of 
territories where his life or freedom would be 
threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, 
membership of a particular social group or political 
opinion.190 
The highlighted language is specific and expressly prohibits 
the expulsion or return of refugees. The Supreme Court itself has 
contrasted this language with other articles in the Refugee Convention 
that do not create a legally binding obligation. “In contrast [to Article 
33], Article 34 provides that contracting states ‘shall as far as possible 
facilitate the assimilation and naturalization of refugees.’” 191  The 
Court characterized this provision of Article 34 as “precatory.”192 It 
 
188.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 111, reporter’s note 5 
(AM. LAW INST. 1987) (“Obligations not to act, or to act only subject to limitations, 
are generally self-executing.”). See Thomas Michael McDonnell, Defensively 
Invoking Treaties in American Courts, 37 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1401, 1428 n.126 
(citing Commonwealth v. Hawes, 76 Ky. (13 Bush) 697, 702 (1878); Blandford v. 
State, 10 Tex. App. 627, 640–41 (1881)); Yuji Iwasawa, The Doctrine of Self-
Executing Treaties in the United States: A Critical Analysis, 26 VA. J. INT’L L. 627, 
674 n.228 (1986) (citing Ware, 3 U.S. at 244–45). 
189.  See McDonnell, supra note 188, at 1428 n.128 (noting that the Supreme 
Court considered Hawes, 76 Ky. (13 Bush) 697, a “very able” opinion. United States 
v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, 427–28 (1886)); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN 
RELATIONS § 111 reporter's note 5 (AM. LAW INST. 1987). The court in Hawes also 
explained that negative treaty provisions are self-executing. Hawes, 76 Ky. (13 
Bush) at 702–03. 
190.  1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 17, art. 33 (emphasis added). 
191.  McDonnell, supra note 188, at 1423 (citing Refugee Convention, supra 
note 17, art. 34). 
192.  I.N.S. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 441 (1987). The Court properly 
recognized this as creating something less than a legally binding obligation, a 
hortatory provision. The Court, however, went on to assert that Article 34 made 
granting asylum (rather than withholding deportation) a discretionary rather than 
a legally binding obligation—a characterization that does not fit with the plain 
meaning nor the purpose of Article 34. Article 34 calls for receiving states to “as far 
as possible facilitate the assimilation and naturalization of refugees.” 1951 Refugee 
Convention, supra note 17, art. 34. It exhorts states to “make every effort to 
expedite naturalization proceedings,” but does not clearly require the states parties 
to do so. Id. The article does not deal with asylum per se except to call upon states 
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bears an uncanny resemblance to Article V of the Treaty of Peace with 
Britain. The language “shall as far as possible” suggests that if it is not 
possible, then it does not have to be done, just as Article V’s “shall 
earnestly recommend” language carries with it the right of states to 
reject the recommendation. 
A. Clarifying the Roberts Court’s Confusion about the Self-
Executing Treaty Doctrine 
The Framers intended that treaties, like federal statutes, be 
the law of the land. But courts have often ignored or misunderstood 
this command of the Supremacy Clause. Such courts have typically 
relied on an 1829 case that was overruled just four years later. In 
Foster & Elam v. Neilson, the Court interpreted the treaty between 
Spain and the United States regarding the U.S. purchase of Florida.193 
The treaty stated that previous Spanish land grants “shall be ratified 
and confirmed.”194 Apparently, the Court took this language to mean 
that such grants will be ratified and confirmed in the future, and 
 
to provide for naturalization of refugees. So the Court’s conclusion regarding 
discretion in asylum adjudication is a little baffling. 
193.  27 U.S. 253 (1829), overruled by United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. 
51 (1833). 
194.  The full text of the relevant article of the Treaty states as follows: 
All the grants of land made before the 24th of January, 
1818, by His Catholic Majesty, or by his lawful 
authorities, in the said territories ceded by His Majesty 
to the United States, shall be ratified and confirmed to 
the persons in possession of the lands, to the same extent 
that the same grants would be valid if the territories had 
remained under the dominion of His Catholic Majesty. 
But the owners in possession of such lands, who, by 
reason of the recent circumstances of the Spanish nation, 
and the revolutions in Europe, have been prevented from 
fulfilling all the conditions of their grants, shall complete 
them within the terms limited in the same, respectively, 
from the date of this treaty; in default of which the said 
grants shall be null and void. All grants made since the 
said 24th of January, 1818, when the first proposal, on 
the part of His Catholic Majesty, for the cession of the 
Floridas was made, are hereby declared and agreed to be 
null and void. 
Treaty of Amity, Settlement, and Limit Between the United States and His Catholic 
Majesty, Spain-U.S., art. 8, Feb. 22, 1819, 8 U.S.T. 252. 
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believed that the treaty provided only an executory right.195 The Court 
held this treaty provision unenforceable.196 
Four years later, however, the Court in United States v. 
Percheman overruled Foster. In Percheman, the Court again analyzed 
whether the same treaty language was sufficiently definite to state a 
legal obligation, but, apparently for the first time, examined the 
Spanish version of the treaty. The Spanish version of the Treaty of 
Amity between the United States and Spain used the phrase 
“quedaran (sic) ratificados,” which is translated “[the grants] shall 
remain ratified [and confirmed] . . . .”197 A treaty can include definite 
future obligations, so the futurity or lack thereof should not have made 
a difference. Apparently, the Foster Court saw the treaty language as 
referring to a future event without indicating who would “ratify and 
confirm” or when such ratification or confirmation would happen, thus 
rendering that treaty term indefinite. 198  Regardless, the Court 
relatively quickly overruled Foster, perhaps recognizing that besides 
the Spanish version of the relevant treaty term, the Court’s original 
decision contained strained analysis. After all, “shall” in this context 
generally denotes and connotes a present, mandatory norm; a legal 
obligation, not future tense.199 
Unfortunately, some federal courts, instead of seeing the Foster 
case for what it was—an overruled opinion of little or no precedential 
value—relied on Foster as if it were controlling precedent. This practice 
reached its zenith in Medellín v. Texas.200 In an admittedly hard case, 
the Medellín majority nevertheless distorted the doctrine of self-
executing treaties, displaying an ignorance of both international and 
domestic law on the subject. In Avena and other Mexican Nationals 
(Mexico v. United States), the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) 
 
195.  Foster, 27 U.S. at 254. 
196.  Id. 
197 .  Tratado de Amistad, Arreglo de Diferencias y Límites entre S. M. 
Católica y los Estados Unidos de América [Treaty of Amity, Settlement, and Limit 
Between the United States and His Catholic Majesty], art. 8, Feb. 22, 1819; 
Percheman, 32 U.S. at 52 (emphasis added). 
198.  See Foster, 27 U.S. at 254 (“By whom shall they [the land grants] be 
ratified and confirmed?”). 
199.  In this regard, the Percheman Court noted, “Although the words ‘shall 
be ratified and confirmed,’ are properly the words of contract, stipulating for some 
future legislative act; they are not necessarily so. They may import that they ‘shall 
be ratified and confirmed,’ by force of the instrument itself.” Percheman, 32 U.S. at 
89 (emphasis added). 
200.  Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008). 
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ruled that United States violated the Vienna Convention on Consular 
Relations (“VCCR”), noting that Texas officials failed to timely inform 
capital defendants, all of whom were Mexican nationals, of their right 
to consult with the Mexican consul.201 The ICJ rejected the argument 
that such VCCR claims were procedurally defaulted. 202  The ICJ 
reasoned that internal rules of a state may not be raised to defeat 
VCCR treaty obligations.203 The ICJ ruled that the United States was 
obligated “to provide, by means of its own choosing, review and 
reconsideration of the convictions and sentences of the Mexican 
nationals . . . .”204 Presumably, the ICJ expected that the United States 
Executive, or federal or Texas courts, would determine whether any of 
the defendants had been prejudiced by Texas’s failure to inform the 
defendants of their consular rights. 
In rejecting the Mexican defendants’ arguments, the Medellín 
majority misunderstood how international law works in tandem with 
domestic law in determining how a country carries out its treaty 
obligations. International law does not care how a country carries out 
its treaty obligations as long as the country carries them out. Article 
26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides, “Every 
treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed 
by them in good faith.”205 Noticeably absent from this fundamental 
article in this foundational treaty is any indication of how a state must 
“perform” its treaty obligations. A given country may use its courts to 
carry out its treaty obligations (via a self-executing treaty), or use its 
executive to do so (by issuing executive orders), or its legislative branch 
(by enacting implementing legislation).206 No matter the method used, 
the doctrine of self-execution rests on a state’s domestic law.207 One can 
consider the mode of performance of a treaty (unless the states parties 
 
201.  Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), Judgment, 2004 
I.C.J. 12 (Mar. 31). 
202.  Avena, 2004 I.C.J. ¶ 112. Defendant Medellín had failed to raise the 
VCCR claim at trial or on direct review. Medellín, 552 U.S. at 501. 
203.  Avena, 2004 I.C.J. ¶ 112. 
204.  Id. ¶ 153(9). 
205.  Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 138, art. 26 
(emphasis added). 
206.  See McDonnell, supra note 188, at 1404–06, illustrating how either the 
Executive or the Judiciary can carry out a treaty obligation; see also ANTHONY 
AUST, MODERN TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE 159–177 (Cambridge University Press 
3d ed. 2013) (discussing how states can implement treaty obligations domestically). 
207.  McDonnell, supra note 188, at 1404–1406. 
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otherwise specifically agree) a matter solely within a state’s 
sovereignty. 
Certain states, such as Britain, can never enter into a self-
executing treaty. Under British law, treaties to be effective 
domestically must be expressly implemented by Parliament. 208  The 
Framers of the United States Constitution were well aware of British 
practice and adopted a different approach.209 The relevant domestic 
law of the United States is contained in Articles 3 and 6(2) of the 
Constitution. As previously noted, Article 6(2) makes treaties the 
supreme law of the land, invocable in state and federal courts as the 
rule of decision. 
Perhaps the most grievous error of the Medellín majority is to 
quote with approval a statement from the First Circuit which claims 
that to be self-executing, treaties have to “convey[] an intent that it be 
‘self-executing’ and is ratified on these terms.”210 As explained above, 
the question of “self-execution” is a matter of domestic law, not 
international law. Rarely, then, could one expect states parties with 
different domestic law traditions to negotiate on the precise manner in 
which a treaty will be enforced. 211  Therefore, the question is not 
whether the negotiating parties to a treaty “convey[ed] an intent that 
it be ‘self-executing.’”212 The question is whether the parties intended 
to create a legally binding obligation. If so, it is up to the domestic law 
of the states parties to the treaty to determine how each party is to 
enforce the treaty. Sometimes the treaty will have a clause requiring 
states that do not recognize the doctrine on self-executing treaties to 
 
208.  Carlos Manuel Vazquez, The “Self-Executing” Character of the Refugee 
Protocol’s Nonrefoulement Obligation, 7 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 39, 45–46 (1993) (“For 
example, even if a treaty [entered into by Britain] purported itself to set a tariff at 
a given level, [British] domestic law-applying officials would collect the tariff as set 
by prior statutes until Parliament executed the treaty by amending the earlier 
statute.”). 
209.  See Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 543 (2008) (Breyer, J., dissenting) 
(referring to Justice Iredell in Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. 199, 276–77 (1796) discussing 
the proposition that the Constitution rejected the British approach, noting that 
“further legislative action in respect to the treaty's debt-collection provision was no 
longer necessary in the United States”). 
210.  Medellín, 552 U.S. at 505 (quoting Igartua-De La Rosa v. United States, 
417 F.3d 145, 150 (1st Cir. 2005) (en banc) (Boudin, C. J.)). 
211.  Justice Breyer was correct in observing, “How could those drafters 
achieve agreement when one signatory nation follows one tradition and a second 
follows another?” Medellín, 522 U.S. at 548 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
212.  Medellín, 552 U.S. at 505 (quoting Igartua-De La Rosa v. United States, 
417 F.3d 145, 150 (1st Cir. 2005) (en banc) (Boudin, C. J.)). 
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enact legislation to bring the treaty into effect by domestic statute.213 
Generally, however, the states parties leave it up to each individual 
state to enforce the treaty under the mode that the state itself has 
chosen to adopt. 
The Medellín majority’s error is egregious. First, the Court 
looks to find something in the treaty that treaty drafters, for good 
reason, generally are unlikely to include. It’s like telling children to 
hunt for Easter eggs hidden in the backyard when in reality all the 
Easter eggs can be found only inside the house. Second, the Medellín 
majority’s misinterpretation ignores the plain meaning and the 
purpose of the Supremacy Clause and the Framers’ intent in drafting 
this critical constitutional provision.214 The Medellín Court never ruled 
on whether Article 36 of the VCCR is self-executing. The language of 
that article is as definite as Article IV from the Treaty of Peace. Article 
36 requires states to inform foreign detainees of their right to consular 
assistance. “The [detaining] authorities shall inform the person [the 
foreign detainee] concerned without delay of his rights [to request the 
assistance of a consul from his or her country]” and if the detainee “so 
requests, the competent authorities of the receiving State shall, 
without delay, inform the consular post of the sending State” of its 
national’s detention.215 Sometimes called the international Miranda 
warning, the right to consular notification is stated in mandatory 
language, “shall inform . . . without delay.” The language is as specific 
as a Miranda warning, and is well within the competence of federal 
and state courts to apply. 
Instead of focusing on the VCCR, the Court directed its 
attention to Article 94 of the U.N. Charter and held that Article 94(1) 
is non-self-executing. Article 94 provides in full as follows: 
 
213.  Because most countries lack constitutional provisions making treaties 
the supreme law of the land, some multilateral treaties have a domestic 
implementation clause, requiring states to enact legislation to make the treaty 
enforceable domestically. Yet depending on the subject matter, countries like the 
United States that have taken the self-executing approach may not need to enact 
legislation. See Iwasawa, supra note 188, at 660; McDonnell, supra note 188, at 
1428–31. 
214.  For a brief discussion of the Framers’ intent in adopting the Supremacy 
Clause, see Vazquez, supra note 208, at 47–48; see also McDonnell, supra note 188, 
at 1406–16. 
215.  Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, art. 36(1)(b)–(1)(c), April 24, 
1963, 596 U.N.T.S. 261. 
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(1) Each Member of the United Nations undertakes to 
comply with the decision of the International Court 
of Justice in any case to which it is a party. 
(2) If any party to a case fails to perform the 
obligations incumbent upon it under a judgment 
rendered by the Court, the other party may have 
recourse to the Security Council, which may, if it 
deems necessary, make recommendations or decide 
upon measures to be taken to give effect to the 
judgment.216 
The Court reasoned that the words “undertake to comply” were 
not sufficiently definite to constitute a self-executing treaty term.217 
Granted, the language might have been stronger, for example, “shall 
comply.” But “[i]n international usage, ‘undertaking’ is well recognized 
to be a hard-immediate obligation.”218 As Justice Breyer observed in 
dissent, “undertake” means to put oneself under a legal obligation.219 
Justice Breyer examined “undertake” and the terms used in the 
Spanish version of the U.N. Charter to conclude that they mean 
“become liable.”220 But query whether the Court would have reached 
the opposite result had Article 94 used the “shall comply” language. 
A better argument for the Medellín majority’s position—one 
that the majority does make—is in reference to Article 94(2) of the U.N. 
Charter.221 That subsection concerns what happens when a state party 
 
216.  U.N. Charter, art. 94 (emphasis added). 
217.  Medellín, 552 U.S. at 508–09. 
218.  Carlos Manuel Vazquez, Treaties as Law of the Land: The Supremacy 
Clause and the Judicial Enforcement of Treaties, 122 HARV. L. REV. 599, 661 (2008) 
(citing Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Mont.), 46 I.L.M. 188, 231 (Feb. 26, 
2007) (ordinary meaning of the word ‘undertake’ is “to give a formal promise, to 
bind or engage oneself, to give a pledge or promise, to agree, to accept an obligation. 
It is a word regularly used in treaties setting out the obligations of the Contracting 
Parties. . . . It is not merely hortatory . . . .”)); Restatement (4th) of Foreign 
Relations, § 301, reporters’ note 2 (AM. LAW INST. 2018) (citing as “[a]n example of 
a nonbinding agreement” an instrument that “avoids words of legal undertaking”). 
219.  Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 553 (2008) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
220.  Id. 
221 .  Medellín, 552 U.S. at 509–10 (arguing that the sole remedy for 
noncompliance under Article 94(2) was referral to the United Nations Security 
Council and that this nonjudicial remedy was evidence that ICJ judgements were 
not meant to be enforceable in domestic courts). The Court also noted that this was 
not an absolute remedy given that the Security Council would need to effectuate 
the judgement and given that the United States would retain its ability to veto the 
Security Council resolution. Id. 
 
2019] Enter at Your Own Risk: Criminalizing Asylum Seekers 87 
fails to comply with a decision of the International Court of Justice. 
Article 94(2) states that “[i]f any party to a case fails to perform the 
obligations [under an ICJ judgment], the other party may have 
recourse to the Security Council.”222 One might argue that here the 
parties to the U.N. Charter specifically agreed that the only mode of 
enforcement of an ICJ decision is through the U.N. Security Council. 
Considering the high regard parties have had for state sovereignty and 
the placement of Article 94(2) in the same article dealing with legal 
obligation of states to comply with ICJ judgments, such an 
interpretation is plausible.223 
Although the state parties usually leave the manner of 
enforcement to the individual states, the parties can agree to make a 
treaty provision non-self-executing. A clear example of this is the 
Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (“MLAT”) between the United States 
and Switzerland. The MLAT expressly states that no defendant shall 
be able to invoke the treaty to exclude evidence in United States 
courts.224 This is a narrow exception to the general rule that treaties 
are self-executing. 
On the other hand, one could argue that Article 94(2) of the 
U.N. Charter is not absolute. The subsection says that an ICJ 
judgment holder “may have recourse to the Security Council . . . .”225 
The subsection does not say that going to the Security Council is the 
only way for the judgment holder to enforce the ICJ judgment. Unlike 
the MLAT, the treaty language in Article 94 does not clearly make that 
article non-self-executing. 
Powerful states typically resist giving broad jurisdiction to 
international tribunals. Given the veto power over Security Council 
 
222.  U.N. Charter, art. 94, ¶ 2 (emphasis added). 
223.  One distinguished commentator analyzed Article 94(2) as essentially 
amounting to a directive to the United States to “make best efforts” to comply. “The 
Medellín opinion indicates that the Court concluded that ICJ judgments are not 
directly enforceable in the courts because Article 94, in effect, obligates the United 
States to do its best to comply with ICJ judgments. . . . This reading is further 
supported by the Court’s interpretation of Article 94(2), in conjunction with the fact 
that the United States retained a veto in the Security Council, as establishing that 
the United States had retained ‘the option of noncompliance.’” Vazquez, supra note 
218, at 661. Professor Vazquez argues that Medellín should be so interpreted by 
lower courts. Id. 
224.  McDonnell, supra note 188, at 1428 (quoting Cardenas v. Smith, 733 
F.2d 909, 918 (D.C. Cir 1984) (“This Treaty shall not give rise to a right on the part 
of any person to take any action in the United States to suppress or exclude any 
evidence . . . .”). 
225.  U.N. Charter, art. 94, ¶ 2. 
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resolutions held by the five permanent members, drafting Article 94(2) 
presumably helped persuade these states—China, France, the United 
Kingdom, the then-U.S.S.R., and the U.S (and perhaps others)—to 
accept the establishment of the International Court of Justice. 
Although imperfect, this argument forms a stronger basis for the 
Medellín Court’s decision than does misinterpreting the self-executing 
treaty doctrine. 
Medellín exemplifies the truism that hard cases make bad law. 
It was a hard case because the petitioners were not asking the United 
States Supreme Court to affirm an international commercial 
arbitration or to recognize a foreign court’s judgment against a private 
party. Rather, they were asking the most powerful national court on 
the planet to accede to an order issued by the UN’s World Court against 
the United States itself, on an issue related to the controversial 
question of capital punishment. 
B. Weak Precedent Asserting the Refugee Convention and 
Protocol are Non-Self-Executing 
A few federal courts of appeal have found the 1968 Refugee 
Protocol non-self-executing. These courts, however, ruled so 
summarily. At best, one can describe their analysis as conclusory.226 
The Second Circuit, in a one-page 1973 per curiam decision, Ming v. 
Marks, adopted the district court’s opinion, which relied heavily on 
some statements in the Senate while debating giving its advice and 
consent to the Protocol. The district court seemed to cite these 
statements for the proposition that our immigration laws and 
regulations already comported with the 1967 Protocol.227 However, the 
 
226.  See, e.g., Al-Fara v. Gonzales, 404 F.3d 733, 743 (3d Cir. 2005); Cuban 
American Bar Ass’n, Inc. v. Christopher, 43 F.3d 1412, 1425 n.13 (11th Cir. 1995) 
(asserting that the protocol is not self-executing without any additional legal 
analysis). 
227.  Ming v. Marks, 367 F. Supp. 673, 677 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), aff’d on opinion 
below, 505 F.2d 1170, 1172 (2d Cir. 1974) (per curiam). There, the district court 
quoted the following from the Senate’s hearing on the Protocol: 
SENATOR [JOHN] SPARKMAN. Is there anything in here that 
conflicts with our existing immigration laws? 
MR. DAWSON. I would answer that briefly and then ask Mrs. 
McDowell [of the Treaty Section, Office of the Legal Advisor, 
Department of State] to give a more authoritative answer. I 
would say that Article 32 which prohibits the expulsion of a 
refugee who is lawfully in this country to any country except on 
grounds of national security or public order would pose certain 
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per curiam decision itself, while ostensibly adopting the district court’s 
opinion, seems to have applied the 1951 Refugee Convention through 
the 1967 Protocol as the rule of decision.228 
The district court opinion upon which the Second Circuit 
opinion and other Circuit opinions are ultimately based is unsound.229 
First, the Ming district court did not undertake an examination to 
determine if the treaty language created a legal obligation at all, and 
thus relied on an unfounded assumption.230 Second, the Supreme Court 
in I.N.S. v. Stevic adopted a far more nuanced analysis of the 1967 
Protocol than did the district court in Ming.231 The Court in Stevic 
noted that there was a significant difference between the Protocol and 
United States domestic law at that time: 
The most significant difference was that Article 33 gave 
the refugee an entitlement to avoid deportation to a 
country in which his life or freedom would be 
threatened, whereas domestic law merely provided the 
Attorney General with discretion to grant withholding 
of deportation on grounds of persecution. The Attorney 
General, however, could naturally accommodate the 
Protocol simply by exercising his discretion to grant 
such relief in each case in which the required showing 
was made, and hence no amendment of the existing 
statutory language was necessary. 232 
The Court essentially interpreted the 1967 Protocol and Article 
33 of the Refugee Convention to mandate the Attorney General to 
exercise his or her discretion in favor of the asylum applicant “in each 
 
questions in connection with section 241 of our Immigration and 
Nationality Act, which states the deportation provisions. But I 
do not believe it would be in conflict. We believe most of those 
grounds in 241 are grounds which can be properly construed as 
having the basis of national security or public order, and we also 
are assured that those relatively limited cases which perhaps 
could not be so construed could be dealt with by the Attorney 
General without the enactment of any further legislation . . . . 
Id. at 678 (emphasis added). 
228.  Ming v. Marks, 505 F.2d 1170, 1172 (2d Cir. 1974). Unfortunately, the 
Second Circuit adopted a strained interpretation of Convention Articles 31 and 32. 
229.  In Bertrand v. Sava, 684 F.2d 204, 218–19 (2d Cir. 1982), the Second 
Circuit again incorrectly relied on Ming for the proposition that the Protocol and 
the Convention were non-self-executing on the ground that the Refugee Act of 1980 
implemented the Protocol. 
230.  Ming, 367 F. Supp. at 678. 
231.  I.N.S. v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 428 n.22 (1984). 
232.  I.N.S. v. Stevic, 467 U.S. at 428 n.22 (emphasis added). 
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case in which the required showing [under the Protocol and 
Convention] was made.”233 So what was once the generally unfettered 
discretion of the Attorney General was now, because of the Protocol, an 
almost compelled exercise of discretion to grant withholding of 
deportation if the immigrant showed that he or she suffered a threat 
of persecution within the meaning of Article 33 of the 1951 Refugee 
Convention.234 By effectively limiting the Attorney General’s exercise 
of discretion, Article 33 of the Refugee Convention (made binding in 
the United States by the 1967 Protocol) had become the rule of 
decision.235 
Ironically, the colloquy in the Senate quoted by the Ming 
district court likewise supports this proposition. Responding to Senator 
John Sparkman’s question, Lawrence Dawson, a State Department 
official, testified, “We also are assured that those relatively limited 
cases which perhaps could not be so construed [where then-current 
immigration law failed to comport with the 1967 Protocol] could be 
dealt with by the Attorney General without the enactment of any further 
legislation . . . .”236 In that same colloquy, another State Department 
official noted two additional ways in which the then-current 
immigration law and regulations differed from the requirements of the 
Protocol: 
There are two categories, only two, that we think are 
not covered, and these are the deportation of an alien 
for reasons of mental illness or deficiency, where he has 
become institutionalized for that reason, or deportation 
on grounds that he has become a public charge. These 
two areas would not be enforced against refugees if the 
protocol were in force.237 
Fundamentally, the testimony supports the Stevic Court’s 
proposition that the Protocol limits Executive discretion over matters 
the Protocol prescribes. Specifically, the testimony indicates that the 
Attorney General has virtually no choice but to comport with the 1967 
Protocol and the relevant provisions of the 1951 Refugee Convention. 
 
233.  Id. at 428. 
234.  See id. 
235.  See Vazquez, supra note 208, at 51 (“[T]he acknowledgement that no 
amendment of the statute was required must have been a recognition that Article 
33 had domestic legal force and superseded the inconsistent provisions of the 
immigration law.”). 
236.  Ming v. Marks, 367 F. Supp. 673, 679 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (quoting S. Rep. 
No. 14 at 8). 
237.  Id. 
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Moreover, had the Senate intended to make the 1967 Protocol 
non-self-executing, it could have attached a reservation, 
understanding or declaration so saying, during the advise-and-consent 
process of ratification of the Protocol. The Senate never attached such 
a reservation, understanding, or declaration.238 In his memorandum 
submitting the 1967 Protocol to the Senate, the President never 
suggested that the Protocol should be considered non-self-executing. 
To the contrary, the President’s memorandum stated, “The Protocol 
constitutes a comprehensive Bill of Rights for refugees fleeing their 
country because of persecution on account of their political views, race, 
religion, nationality, or social ties.”239 
One might argue that the Refugee Act of 1980 suggests that 
Congress believed that the 1967 Protocol was non-self-executing and 
that implementing legislation was required. The Senate Committee 
Report on the bill that later became the Refugee Act notes, however, 
that the bill “improves and clarifies” asylum procedures, but continues 
the substantive standards of the 1967 Protocol and the relevant 1951 
Refugee Convention articles: 
[T]he bill establishes an asylum provision in the 
Immigration and Nationality Act for the first time by 
improving and clarifying the procedures for 
 
238 .  The Senate attached reservations to Articles 24 and 29 of the 
Convention, but made no reservation or understanding applicable here. See 
Declarations and Reservations to the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, UN 
TREATY SERVICE, https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY& 
mtdsg_no=V-5&chapter=5&clang=_en#EndDec [https://perma.cc/5KZS-E67R]. 
The Senate has attached “non-self-executing” clauses in “understandings or 
declarations” to the Convention against Torture, the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights, and the Convention for the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination. See United States Reservations, Understandings, and Declarations 
to Human Rights Treaties, UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA LIBRARY, http://hrlibrary. 
umn.edu/usdocs/usres.html [https://perma.cc/2L68-6R4F]. Some commentators 
question whether including a non-self-executing clause in a reservation, 
understanding, and declaration document should have any legal effect given the 
command of the Supremacy Clause that ‘all treaties’ are the supreme law of the 
land. See, e.g., Jordan Paust, Avoiding “Fraudulent” Executive Policy: Analysis of 
Non-Self-Execution of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 42 DEPAUL L. 
REV. 1257, 1264–68 (1993) (detailing the legal and policy rationale for finding these 
clauses to be without legal effect). Because there is no such clause in the Protocol, 
that issue is inapplicable here. 
239.  Special Message to the Senate Transmitting the Protocol Relating to 
the Status of Refugees, 1 PUB. PAPERS 868 (Aug. 1, 1968); see also Vazquez, supra 
note 208, at 58 (quoting same language). The authors are indebted to Professor 
Vazquez for his deep and penetrating scholarship on these issues. 
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determining asylum claims filed by aliens who are 
physically present in the United States. The 
substantive standard is not changed; asylum will 
continue to be granted only to those who qualify under 
the terms of the United Nations Protocol Relating to the 
Status of Refugees, to which the United States acceded 
in November 1969.240 
Professor Carlos Manuel Vazquez further refutes that 
argument: 
As the House Judiciary Committee Report states, and 
as the Supreme Court made clear in Stevic, this change 
[the Refugee Act of 1980] was made ‘for the sake of 
clarity.’ . . . The amendment to the statute, which 
removed the discretion that the statute appeared to 
give the Attorney General, could have “clarified” 
existing law only if Article 33 itself served to limit the 
discretion that the Attorney General enjoyed before 
accession to the Protocol.241 
Although Stevic concerns the non-refoulement obligation under 
Article 33 of the Convention, the same reasoning applies to Article 31 
of the Convention. 242  Article 31 is equally definite, containing 
mandatory language and stated in the negative.243 Because Article 31 
as well as Article 33 is self-executing, and for all the reasons set forth 
above, federal courts should enjoin the Administration from 
prosecuting asylum-seekers who make out a prima facie asylum case 
and who satisfy Article 31 until their asylum claims are adjudicated. 
On the same basis, federal courts should enjoin the Administration 
from indefinitely detaining asylum-seekers who likewise make out a 
prima facie asylum case and who satisfy Article 31. 
 
240.  S. REP. NO. 96-256, at 9 (1979) (emphasis added). 
241.  Vazquez, supra note 208, at 52. See also I.N.S. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 
U.S. 421, 428 n.8 (1987) (emphasis added) (“While the Protocol constrained the 
Attorney General with respect to § 243(h) (withholding of deportation) between 1968 
and 1980, the Protocol does not require the granting of asylum to anyone, and hence 
does not subject the Attorney General to a similar constraint with respect to his 
discretion under § 208(a).”). 
242.  Articles 3 and 4 of the Convention prohibiting discrimination on the 
basis of race, religion, and national origin are likewise more than adequately 
definite. 
243.  For similar reasons, Article 3 of the Refugee Convention is likewise self-
executing: “The Contracting States shall apply the provisions of this Convention to 
refugees without discrimination as to race, religion or country of origin.” 1951 
Refugee Convention, supra note 17, art. 3. 
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C. Interpreting Federal Statutes to Comply with International 
Refugee Law and International Human Rights Law 
The Supreme Court has long held that international law is 
“part of our law.” 244  Aside from directly enforcing the Refugee 
Convention, federal courts are generally obligated to interpret federal 
statutes to avoid violating international law. Chief Justice John 
Marshall declared in Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy245 that a 
statute “ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any 
other possible construction remains.”246 The American Law Institute’s 
Restatement (Fourth) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States 
follows this canon: “Where fairly possible, courts in the United States 
construe federal statutes to avoid conflict with international law 
governing jurisdiction to prescribe.” 247  Courts should find a later 
federal statute to supersede “an earlier rule of international law or a 
provision of an international agreement as law of the United States if 
the purpose of the act to supersede the earlier rule or provision is clear 
or if the act and the earlier rule or provision cannot be fairly 
reconciled.”248 
Here there is little, if any, evidence of a Congressional purpose 
for the illegal entry statute to supersede the Refugee Convention or the 
 
244.  Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163 (1895) (“International law, in its 
widest and most comprehensive sense . . . is part of our law, and must be 
ascertained and administered by the courts of justice as often as such questions are 
presented in litigation . . . duly submitted to their determination.”); see Paquete 
Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900). 
245.  6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804). 
246.  Id. 
247.  RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES, § 406 (AM. LAW INST. 2018); see also Spector v. Norwegian Cruise Line Ltd., 
545 U.S. 119, 136 (2005) (“If . . . [the statute] were not to take conflicts with 
international law into account, it would lead to [an] anomalous result. . . . [that] 
Congress could not have intended. . . ."); Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25, 32 (1982) 
(applying this “maxim of statutory construction” to employment law on military 
bases); McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10, 
21–22 (1963) (requiring clear congressional intent before sanctioning a potential 
conflict with international law); Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503, 508–11 (1947) 
(distinguishing the ability for statutes to conflict with international law from the 
judicial assumption that they do not); Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102, 118–20 
(1933) (appealing to this assumption when a statute’s legislative history makes no 
reference to a particular treaty). 
248.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES, § 115(1)(a) (AM. LAW INST. 1987) (emphasis added). 
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Refugee Protocol.249 The undisputed purpose of the Refugee Act of 1980 
was to bring U.S. law into harmony with international refugee law: 
If one thing is clear from the legislative history of the 
new definition of ‘refugee,’ and indeed the entire 1980 
Act, it is that one of Congress’ primary purposes was to 
bring United States refugee law into conformance with 
the 1967 United Nations Protocol Relating to the 
Status of Refugees [and hence with the Refugee 
Convention of 1951]. . . .250 
As discussed above, Article 31 of the Refugee Convention 
generally prohibits the criminal prosecution of refugees for illegal 
entry or presence. The current Justice Department has adopted a 
policy of criminally prosecuting for illegal entry virtually everyone 
suspected of crossing the border without inspection. 251  The Justice 
Department and the Department of Homeland Security have done 
little to ensure that valid asylum-seekers are protected from such 
prosecutions. Consequently, the United States is violating this article 
of the Convention, and thereby transgressing an international law 
obligation. 
The Refugee Convention does permit some initial 
administrative detention of bona fide asylum-seekers.252 However, the 
States Parties Executive Committee of the U.N. High Commissioner of 
Refugees, charged with monitoring compliance with the Convention, 
notes detention’s limits: 
[D]etention should normally be avoided. If necessary, 
detention may be resorted to only on grounds 
prescribed by law to verify identity; to determine the 
elements on which the claim to refugee status or 
asylum is based; to deal with cases where refugees or 
asylum-seekers have destroyed their travel and/or 
identity documents or have used fraudulent documents 
in order to mislead the authorities of the State in which 
they intend to claim asylum; or to protect national 
security or public order. . . .253 
 
249.  See H.R. REP. NO. 104-828 (1996) (Conf. Rep.). 
250.  I.N.S. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 436 (1987) (emphasis added). 
The United States acceded to the Protocol in 1968. Protocol Relating to the Status 
of Refugees, Feb. 9, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, T.I.A.S. No. 6577. 
251.  See supra notes 34–50 and accompanying text. 
252.  Id. 
253 .  Executive Committee of the High Commissioner of Refugees, 
Conclusions No. 41 (XXXVII) Detention of refugees and asylum-seekers ¶ b, 1986 
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There is considerable authority for the proposition, however, 
that prolonged administrative detention of refugees and bona fide 
asylum-seekers violates international law.254 
Nothing in the legislative history of the criminal statute 
penalizing illegal entry suggests that either the Congress or the 
President were made aware that prosecuting refugees for illegal entry 
or presence in the United States violated international law.255 Nothing 
in the Congressional Record, Committee Reports, or other evidence of 
legislative history shows that Congress intended to abrogate Article 31 
of the Refugee Protocol. Absent clear congressional intention to 
abrogate an international law obligation, a court should “fairly 
reconcile” the treaty and the congressional statute to construe them as 
consistent with one another to the extent possible. 256 Thus, federal 
courts should dismiss without prejudice any charges against asylum-
seekers who have passed fair credible fear interviews—that is, asylum-
seekers who have demonstrated a prima facie case of asylum eligibility, 
for example with a finding of credible fear. Should the asylum-seeker 
ultimately be unsuccessful in the pursuit of asylum, then the criminal 
charges can be reinstated against him or her.257 
 
Y.B. on Hum. Rts. 204, U.N. Sales No. E.91.XIV.4 (1986). But see Anita Sinha, 
Defining Detention: The Intervention of the European Court of Human Rights in the 
Detention of Involuntary Migrants, 50 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 176, 220–26 
(2019) (noting the increased use of detention of “involuntary migrants” in Europe 
and the unwillingness of the European Court of Human Rights to stop at least 
short-term detention). 
254.  See, e.g., Report of the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, supra note 129, ¶¶ 25–28 
(emphasizing the compounding effect of unnecessary, disproportionate, and 
prolonged detention). Aside from detention itself are the exacerbating factors of 
conditions in detention, deliberate family separation, and interference with the 
right to counsel. 
255.  See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 104–828 (1996) (Conf. Rep.) (showing that the 
legislative history lacks a reference to any intention to supersede or conflict with 
international law). 
256.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES, supra note 248, § 115(1)(a). 
257.  That is not to say the criminal prosecution of first-time unauthorized 
entrants is either necessary or fair. The United States had more than a century of 
open borders. Criminal prosecution of immigrants entering illegally was only 
adopted in 1929. See Kelly Lytle Hernandez, How Crossing the US-Mexico Border 
Became a Crime, CONVERSATION (Apr. 30, 2017), http://theconversation. 
com/how-crossing-the-us-mexico-border-became-a-crime-74604 [https://perma.cc/ 
4H6S-8ADK]. Hernandez further notes: 
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In any event, criminal prosecution of migrants for “improper 
entry,” whether they are eligible or ineligible for asylum, is generally 
neither necessary nor compatible with international human rights law. 
Immigration into the United States was essentially unrestricted until 
1875.258 Prosecution of individuals for what is largely a status offense 
is disfavored and often unconstitutional. 259  Before the current 
Administration, few first-time unauthorized entrants were ever 
prosecuted for such entry. Prosecuting individuals who are fleeing 
persecution not only violates international law, but also elemental 
justice. 
CONCLUSION 
In the past two decades, a series of cataclysmic events has 
created a “perfect storm” resulting in social and economic upheaval 
that has led millions of people to cross international borders. These 
events include the 9/11 attacks, the widespread incidence of 
insurgencies, terroristic occupation and devastation of societies, and 
the emergence of brutal, corrupt, autocratic dictatorships, often 
theocratic or grounded in ethnic division. Violent conflict and outright 
civil and transnational wars have broken out in Iraq, Afghanistan, 
Syria, Libya, Nigeria, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Yemen, the 
Philippines, Kashmir, Ukraine and the Crimea, Myanmar, Haiti, 
Sudan and South Sudan, Somalia and Somaliland, El Salvador, 
Honduras, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Colombia, and now Venezuela and 
 
It was not always a crime to enter the United States without 
authorization. In fact, for most of American history, immigrants 
could enter the United States without official permission and not 
fear criminal prosecution by the federal government. . . . With 
few exceptions, prosecutions for unlawful entry and reentry 
remained low until 2005. . . . By 2015, prosecutions for unlawful 
entry and reentry accounted for 49 percent of all federal 
prosecutions and the federal government had spent at least U.S. 
$7 billion to lock up unlawful border crossers. 
Id. 
258.  Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 761 (1972) (noting that “[t]he Act 
of March 3, 1875, 18 Stat. 477, barred convicts and prostitutes [and that] [s]even 
years later Congress passed the first general immigration statute. Act of Aug. 3, 
1882, 22 Stat. 214”). 
259.  See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962) (prosecution of 
defendant for “being an addict” violates due process and the Eighth Amendment). 
Here, the noncitizen is essentially prosecuted for “being a foreigner” and entering 
the United States without being inspected. 
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perhaps Brazil. Financial insecurity has spread throughout the 
international community with the devastating worldwide economic 
recession/depression of 2008, the revolutionary technological advances 
in communication and resulting digitization and robotic automation of 
the workplace and world economies displacing hundreds of thousands, 
if not millions of workers; climate change pushing multitudes in the 
Global South from ruined farms and villages; and the rise of civil strife 
in many other parts of the world, but again especially in the Global 
South. In many receiving countries, this perfect storm has 
simultaneously fueled virulently intense hostility, often tinged with 
violence, toward immigrants, even between communities that have 
peacefully cohabited for generations.260 
Instead of standing as a bulwark against these pressures, 
which ultimately amount to fearing and blaming the foreigner—the 
“other”—the United States has not merely given into them but has 
exacerbated and exploited them for political gain. Since the end of 
World War II, the United States has generally seen itself as the 
undisputed world leader in human rights, known, among other things, 
for one of the most generous refugee programs in the world. A “Nation 
of Immigrants,” as this country has boasted for at least a century (until 
last year when USCIS removed that sobriquet from its Mission 
Statement), 261  the United States has taken full advantage of the 
 
260.  See Staff of Reuters, with Notable Contributions from Wa Lone and 
Kyaw Soe Oo, THE PULITZER PRIZES, https://www.pulitzer.org/winners/staff-
reuters-notable-contributions-wa-lone-and-kyaw-soe-oo [https://perma.cc/5YVW-
N7KE] (excerpt from Pulitzer citation: “For expertly exposing the military units 
and Buddhist villagers responsible for the systematic expulsion and murder of 
Rohingya Muslims from Myanmar, courageous coverage that landed its reporters 
in prison.”); Facing Myanmar’s Brutal Persecution, Rohingya Refugees Still Can’t 
Return Home, PBS NEWS HOUR (Apr. 24, 2019), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/ 
show/facing-myanmars-brutal-persecution-rohingya-refugees-still-cant-return-
home [https://perma.cc/5Z2M-JU34]; Myanmar, THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS 
GROUP (Mar. 2019), https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-east-asia/myanmar 
[https://perma.cc/LG6V-TMDA]. 
261 .  Abigail Hauslohner, Nation of Immigrants? According to U.S. 
Citizenship and Immigration Services, Not So Much, WASH. POST (Feb. 22, 2018), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2018/02/22/nation-of-
immigrants-according-to-u-s-customs-and-immigration-services-not-so-much/ (on 
file with the Columbia Human Rights Law Review). Compare the original Mission 
Statement with the update. The original version was: 
USCIS secures America’s promise as a nation of immigrants by 
providing accurate and useful information to our customers, 
granting immigration and citizenship benefits, promoting an 
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remarkable contributions of successive waves of newcomers who 
continually reinvigorate both our economy and our democracy. The 
current Administration has turned its back on these ideals, using its 
vast discretionary power over immigrants to harshly enforce and often 
violate our immigration laws, undermining American values and 
staining our country’s international reputation. 
Federal courts, however, have both the authority and the 
responsibility to enforce the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967 
Refugee Protocol as well as international human rights norms to 
protect asylum-seekers from criminal prosecution and from prolonged 
immigration detention. The Framers of the United States Constitution 
and its key amendments envisioned that federal courts would apply 
treaties as the rule of decision to protect foreigners and would serve as 
a check on an Executive that tramples on individual rights, 
particularly the rights of a vulnerable minority. To fulfill their 
constitutional obligations, federal courts must live up to that vision 
and stand up against a rogue Administration tilting towards 
authoritarianism and willfully disregarding the rule of law—both 
domestic and international. 
 
awareness and understanding of citizenship, and ensuring the 
integrity of our immigration system. 
Id. (emphasis added). The new version is: 
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services administers the 
nation’s lawful immigration system, safeguarding its integrity 
and promise by efficiently and fairly adjudicating requests for 
immigration benefits while protecting Americans, securing the 
homeland, and honoring our values. 
Id. 
